April 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 174992 : April 17, 2007] THE LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, AND ELEAZAR P. QUINTO<BR><BR>[G.R. NO. 175546]<BR><BR>JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, AND ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, AS THE DULY ELECTED OFFICERS OF THE LIBERAL PARTY V. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FRANKLIN M. DRILON :
[G.R. No. 174992 : April 17, 2007]
THE LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, AND ELEAZAR P. QUINTO<BR><BR>[G.R. NO. 175546]<BR><BR>JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, AND ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, AS THE DULY ELECTED OFFICERS OF THE LIBERAL PARTY V. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FRANKLIN M. DRILON
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated April 17, 2007.
G.R. No. 174992 (THE LIBERAL PARTY, represented by its President, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO) and G.R. No. 175546 (JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, as the duly elected officers of the Liberal Party v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANKLIN M. DRILON)
The Court considered and acted on the following issues:
The individual Opinions of the Justices are attached to this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Senator Franklin M. Drilon in G.R. No. 174992 is GRANTED and the petition of Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. in G.R. No. 175546 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
J. Nachura, no part.
G.R. No. 174992 (THE LIBERAL PARTY, represented by its President, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO) and G.R. No. 175546 (JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, ROLANDO G. ANDAYA, JR., ERIC D. SINGSON, HARLIN C. ABAYON, RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, DANTON Q. BUESER, DANILO E. SUAREZ, FLORENCIO T. MIRAFLORES, SOLOMON R. CHUANGLAO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, RIGOBERTO D. TIGLAO, and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, as the duly elected officers of the Liberal Party v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANKLIN M. DRILON)
The Court considered and acted on the following issues:
On the first issue, the Court voted 7-6 that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the Drilon petition. On the second issue, the Court voted 9-5 that the Daza-Drilon amendments were validly ratified. In view of the voting on the second issue, the third issue has become academic.
- Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the Drilon petition in COMELEC Case SPP No. 06-002;
- Whether the Daza-Drilon amendments to the Salonga Liberal Party Constitution were validly ratified; and
- Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to order the Liberal Party to hold the election of its officers.
The individual Opinions of the Justices are attached to this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Senator Franklin M. Drilon in G.R. No. 174992 is GRANTED and the petition of Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. in G.R. No. 175546 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
J. Nachura, no part.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) FELIPA BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court
purely political issue which is non-justiciable.
In its Petition before the COMELEC, the Drilon faction stated that this case "involves an intra-party and leadership dispute."[4] The Drilon faction sought "the nullification of the election of respondents made during the romp and illegal elections"[5] held on 2 March 2006.
In its Answer to the Petition, the Atienza faction declared that the National Assembly "had chosen to strip him (Drilon) of his post and elect another one in his stead."[6] The Atienza faction explained its reason for stripping Drilon of his post:
In its Reply before the COMELEC, the Drilon faction justified Drilon's announcement of withdrawal of support to President Arroyo by claiming that Liberal Party leaders, in a "party activity" held on 8 July 2005 at Club Filipino, voted for withdrawal of support, as follows:
Seven of the Atienza faction's leading members, who are respondents in this case, took part in the voting, as follows: Michael Defensor for "Impeachment," Rolando Andaya, Jr., for "Impeachment RGA," Federico Sandoval, for "Support with Institutional Change," Danton Bueser, for "Appeal for leave of Absence," Eduardo Nachura, for "Impeachment," Danilo Suarez, for "Impeach, D. Suarez," and Solomon Chungalao, for "Move for impeachment."[10]
Whether the Drilon faction was right and the Atienza faction was wrong, or vice versa, in withdrawing political support to President Arroyo, is not a justiciable issue. This is purely a political issue which involves no legally demandable or enforceable right. The COMELEC or this Court cannot decide this case without upholding the purely political position taken by either faction. Both factions point to the same root cause of this intra-party dispute - the choice of the party's political alliance with the President and its consequences on the party leadership.
Neither faction can claim that its political position is protected by law. Refusing to resolve this intra-party dispute does not deprive any person or faction of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The COMELEC or this Court has no legal duty or discretion to decide purely political disputes between contending party factions. The Drilon faction cannot ask the COMELEC or this Court to protect its decision to withdraw political support to the President. Neither can the Atienza faction seek the COMELEC or this Court's assistance to enforce its political decision to support the President.
The COMELEC or this Court must not wade into the murky waters of internal party politics. The COMELEC or this Court has neither power nor right to decide the propriety of political alignments within or among political parties. The COMELEC or this Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the contending political factions on whether it was correct to withdraw political support to the President.
The COMELEC's lack of jurisdiction to decide the validity
of conflicting party constitutions precludes it from
determining the party's legitimate leaders.
In this case, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine the legitimate president of the Liberal Party because this determination depends on the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments[11] to the Salonga constitution.[12] Whether the party members who are authorized to amend the Liberal Party constitution have validly ratified the Daza-Drilon amendments is an issue outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction is to regulate elections to public office and to register political parties. If a party's constitution advocates unlawful means to achieve the party's platform, the COMELEC can refuse to register the party. Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution states:
The COMELEC cannot refuse to register a party whose constitution does not violate Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Consequently, the COMELEC cannot inquire into the validity of amendments to a party constitution that does not violate Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution. No law authorizes the COMELEC to declare a party constitution valid, void or ineffective. The only authority of the COMELEC is to register or refuse to register a political party.
A party constitution can be amended by less than a majority of the party's members if the party constitution so provides. A party constitution can also be amended only by party members holding elective public office if the party constitution so provides. There is no one person, one vote in the adoption or amendment of constitutions of political parties. The adoption and amendment of a party constitution is purely an internal party matter, beyond the jurisdiction of the COMELEC insofar as it does not violate Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
A political party enjoys all the freedom to adopt any political platform in its party constitution, and to amend the same. The party constitution embodies the basic political ideology or plan of government of a political party. A free and open party system precludes a censor like the COMELEC from passing upon the validity of a party's political constitution, or the validity of its amendments. To allow the COMELEC to pass upon the validity of a political party's constitution, or its amendments, is to enthrone the COMELEC as the arbiter of political thought in this country. A COMELEC with such power is anathema to a free and open party system, and even a grave threat to our democracy.
If a free and open party system is to have any meaning at all, a political party must be free to adopt any party constitution that it wants without any vetting or approval from any government agency. The only limitation is Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, if the party wants to register with the COMELEC. Even then, the COMELEC can only refuse to register the political party, and cannot declare void or invalid the party's political constitution.
The Constitution mandates the COMELEC to regulate the conduct of elections to public office to insure free, orderly and honest elections. The Constitution does not empower the COMELEC to decide the validity of a political party's constitution which is the basic document that lays down the party's political ideas, beliefs and doctrines. This Court should be wary of granting the COMELEC with extraordinary and boundless "wherewithal powers" that are nowhere found in the Constitution.
Indeed, any claim to extraordinary "wherewithal powers" by the COMELEC is suspect and dubious if such alleged powers are not necessary to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office. The COMELEC does not even make any assertion that the determination of the validity of a political party's constitution is necessary to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office.
In this case, whether the legitimate Liberal Party president is Drilon or Atienza depends on whether the Daza-Drilon amendments have validly amended the Salonga constitution. To identify the party leaders, the COMELEC must first determine the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments. However, such determination is outside the competence of the COMELEC because this issue is purely an internal party matter.
The contending factions within the Liberal Party - the Drilon and Atienza factions - each carry substantial support within the party. Neither faction can be dismissed as a nuisance or minor recalcitrant group with no semblance of legitimate claim to party leadership. Drilon himself is acknowledged by the Atienza faction as the hold-over President of the party. Atienza is recognized by the Drilon faction as the Chairman of the party, at least before the intra-party dispute. The COMELEC En Banc describes the intra-party leadership dispute between the two factions as follows:
In the same manner, the COMELEC in this case should have refused to recognize either the Drilon or the Atienza faction until both factions have settled, through internal party processes, the question on who should represent the entire party. As in Palmares, the price of intra-party leadership dispute is non-recognition by the COMELEC of any contending faction until the leadership struggle is internally resolved within the party itself.
This case is different from Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. Commission on Elections[16] where there was no dispute on the party constitution or on the legitimacy of the incumbent party officers. In Laban, no one claimed a right to hold a party office occupied by another. The issue in Laban was who among the incumbent officers - the Chairman or the Secretary General - could sign certificates of candidacy of the official party candidates. The COMELEC could resolve the issue by simply applying the provisions of the Laban constitution which no one disputed. Thus, in Laban, this Court declared:
No law authorizes the COMELEC to
regulate elections of political parties.
As admitted by the Assistant Solicitor General during the oral argument, a political party is a "private organization."[19] Election to a party position is election to a private office. The COMELEC's jurisdiction applies only to elections to public office. No law authorizes the COMELEC to order and supervise internal elections of political parties. The COMELEC cannot order party elections to resolve intra-party disputes, such as conflicting political alignments espoused by opposing factions within the party.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, refer to the enforcement and administration of laws relating to the conduct of elections to public office to ensure free, orderly and honest elections. This is clear from Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides:
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C mentions election of regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay officials, clearly referring to election to public office. Section 2(3) empowers the COMELEC to decide "all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters." Section 2(3) can only refer to election to public office because of the specification of polling places, election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. Section 2(3) cannot conceivably refer to election to private office.
Section 2(4) can only refer to election to public office since it refers to the COMELEC's power to deputize the Armed Forces to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections." Section 2(5) refers to the power of the COMELEC to register political parties but does not mention any power of the COMELEC to regulate political parties. Section 2(6) refers to election to public office, not to private office, because it empowers the COMELEC to prosecute "violations of election laws." Section 2(7) can only refer to election to public office, not to private office, because it speaks of "election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies."
Section 2(8) can only refer to election to public office, not to private office, because it speaks of removal by the President of deputized officials and employees for violation of orders of the COMELEC. Section 2(9) cannot refer to election to private office because it speaks of a report to the President and to Congress on the conduct of an "election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall."
In short, all the powers and functions of the COMELEC under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution refer to electoral activities requiring the vote of the public electorate or registered voters. Hence, insofar as the conduct of elections is concerned, the COMELEC's powers and functions extend only to election to public office, excluding election to private office. By no stretch of the imagination can any of these powers and functions apply to election to private office.
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code likewise limits the powers and functions of the COMELEC to election to public office. Section 52 provides:
First, a free election where all citizens of voting age are free to vote under the principle of one person, one vote can only refer to election to public office. Second, insuring orderly elections, in conjunction with the power of the COMELEC to deputize the Armed Forces, can only refer to election to public office. Third, assuming for the sake of argument that the COMELEC has the power to regulate election to private office and the issues in this case are justiciable, the COMELEC will not have the exclusive power required in Section 52. Jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies, including "election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations,"[20] belongs to the regional trial courts. A political party may even incorporate and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This will subject the political party to some measure of regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, including compelling the political party to hold meetings.[21]
The COMELEC cannot regulate internal affairs
of political parties in the absence of a law.
No law grants the COMELEC power to regulate internal affairs of political parties. The COMELEC has no duty or power to insure party harmony, or to promote unity of political thought within a party. There is no state interest in preventing dissension or factionalism within a political party, or even preventing the self-destruction of a party. Such dissension and factionalism within, or self-destruction of, a political party is part of our free and open party system. It is a consequence of the freedom of association, which necessarily includes the freedom to dissent and even to disassociate. Only when the actions of the political parties adversely affect free, orderly and honest elections to public office can the COMELEC intervene in the internal affairs of political parties.
However, there must first be a law regulating such political party activities. In addition, the law must be narrowly drawn, that is, the curtailment of political activities is only to the extent necessary to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office. This is because any regulation of political activities derogates from the constitutional right of freedom of association and the right to a free and open party system. Thus, we have laws limiting election speding,[22] campaign period,[23] and political advertising.[24] All these laws, however, apply to elections to public office, not to internal party elections involving election to private office.
The leading case in the United States on freedom of association of political parties is Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee.[25] In Eu, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a California law that required the geographical rotation of party officers, limited their term of office, and banned the party from endorsing candidates in its primaries. The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Eu is instructive:
why it should intrude into internal party politics
under its existing powers to regulate political parties.
The COMELEC can regulate political parties pursuant to specific provisions of existing laws. However, the COMELEC has not shown that the holding of elections of the Liberal Party officers, and the COMELEC's supervision of such internal elections, is necessary to attain the purposes of these laws - such as the laws limiting election spending, campaign periods, and political advertising.
While the State has an interest to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office, it has also an interest to insure maximum freedom of association to political parties. Only when there is a compelling reason to regulate activities of political parties, so as to achieve free, orderly and honest elections to public office, can the State intrude into the activities of political parties. The Constitution mandates a "free and open party system" because the democracy envisioned in the Constitution requires a free and open party system.
Independent political parties are essential to our democracy. Without independent political parties, there will be no organized opposition to analyze and critique government actions and policies, or to provide alternative government actions and policies. Without independent political parties, the incumbent administration will control the electoral process and perpetuate itself in power. Political parties can only remain independent if they enjoy maximum freedom of association. This Court has a duty to safeguard the freedom of association of political parties, and to insure an open and free party system.
Atienza faction has conclusively admitted the validity of
the Daza-Drilon amendments because of judicial admissions.
In its Answer[27] before the COMELEC, the Atienza faction claimed that the Daza-Drilon amendments to the Salonga constitution were not validly ratified.[28] However, in the same Answer, the Atienza faction invoked four times the Daza-Drilon amendments as the "Party Constitution," and castigated Drilon for violating such "Party Constitution." The Atienza faction's Answer pleaded before the COMELEC, as follows:
The Atienza faction invoked the six Sections and three Articles "of the Party Constitution" without any qualification whatsoever. The Atienza faction accused Drilon of usurpation of power which "no doubt violates Section 6, Article I of the Party Constitution." The Atienza faction also accused Drilon of failing to convene the NECO in violation of "Section 30, Article V" of the same party constitution. The Atienza faction further accused Drilon of "re-channeling" party funds in violation of the full disclosure policy "required under the party constitution," citing "No. 3 Section 6, Article I of the party Constitution."
The Atienza faction faulted Drilon for failing to submit for the NECO's approval the appointment of Director-General Asis in violation of "Section 24, Article IV, and Section 28, Article V of the Party Constitution." The Atienza faction also invoked the approval by the NECO of any addition to its membership as required under "Section 27 (on "Composition") of the Party Constitution." All these Sections and Articles are found in the Daza-Drilon amendments, not in the Salonga constitution.
The invocation of six Sections and three Articles of the Daza-Drilon amendments in the Answer constitutes judicial admissions which are conclusive and binding[30] on the Atienza faction. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
The Atienza faction did not contradict its judicial admissions before the COMELEC where they were made. It did not also contradict these judicial admissions in its pleadings before this Court. Counsel for the Atienza faction explained for the first time these admissions during the oral argument only after being asked to read these admissions in the Answer, which counsel himself prepared.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Atienza faction explained that they "had invoked the same Constitution that they (Drilon faction) are using for the sake of telling them give us due process."[31] In short, the Atienza faction deliberately invoked the Daza-Drilon amendments not only to defend against the Drilon Petition, but also to seek positive relief from the COMELEC.
Clearly, the Atienza faction did not commit any palpable mistake, or even a simple mistake, in invoking the Daza-Drilon amendments. A palpable mistake is one where the act, word or deed is manifestly or obviously unintended. Here, the Atienza faction intentionally invoked the Daza-Drilon amendments to seek negative and positive reliefs from the COMELEC.
Besides, the repeated admissions in four paragraphs of the Answer, referring to six Sections and three Articles of the Daza-Drilon amendments, are not unintended acts or words. The language used in these admissions - castigating Drilon in harsh language for violating specific provisions of the party constitution, shows intentional and deliberate acts that clearly preclude palpable mistake. The Atienza faction even accused Drilon of misusing party funds in violation of Section 6(3), Article I of the Daza-Drilon amendments. This cannot constitute palpable mistake since this accusation could even constitute a criminal offense.
Another factor that precludes palpable mistake is that the invocation of the Daza-Drilon amendments in the Answer is consistent with Annexes "B" and "C" that the Atienza faction attached to its Answer. These are the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas Resolution and the Kalipi Council of Ladies Resolution which uniformly invoke "Section 28 of the Liberal Party Constitution" in calling "the Party President to convene the NECO x x x to finally resolve this issue x x x." Section 28 on the powers and functions of the NECO is not found in the Salonga constitution but in the Daza-Drilon amendments.
These judicial admissions in the Answer are conclusive and binding on the Atienza faction. Thus, the Atienza faction is deemed to have admitted the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments. However, even with such admission, the intra-party dispute on the party leadership remains. The undeniable fact is that the Atienza faction, which counts at least 13 members of the House of Representatives, does not recognize Drilon as the party leader.
In political parties, the choice of the party leaders is often not democratic. There is no one person, one vote in the election of party leaders. The party constitution may limit the electors of party leaders to party members holding elective public office. The party constitution may even allow the party member holding the highest elective public office to name the other party leaders. There is no legal infirmity in such undemocratic party governance.
The choice of party leaders is also a matter of hammering out alliances within the party, a process requiring political compromises among the contending factions. The COMELEC or this Court cannot intrude into this process, even as one faction, to secure what it cannot gain within the party's internal processes, may bring the dispute before the COMELEC or this Court. Neither the COMELEC nor this Court has the jurisdiction or competence to resolve such intra-party disputes.
Thus, the determination of party leaders - when and how to choose them - must be left to the internal processes of the party itself. This situation brings this case to Palmares, where this Court affirmed the COMELEC's refusal to recognize any of the contending factions until someone emerges from the party who can authoritatively claim to represent the entire party. In this case, as in Palmares, the non-recognition of any contending faction will not adversely affect the holding of free, orderly and honest elections to public office.
In summary, neither the COMELEC nor this Court has jurisdiction to resolve an intra-party dispute that is rooted on a purely political issue � in this case whether a party should continue its political alignment with the incumbent President of the Philippines. While the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of amendments to the constitution of a political party, the Atienza faction in this case has judicially admitted the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments. The COMELEC has also no jurisdiction to order and supervise the election of officers of a political party.
Accordingly, I vote to SET ASIDE COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 13 October 2006 in SPP No. 06-002.
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) FELIPA BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I vote to set aside COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 13 October 2006 in SPP No. 06-002. Due to judicial admissions, petitioners in G.R. No. 175546 have admitted the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments to the Salonga Liberal Party constitution.
First, neither the COMELEC nor this Court has jurisdiction over an intra-party dispute involving the Liberal Party's political alliance with the President of the Philippines. Second, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of amendments to the Liberal Party's constitution. Third, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to order and supervise the internal elections of the Liberal Party.
This case involves an examination of two competing state interests � the state interest to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office, and the state interest to insure maximum freedom of association to political parties. A democracy can exist only if the people freely choose those who govern them. It is thus essential to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office to preserve democracy in this country.
However, a democracy can thrive only if there are independent political parties. Without independent political parties, a nation becomes a one-party state � with the party in power as the sole political party. Such a situation, as the Assistant Solicitor General[1] admitted during the oral argument of this case, breeds a "totalitarian"[2] state. It is thus also essential to insure maximum freedom of association to political parties to preserve democracy in this country. Hence, in addition to the freedom of association clause[3] in the Bill of Rights guaranteed to all the people, Section 6, Article IX-C of the Constitution specifically prescribes a "free and open party system," as follows:
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article. (Emphasis supplied)Where does freedom of association of political parties end, and free, orderly and honest elections begin? When can the state curtail freedom of association of political parties to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office? Since the answer to these questions involve a calibrated balancing of competing interests, the answer ultimately depends on the facts of each case. However, a law may impinge on such freedom of association only to the extent necessary to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office. Such law must be narrowly drawn to serve the intended purpose.
This case raises the following issues:This is an intra-party dispute rooted in aI submit that the COMELEC has no such jurisdiction or power.
- Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the leadership issue of the Liberal Party in COMELEC En Banc Case SPP No. 06-002;
- Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of amendments to the constitution of the Liberal Party; and
- Whether the COMELEC has the power to order and supervise the election of party officers to resolve the leadership issue in the Liberal Party.
purely political issue which is non-justiciable.
In its Petition before the COMELEC, the Drilon faction stated that this case "involves an intra-party and leadership dispute."[4] The Drilon faction sought "the nullification of the election of respondents made during the romp and illegal elections"[5] held on 2 March 2006.
In its Answer to the Petition, the Atienza faction declared that the National Assembly "had chosen to strip him (Drilon) of his post and elect another one in his stead."[6] The Atienza faction explained its reason for stripping Drilon of his post:
The root of the present crisis gripping the Liberal Party can be traced from the July 8, 2005 unilateral announcement by Mr. Drilon and his motley assemblage that the Liberal Party is withdrawing support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.[7] (Italicization in original; boldfacing supplied)The Atienza faction stated that Drilon's announcement of withdrawal of support to President Arroyo "drove a deep wedge among party members."[8]
In its Reply before the COMELEC, the Drilon faction justified Drilon's announcement of withdrawal of support to President Arroyo by claiming that Liberal Party leaders, in a "party activity" held on 8 July 2005 at Club Filipino, voted for withdrawal of support, as follows:
| GMA Resign | 19 (votes) |
| Impeach GMA | 11 |
| Support GMA all the way | 0 |
| GMA Leave of Absence | 1 |
| Reaffirm GMA with Reforms | 1[9] |
Seven of the Atienza faction's leading members, who are respondents in this case, took part in the voting, as follows: Michael Defensor for "Impeachment," Rolando Andaya, Jr., for "Impeachment RGA," Federico Sandoval, for "Support with Institutional Change," Danton Bueser, for "Appeal for leave of Absence," Eduardo Nachura, for "Impeachment," Danilo Suarez, for "Impeach, D. Suarez," and Solomon Chungalao, for "Move for impeachment."[10]
Whether the Drilon faction was right and the Atienza faction was wrong, or vice versa, in withdrawing political support to President Arroyo, is not a justiciable issue. This is purely a political issue which involves no legally demandable or enforceable right. The COMELEC or this Court cannot decide this case without upholding the purely political position taken by either faction. Both factions point to the same root cause of this intra-party dispute - the choice of the party's political alliance with the President and its consequences on the party leadership.
Neither faction can claim that its political position is protected by law. Refusing to resolve this intra-party dispute does not deprive any person or faction of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The COMELEC or this Court has no legal duty or discretion to decide purely political disputes between contending party factions. The Drilon faction cannot ask the COMELEC or this Court to protect its decision to withdraw political support to the President. Neither can the Atienza faction seek the COMELEC or this Court's assistance to enforce its political decision to support the President.
The COMELEC or this Court must not wade into the murky waters of internal party politics. The COMELEC or this Court has neither power nor right to decide the propriety of political alignments within or among political parties. The COMELEC or this Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the contending political factions on whether it was correct to withdraw political support to the President.
The COMELEC's lack of jurisdiction to decide the validity
of conflicting party constitutions precludes it from
determining the party's legitimate leaders.
In this case, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine the legitimate president of the Liberal Party because this determination depends on the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments[11] to the Salonga constitution.[12] Whether the party members who are authorized to amend the Liberal Party constitution have validly ratified the Daza-Drilon amendments is an issue outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction is to regulate elections to public office and to register political parties. If a party's constitution advocates unlawful means to achieve the party's platform, the COMELEC can refuse to register the party. Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:However, the Constitution does not empower the COMELEC to declare valid, void or ineffective a party constitution that violates Section 2, Article IX-C. Indeed, the mere ideological advocacy of regime change through violence, without any accompanying unlawful overt act or intent to incite to lawless action, is constitutionally protected as part of freedom of expression.[13] Constitutions of parties that the COMELEC refuse to register under Section 2, Article IX-C are not necessarily void.
x x x x
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The COMELEC cannot refuse to register a party whose constitution does not violate Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Consequently, the COMELEC cannot inquire into the validity of amendments to a party constitution that does not violate Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution. No law authorizes the COMELEC to declare a party constitution valid, void or ineffective. The only authority of the COMELEC is to register or refuse to register a political party.
A party constitution can be amended by less than a majority of the party's members if the party constitution so provides. A party constitution can also be amended only by party members holding elective public office if the party constitution so provides. There is no one person, one vote in the adoption or amendment of constitutions of political parties. The adoption and amendment of a party constitution is purely an internal party matter, beyond the jurisdiction of the COMELEC insofar as it does not violate Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
A political party enjoys all the freedom to adopt any political platform in its party constitution, and to amend the same. The party constitution embodies the basic political ideology or plan of government of a political party. A free and open party system precludes a censor like the COMELEC from passing upon the validity of a party's political constitution, or the validity of its amendments. To allow the COMELEC to pass upon the validity of a political party's constitution, or its amendments, is to enthrone the COMELEC as the arbiter of political thought in this country. A COMELEC with such power is anathema to a free and open party system, and even a grave threat to our democracy.
If a free and open party system is to have any meaning at all, a political party must be free to adopt any party constitution that it wants without any vetting or approval from any government agency. The only limitation is Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, if the party wants to register with the COMELEC. Even then, the COMELEC can only refuse to register the political party, and cannot declare void or invalid the party's political constitution.
The Constitution mandates the COMELEC to regulate the conduct of elections to public office to insure free, orderly and honest elections. The Constitution does not empower the COMELEC to decide the validity of a political party's constitution which is the basic document that lays down the party's political ideas, beliefs and doctrines. This Court should be wary of granting the COMELEC with extraordinary and boundless "wherewithal powers" that are nowhere found in the Constitution.
Indeed, any claim to extraordinary "wherewithal powers" by the COMELEC is suspect and dubious if such alleged powers are not necessary to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office. The COMELEC does not even make any assertion that the determination of the validity of a political party's constitution is necessary to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office.
In this case, whether the legitimate Liberal Party president is Drilon or Atienza depends on whether the Daza-Drilon amendments have validly amended the Salonga constitution. To identify the party leaders, the COMELEC must first determine the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments. However, such determination is outside the competence of the COMELEC because this issue is purely an internal party matter.
The contending factions within the Liberal Party - the Drilon and Atienza factions - each carry substantial support within the party. Neither faction can be dismissed as a nuisance or minor recalcitrant group with no semblance of legitimate claim to party leadership. Drilon himself is acknowledged by the Atienza faction as the hold-over President of the party. Atienza is recognized by the Drilon faction as the Chairman of the party, at least before the intra-party dispute. The COMELEC En Banc describes the intra-party leadership dispute between the two factions as follows:
As it stands now, there is a prevailing and persistent sense of distrust between the two factions. One faction cannot be expected to defer to the other for it to conduct/administer the election of party officers. One faction asserts that an election be conducted. The other faction argues that the term of its present officers has not yet expired so there is no need for the conduct of elections. Indeed, the instant controversy has caused confusion not only among the LP members but also to the electorate and the public in general on who are the real and legitimate officers of the LP. Where does this leave Us now?[14]This Court has affirmed the COMELEC's refusal to resolve an intra-party leadership dispute because the COMELEC could not determine the legitimate party leaders, due to conflicting claims to party leadership among the contending factions. In Palmares v. Commission on Elections,[15] this Court declared, in upholding the COMELEC's dismissal of the petitions of four claimants to the Nacionalista party leadership:
The dismissal of the four petitions does not write finis to the issue of leadership in the Nacionalista Party. On the contrary, the decision explicitly states that the non-recognition of any group as the Nacionalista Party is "until such time as sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is adduced to establish (1) the juridical link between claimants and the Nacionalista Party previously registered with the COMELEC, and (2) [the] legal authority of claimants to act on behalf of such party." (Underscoring in the original; boldfacing supplied)Thus, the Court affirmed the COMELEC's refusal to recognize any of the contending factions until someone or a group can authoritatively claim to represent the entire party.
In the same manner, the COMELEC in this case should have refused to recognize either the Drilon or the Atienza faction until both factions have settled, through internal party processes, the question on who should represent the entire party. As in Palmares, the price of intra-party leadership dispute is non-recognition by the COMELEC of any contending faction until the leadership struggle is internally resolved within the party itself.
This case is different from Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. Commission on Elections[16] where there was no dispute on the party constitution or on the legitimacy of the incumbent party officers. In Laban, no one claimed a right to hold a party office occupied by another. The issue in Laban was who among the incumbent officers - the Chairman or the Secretary General - could sign certificates of candidacy of the official party candidates. The COMELEC could resolve the issue by simply applying the provisions of the Laban constitution which no one disputed. Thus, in Laban, this Court declared:
The only issue in this case, as defined by the COMELEC itself, is who as between the Party Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the official candidates of the party. x x xKalaw v. Commission on Elections[18] is not a precedent for this case. In Kalaw, the private respondents asked the COMELEC to prohibit Kalaw from "usurping or using the title or position President of the Liberal Party." Kalaw moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC ruled that it had jurisdiction and this Court upheld the COMELEC's ruling. However, Kalaw was merely a minute resolution which did not state the reasons of private respondents in demanding that Kalaw stop usurping the title of president of the Liberal Party. We cannot divine from the minute resolution if Kalaw was a hold-over president, if she invoked a different party constitution, or if private respondents had ousted her as party president. Thus, Kalaw has no precedent value for this case.
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It need not go so far as to resolve the root of the conflict between party officials. It need only resolve such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers.[17]
No law authorizes the COMELEC to
regulate elections of political parties.
As admitted by the Assistant Solicitor General during the oral argument, a political party is a "private organization."[19] Election to a party position is election to a private office. The COMELEC's jurisdiction applies only to elections to public office. No law authorizes the COMELEC to order and supervise internal elections of political parties. The COMELEC cannot order party elections to resolve intra-party disputes, such as conflicting political alignments espoused by opposing factions within the party.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, refer to the enforcement and administration of laws relating to the conduct of elections to public office to ensure free, orderly and honest elections. This is clear from Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:Section 2(1) of Article IX-C speaks of "laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." All these activities refer to public offices or public issues that require voting by the electorate. None of these activities can conceivably refer to an election that requires voting only by members of a private organization like a political party.
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C mentions election of regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay officials, clearly referring to election to public office. Section 2(3) empowers the COMELEC to decide "all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters." Section 2(3) can only refer to election to public office because of the specification of polling places, election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. Section 2(3) cannot conceivably refer to election to private office.
Section 2(4) can only refer to election to public office since it refers to the COMELEC's power to deputize the Armed Forces to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections." Section 2(5) refers to the power of the COMELEC to register political parties but does not mention any power of the COMELEC to regulate political parties. Section 2(6) refers to election to public office, not to private office, because it empowers the COMELEC to prosecute "violations of election laws." Section 2(7) can only refer to election to public office, not to private office, because it speaks of "election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies."
Section 2(8) can only refer to election to public office, not to private office, because it speaks of removal by the President of deputized officials and employees for violation of orders of the COMELEC. Section 2(9) cannot refer to election to private office because it speaks of a report to the President and to Congress on the conduct of an "election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall."
In short, all the powers and functions of the COMELEC under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution refer to electoral activities requiring the vote of the public electorate or registered voters. Hence, insofar as the conduct of elections is concerned, the COMELEC's powers and functions extend only to election to public office, excluding election to private office. By no stretch of the imagination can any of these powers and functions apply to election to private office.
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code likewise limits the powers and functions of the COMELEC to election to public office. Section 52 provides:
In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. (Emphasis supplied)Section 52 refers to the exclusive power of the COMELEC to enforce election laws "for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections." This can only mean election to public office for several reasons.
First, a free election where all citizens of voting age are free to vote under the principle of one person, one vote can only refer to election to public office. Second, insuring orderly elections, in conjunction with the power of the COMELEC to deputize the Armed Forces, can only refer to election to public office. Third, assuming for the sake of argument that the COMELEC has the power to regulate election to private office and the issues in this case are justiciable, the COMELEC will not have the exclusive power required in Section 52. Jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies, including "election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations,"[20] belongs to the regional trial courts. A political party may even incorporate and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This will subject the political party to some measure of regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, including compelling the political party to hold meetings.[21]
The COMELEC cannot regulate internal affairs
of political parties in the absence of a law.
No law grants the COMELEC power to regulate internal affairs of political parties. The COMELEC has no duty or power to insure party harmony, or to promote unity of political thought within a party. There is no state interest in preventing dissension or factionalism within a political party, or even preventing the self-destruction of a party. Such dissension and factionalism within, or self-destruction of, a political party is part of our free and open party system. It is a consequence of the freedom of association, which necessarily includes the freedom to dissent and even to disassociate. Only when the actions of the political parties adversely affect free, orderly and honest elections to public office can the COMELEC intervene in the internal affairs of political parties.
However, there must first be a law regulating such political party activities. In addition, the law must be narrowly drawn, that is, the curtailment of political activities is only to the extent necessary to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office. This is because any regulation of political activities derogates from the constitutional right of freedom of association and the right to a free and open party system. Thus, we have laws limiting election speding,[22] campaign period,[23] and political advertising.[24] All these laws, however, apply to elections to public office, not to internal party elections involving election to private office.
The leading case in the United States on freedom of association of political parties is Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee.[25] In Eu, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a California law that required the geographical rotation of party officers, limited their term of office, and banned the party from endorsing candidates in its primaries. The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Eu is instructive:
In the instant case, the State has not shown that its regulation of internal party governance is necessary to the integrity of the electoral process. Instead, it contends that the challenged laws serve a compelling "interest in the 'democratic management of the political party's internal affairs.'" x x x This however, is not a case where intervention is necessary to prevent the derogation of the civil rights of party adherents. x x x Moreover, as we have observed, the State has no interest in "protect[ing] the integrity of the Party against the Party itself." x x x The State further claims that limiting the term of the state central committee chair and requiring that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern California helps "prevent regional friction from reaching a 'critical mass.'" x x x However, a State cannot substitute its judgment for that of the party as to the desirability of a particular internal party structure, any more that it can tell a party that its proposed communication to party members is unwise. x x xThe COMELEC has not shown any compelling reason
In sum, a State cannot justify regulating a party's internal affairs without showing that such regulation is necessary to ensure an election that is orderly and fair. Because California has made no such showing here, the challenged laws cannot be upheld.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
why it should intrude into internal party politics
under its existing powers to regulate political parties.
The COMELEC can regulate political parties pursuant to specific provisions of existing laws. However, the COMELEC has not shown that the holding of elections of the Liberal Party officers, and the COMELEC's supervision of such internal elections, is necessary to attain the purposes of these laws - such as the laws limiting election spending, campaign periods, and political advertising.
While the State has an interest to insure free, orderly and honest elections to public office, it has also an interest to insure maximum freedom of association to political parties. Only when there is a compelling reason to regulate activities of political parties, so as to achieve free, orderly and honest elections to public office, can the State intrude into the activities of political parties. The Constitution mandates a "free and open party system" because the democracy envisioned in the Constitution requires a free and open party system.
Independent political parties are essential to our democracy. Without independent political parties, there will be no organized opposition to analyze and critique government actions and policies, or to provide alternative government actions and policies. Without independent political parties, the incumbent administration will control the electoral process and perpetuate itself in power. Political parties can only remain independent if they enjoy maximum freedom of association. This Court has a duty to safeguard the freedom of association of political parties, and to insure an open and free party system.
Atienza faction has conclusively admitted the validity of
the Daza-Drilon amendments because of judicial admissions.
In its Answer[27] before the COMELEC, the Atienza faction claimed that the Daza-Drilon amendments to the Salonga constitution were not validly ratified.[28] However, in the same Answer, the Atienza faction invoked four times the Daza-Drilon amendments as the "Party Constitution," and castigated Drilon for violating such "Party Constitution." The Atienza faction's Answer pleaded before the COMELEC, as follows:
61. Thus, in stonewalling all requests for a meeting, Mr. Drilon has monopolized the decision-making process within the party and has arrogated unto himself all the powers of the NECO and the National Directorate. This usurpation of powers no doubt violates Section 6, Article I of the Party Constitution which guarantees the rights of party members to be heard on party issues and Section 30, Article V which provides that "The NECO shall meet at least once a year on the call of the party president..." (Boldfacing in the original; underscoring supplied)The six (6) Sections and the three (3) Articles mentioned in paragraphs 61, 67, 80 and 81 of the Atienza faction's Answer indisputably refer to the party constitution with the Daza-Drilon amendments. Counsel for the Atienza faction, during the oral argument, admitted this. The reason for this admission is obvious - these six Sections and three Articles are not found in the Salonga constitution but appear only in the Daza-Drilon amendments.
x x x x
67. This re-channeling of party funds was again done without proper authority and without full disclosure required under the party constitution. In so doing, Mr. Drilon violated No. 3, Section 6, Article I of the party Constitution which provides that all members must be informed of "all finances and the use of party funds and property." (Boldfacing in the original; underscoring supplied)
x x x x
80. The position of DG [Director General] is one of the most sensitive positions in the party, as he or she acts as "chief executive officer" of the party and runs its day-to-day administrative affairs. Thus, when the party Constitution was revised, the appointment of a DG should abide by Section 24, Article IV, and Section 28, Article V of the Party Constitution. But Mr. Drilon failed to submit the name of the nominee, Ms. Asis, to the NECO for its confirmation. Thus, Ms. Asis is actually illegally exercising the powers and functions of a DG without the proper confirmation of the NECO. (Boldfacing in the original; underscoring supplied)
81. Section 27 (on "Composition") of the Party Constitution is clear - any addition to the NECO is subject to the approval of the NECO itself.[29] (Boldfacing in the original; underscoring supplied)
The Atienza faction invoked the six Sections and three Articles "of the Party Constitution" without any qualification whatsoever. The Atienza faction accused Drilon of usurpation of power which "no doubt violates Section 6, Article I of the Party Constitution." The Atienza faction also accused Drilon of failing to convene the NECO in violation of "Section 30, Article V" of the same party constitution. The Atienza faction further accused Drilon of "re-channeling" party funds in violation of the full disclosure policy "required under the party constitution," citing "No. 3 Section 6, Article I of the party Constitution."
The Atienza faction faulted Drilon for failing to submit for the NECO's approval the appointment of Director-General Asis in violation of "Section 24, Article IV, and Section 28, Article V of the Party Constitution." The Atienza faction also invoked the approval by the NECO of any addition to its membership as required under "Section 27 (on "Composition") of the Party Constitution." All these Sections and Articles are found in the Daza-Drilon amendments, not in the Salonga constitution.
The invocation of six Sections and three Articles of the Daza-Drilon amendments in the Answer constitutes judicial admissions which are conclusive and binding[30] on the Atienza faction. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.The Atienza faction can contradict these judicial admissions only by showing that they were a palpable mistake, or that no such admissions were made. Since the admissions are direct, categorical, and without any qualification whatsoever, the Atienza faction cannot claim that no such admissions were made. The only way out for the Atienza faction is to show palpable mistake.
The Atienza faction did not contradict its judicial admissions before the COMELEC where they were made. It did not also contradict these judicial admissions in its pleadings before this Court. Counsel for the Atienza faction explained for the first time these admissions during the oral argument only after being asked to read these admissions in the Answer, which counsel himself prepared.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Atienza faction explained that they "had invoked the same Constitution that they (Drilon faction) are using for the sake of telling them give us due process."[31] In short, the Atienza faction deliberately invoked the Daza-Drilon amendments not only to defend against the Drilon Petition, but also to seek positive relief from the COMELEC.
Clearly, the Atienza faction did not commit any palpable mistake, or even a simple mistake, in invoking the Daza-Drilon amendments. A palpable mistake is one where the act, word or deed is manifestly or obviously unintended. Here, the Atienza faction intentionally invoked the Daza-Drilon amendments to seek negative and positive reliefs from the COMELEC.
Besides, the repeated admissions in four paragraphs of the Answer, referring to six Sections and three Articles of the Daza-Drilon amendments, are not unintended acts or words. The language used in these admissions - castigating Drilon in harsh language for violating specific provisions of the party constitution, shows intentional and deliberate acts that clearly preclude palpable mistake. The Atienza faction even accused Drilon of misusing party funds in violation of Section 6(3), Article I of the Daza-Drilon amendments. This cannot constitute palpable mistake since this accusation could even constitute a criminal offense.
Another factor that precludes palpable mistake is that the invocation of the Daza-Drilon amendments in the Answer is consistent with Annexes "B" and "C" that the Atienza faction attached to its Answer. These are the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas Resolution and the Kalipi Council of Ladies Resolution which uniformly invoke "Section 28 of the Liberal Party Constitution" in calling "the Party President to convene the NECO x x x to finally resolve this issue x x x." Section 28 on the powers and functions of the NECO is not found in the Salonga constitution but in the Daza-Drilon amendments.
These judicial admissions in the Answer are conclusive and binding on the Atienza faction. Thus, the Atienza faction is deemed to have admitted the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments. However, even with such admission, the intra-party dispute on the party leadership remains. The undeniable fact is that the Atienza faction, which counts at least 13 members of the House of Representatives, does not recognize Drilon as the party leader.
In political parties, the choice of the party leaders is often not democratic. There is no one person, one vote in the election of party leaders. The party constitution may limit the electors of party leaders to party members holding elective public office. The party constitution may even allow the party member holding the highest elective public office to name the other party leaders. There is no legal infirmity in such undemocratic party governance.
The choice of party leaders is also a matter of hammering out alliances within the party, a process requiring political compromises among the contending factions. The COMELEC or this Court cannot intrude into this process, even as one faction, to secure what it cannot gain within the party's internal processes, may bring the dispute before the COMELEC or this Court. Neither the COMELEC nor this Court has the jurisdiction or competence to resolve such intra-party disputes.
Thus, the determination of party leaders - when and how to choose them - must be left to the internal processes of the party itself. This situation brings this case to Palmares, where this Court affirmed the COMELEC's refusal to recognize any of the contending factions until someone emerges from the party who can authoritatively claim to represent the entire party. In this case, as in Palmares, the non-recognition of any contending faction will not adversely affect the holding of free, orderly and honest elections to public office.
In summary, neither the COMELEC nor this Court has jurisdiction to resolve an intra-party dispute that is rooted on a purely political issue � in this case whether a party should continue its political alignment with the incumbent President of the Philippines. While the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of amendments to the constitution of a political party, the Atienza faction in this case has judicially admitted the validity of the Daza-Drilon amendments. The COMELEC has also no jurisdiction to order and supervise the election of officers of a political party.
Accordingly, I vote to SET ASIDE COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 13 October 2006 in SPP No. 06-002.
Endnotes:
[1] Atty. Amparo Cabotaje-Tang.
[2] Transcript of stenographic notes of oral arguments, p. 364.
[3] Section 8, Article III of the Constitution.
[4] Rollo, p. 36.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 73.
[7] Id. at 76.
[8] Id. at 63.
[9] Id. at 158.
[10] Id. at 158-159.
[11] The amendments were made in 1999-2004 during the incumbencies of Raul Daza and Franklin M. Drilon as presidents of the Liberal Party.
[12] The original Liberal Party constitution was adopted in 1992 during the presidency of Jovito R. Salonga.
[13] Salonga v. Cruz-Pano, No. L-59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA 438, citing Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444.
[14] Rollo, p. 819, COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 13 October 2006.
[15] G.R. Nos. 86177-78, 31 August 1989.
[16] G.R. No. 161265, 24 February 2004, 423 SCRA 665.
[17] Id. at 680.
[18] G.R. No. 80218, 5 November 1987.
[19] Transcript of stenographic notes of oral argument, p. 392.
[20] Section 5.2, R.A. No. 8799 (Securities Regulation Code); Section 1(3), Rule I, Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799.
[21] Section 5.1(k) of RA No. 8799 states: " x x x the Commission shall have, among others, the powers and functions x x x [to] compel the officers of any registered corporation or association to call meetings of stockholders or members thereof under its supervision."
[22] Sections 100 and 101, Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Section 13, R.A. No. 7166.
[23] Section 80, Omnibus Election Code.
[24] R.A. No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act.
[25] 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
[26] Id. at 232-233 (internal citations omitted).
[27] Rollo, pp. 62-121.
[28] Id. at 72.
[29] Id. at 83, 85, 89-90.
[30] Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053, 23 January 1997, 266 SCRA 396.
[31] Transcript of stenographic notes of oral argument, p. 251.
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.
I fully concur with the opinion of Justice Garcia insofar as it affirms the findings of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that (1) petitioner Senator Franklin Drilon had served as president of the Liberal Party in a hold-over capacity, as his term expired in July 2004; (2) the 1992 Salonga Constitution has remained the valid Constitution of the Liberal Party notwithstanding the amendments proposed thereto in 2004; and (3) the party elections of 2 March 2006 wherein the slate affiliated with respondent Mayor Jose Atienza was installed, is invalid. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELEC in making these determinations. I fully agree with the reasons expounded by Justice Garcia in support of these rulings, and adopt the same for the purposes of this opinion.
Nevertheless, I write separately to elucidate on the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to adjudicate the leadership dispute within the Liberal Party and the factual issues concerning the Constitution of the Liberal Party.
I.
As indicated in the Court's Resolution dated 13 March 2007, a majority has affirmed the COMELEC's jurisdiction over the petition filed by Senator Franklin Drilon. Thus, the question of jurisdiction is no longer under consideration. Still, I wish to share my views on why the COMELEC's jurisdiction should be affirmed in this case.
The parties do not challenge, in fact implicitly concede, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the leadership controversy submitted to it by Senator Drilon, as the questions they have actually raised before this Court are limited as to the specific manner by which COMELEC exercised its jurisdiction. An argument insisting on the absolute lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve leadership disputes, fosters a radical and retrogressive shift in jurisprudence that heralds the severe diminution of the capability of the COMELEC, the body tasked since 1940 by the Filipino people through the Constitution, to oversee the conduct of orderly elections. The trust reposed on the COMELEC by the sovereign people through their Constitution cannot be lightly disregarded. In line with the wise balance engendered by the constitutional principle of judicial review, errors of the COMELEC are correctible by this Court, a power that is founded on specific provisions of the Constitution, and entrenched as well by precedents A contrary holding would result in the sort of chaos that guts the constitutional imperative that elections in this country would be free, honest and orderly.
A submission had been made that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the leadership dispute in the Liberal Party, including questions pertaining to the validity of amendments to its Constitution and the determination of which set of persons should be recognized as the Party's leaders due the "state interest to insure maximum freedom of association to political parties," encompassed in Section 8, Article III of the Constitution, otherwise known as the "freedom of association clause."
Yet this proposition ultimately treats the Liberal Party no better than it would a privately organized club such as the Rotary. While both the Rotary Club and the Liberal Party are privately organized associations, thus engendering a general policy of non-interference on the part of the courts unless statutory rights and privileges are involved, the fact that the Liberal Party has since 1946 participated in the country's electoral processes, however, is of such sufficient import as to vest jurisdiction in the COMELEC over the instant petitions in accordance with the 1987 Constitution. For what ultimately is at stake is not a mere matter of bragging rights among the contending factions, but significant rights under our election laws affecting the conduct and outcome of elections and on that basis may be extended or adjudicated by the COMELEC alone.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is primarily laid by the Constitution, with statutes such as the Omnibus Election Code augmenting it. At present, there is no need to look beyond the Constitution to discern that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition filed by Senator Franklin Drilon. Said petition had sought to enjoin the camp of Mayor Lito Atienza from acting as the newly-elected officers of the Liberal Party on the ground that their election on 2 March 2006 is void. The resolution of such petition necessitated a determination of the state of the extant Constitution of the Party, as well as the validity of the amendments thereto which were proposed in 2004.
The first solid foundation in the 1987 Constitution for the COMELEC's jurisdiction is found in Section 2(1), Article IX-C, which reads:
It was also raised Kalaw v. COMELEC[3] had no value as precedent for this case. Kalaw stands as one of the many precedents that definitively established the constitutional authority of the COMELEC to resolve a leadership dispute within a party. Even though Kalaw was resolved by way of a minute resolution, and minute resolutions are generally not considered as decisions,[4] there is no dispute that the rationale for the holding in Kalaw was expressly adopted and incorporated by the Court in LDP, thereby leaving no doubt as to its present doctrinal weight.
Nor is it material in Kalaw that from the minute resolution it could not be ascertained if Eva Estrada Kalaw was a hold-over party president, if she was invoking a different party constitution, or if she had been ousted as party president. That is of no consequence. What is both indubitable and significant is that the adversaries of Kalaw in the case had sought to enjoin her "from usurping or using the title or position of President of the Liberal Party." Indeed, it was a classic case of a leadership dispute involving the legitimacy of a claimant to an internal party office. The explicit holding of the Court that the COMELEC had jurisdiction to resolve such dispute should bear influence in this case, especially as such holding was reaffirmed in LDP. Declared the Court:
A more telling and consequential as precedent on this point is Sumulong v. COMELEC,[10] which concerned a leadership dispute within the Popular Front Party. The COMELEC, then a newly-formed constitutional body, declined to pass upon the question which of the competing factions was entitled to use the name Popular Front Party "because this question in the opinion of this [COMELEC] properly pertains to the courts of justice."[11] The Court expressly rebuffed the COMELEC, as it stressed the legal mandate of the poll body "to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections" and "all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officers."[12] The Court, through Justice Laurel, explained:
Both Section 2(1) and 2(5), Article IX-C clearly provide the linkage between the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and its mandate to oversee an orderly and fair elections. Such mandate tempers any insistence that a political party must be left on its own devices in resolving its leadership disputes, for if the inability of the party to engage in self-reparation leaves a disorderly and unfair election as a consequence, it is the entire electorate that suffers in the ultimate reckoning.
It cannot be denied that at the time Drilon filed the petition with the COMELEC, the proximate relation between the leadership dispute and the forthcoming electoral exercise already existed. By the time the Court resolves this petition, the fact of the dispute could have already caused repercussions in the orderly conduct of the 2007 national elections. The so-called "Drilon wing" has already proclaimed its own senatorial candidates affiliated with the "opposition bloc,"[14] while the "Atienza wing" has reportedly coalesced with pro-administration parties.[15] At the very least, it is clear that the Drilon wing will seek entitlement to the rights and privileges due the Liberal Party under the law. At worst, the Atienza wing will compete with the Drilon wing for such rights and privileges.
Imagine the consequences if the Court had ruled that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the present leadership dispute. As no definitive means is provided as to how the leadership dispute would be resolved, two competing factions of the Liberal Party will claim entitlement to all the rights and privileges due the Liberal Party as a duly registered political party participating in the 2007 elections. It would have been unlikely that a resolution would ensue before the May elections. The problems in the offing would conceivably extend to such issues as which "legitimate faction" shall be entitled to copies of the election returns, pollwatchers and such other rights and privileges provided in the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws.
I concede that from the Constitution itself, the COMELEC should not wade into every intra-party dispute that is presented to it. Sinaca v. COMELEC,[16] which did not involve a leadership issue, is an example of such a case. However, as presaged by precedents such as Sumulong, Kalaw, Palmares and LDP, there should be no doubt that where the dispute bears a proximate relation to the exercise by the political party of its rights and privileges under the law with respect to a national or local election, then the COMELEC may exercise its jurisdiction under Section 2(1) or 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. In other words, where the dispute involves an issue of leadership within a political party or any question the adjudication of which is essential to the determination of whether a political party or which faction in representation of the political party should be accorded the rights and privileges to which political parties are entitled under the law, the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the dispute.
Thus, I agree that it was necessary for the COMELEC to ascertain which Constitution of the Liberal Party is binding on it, as that is the only way to determine the status of Drilon as Party President, and the validity of the election of the Atienza slate.
II.
Even as the Constitution establishes the broad jurisdiction of the COMELEC over leadership disputes, the exercise of such jurisdiction does not correspond to an extraordinary grant of corrective powers to the poll body in resolving the dispute. The internal affairs of political parties, which may very well include leadership disputes, are sheltered by the constitutional right to free association. The ability of the COMELEC to "interfere" in these internal affairs, even if predicated on its broad constitutional jurisdiction, is limited to those reliefs which are absolutely necessary in resolving the rights and privileges due the political party with respect to a Philippine election.
I submit the following standards: (1) the COMELEC should exercise its jurisdiction only if the dispute presented before it bears proximate relation to the rights and privileges accorded to the political party under the election laws in view of its participation in the elections; and (2) the COMELEC should adjudicate the leadership dispute by simply evaluating the evidence on record and applying the laws in point for the purpose of determining which of the competing factions should be accorded the right to claim such rights and privileges.
The basis of the second standard is clear in law and jurisprudence. Section 8, Article III of the Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the people "to form x x x associations x x x for purposes not contrary to law." Such right to free association becomes especially compelling when it pertains to the right of people of common interests, beliefs and aspirations to organize themselves into a political party to better influence the polity. Our constitutional democracy was the offspring of the rebellion against a system that had infringed on political dissent, hence the particular guarantee that cherishes the inalienable right of political organization acquires special reverence among the constitutional values.
The Liberal Party is a privately organized political party, formed under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association, which in turn bears facets of the right to privacy.[17] As such, State interference with the Party's internal organization should be kept at a minimum, and only when due.
It is when the Liberal Party seeks participation in a Philippine election that a degree of state interference is due. The mechanics involved in the conduct of a peaceful, orderly and honest electoral exercise in this country necessarily requires a degree of state regulation of the participants thereto in order that chaos would not ensue. As such, there is a system in place, also recognized by the Constitution, that requires the accreditation of political parties in order that they may be guaranteed certain rights and privileges, such as the right to poll watchers or a copy of election returns. The particular problem posed by leadership disputes consists in the determination of which persons may exercise such rights and privileges in behalf of the party. Left unresolved, the problem would explode at election time itself, at a moment when the COMELEC is already burdened with the task of overseeing the conduct of elections and the tabulations afterwards. Since disorderly elections strike at the heart of democratic governance, there is a necessary cession of certain political guarantees such as free association for the preservation of an unimpeachable election.
Still, it should not follow that the right of the State, through the COMELEC, to ensure free, honest and orderly elections leads to the axiomatic trampling of the rights of free association. If possible, the balance should be drawn to accommodate both constitutional principles. It should only be when there is no viable way to uphold the right of free association even as the State regulates the electoral exercise, that the need arises to ascertain which principle should prevail and which principle should yield.
When is the COMELEC, in adjudicating a leadership dispute, deemed as infringing the right of free association? The boundary is breached when the disputants themselves are compelled to perform an extra positive act or explicit move for the purpose of resolving the controversy. The extent by which the COMELEC may act in settling the impasse is limited to a dispassionate recital of the correct state of facts based on the records and evidence before it, as well as the corresponding legal principles that come into play following the determined facts.
The precedents I cited tellingly impart that that from the recognition of the COMELEC's jurisdiction over leadership disputes within political parties, it does not necessarily follow that the COMELEC may exercise extraordinary powers of compulsion in order to resolve such disputes.
The Court in Sumulong[18] and Kalaw[19] recognized that the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to resolve the leadership question in a political party, particularly through the determination of the critical factual predicates. Thus, Sumulong observed that "[w]ho constitute the party directorate and who are its authorized representatives for this purpose involve an ascertainment of fact which must be made by the appointing power, subject to the supervisory and reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections."[20] However, in a similar vein, the Court held in Kalaw that "[the] ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution of such controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into two wings under separate leaders each claiming to be president of the entire party " involves questions of fact which should be examined and decided by the respondent COMELEC and not by this Court."[21]
In LDP,[22] there was sufficient basis on the record for the COMELEC, and ultimately the Court, to make the factual determination as to who between the LDP Party Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the certificates of candidacy upon the competing claims of both sides. In concluding therein that it was the LDP Party Chairman who held such right over the Secretary General, the Court relied on the language of the party constitution and the facts on record.
However, LDP reflects not only the correct attitude of the Court, but also the wrong-headed approach enacted by the COMELEC which significantly was rebuked by the Court. The COMELEC in LDP had allowed for the official recognition of two wings within the LDP rather than resolving which of the two wings was actually entitled to "represent" the party in the 2004 elections. This novel resolution was struck down by the Court, relying on a straightforward determination of which of the two "wings", under the party constitution, bore the authority to authenticate the candidates of the political party. The "Solomonic" solution of the COMELEC entailed additional steps other than a singular determination of the facts and laws involved in order to resolve the leadership dispute at hand.
III.
I agree with the opinion of Justice Garcia when it upholds the COMELEC's conclusions that Senator Drilon can no longer be legally deemed as the Party President, and that the Atienza slate was not legally elected to Party offices either. These conclusions were derived from the evaluation of the COMELEC of the evidence presented by the parties before it, in conformity with the long-recognized role of the poll body as a trier of fact.
I wish to dwell upon the issue pertaining to Senator Drilon's claim of present incumbency as party president, which in turn hinges on the valid ratification of amendments to the party constitution. With respect to Senator Drilon's claims before the COMELEC that he is entitled to remain as Party President, the duty falls upon his side to prove the factual basis that establishes this argument. In particular, he would have to prove that the Liberal Party Constitution was indeed amended in 1999 and 2004.
It should be borne in mind that the enactment of the constitution of a political party does not require the concurrence of any government body, including the COMELEC, before it can be implemented. Indeed, any legislation that would require a political party to submit its constitution for approval to the COMELEC or any other arm of government would be unconstitutional, noxious as it would be to the constitutional guarantee of free association. Yet since a party constitution does not necessitate any imprimatur from the COMELEC, there can be no prima facie assumption entertained by the COMELEC that a constitution presented to it has indeed been duly ratified or amended.
If there is no dispute raised before the COMELEC as to the validity of a party constitution or its amendments, then the poll body should take in such unanimity as sufficient proof that the party charter has indeed been duly ratified or amended. However, if, as in this case, competing factions of a political party do present varying claims as to whether a particular constitution has been amended or ratified, the COMELEC is well empowered and obligated to require the parties to submit proof of their respective claims, and to evaluate the evidence following the appropriate legal guidelines under the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
In the present dispute, both parties do admit the existence of the same Liberal Party Constitution prior to the said 1999 and 2004 amendments, referred to in the record as the Salonga Constitution. The question lies in the valid ratification of these two sets of amendments, to which the Drilon camp attests while the Atienza side disputes the same. While affidavits have been presented attesting to the ratification of said amendments[23], there are also affidavits disclaiming such ratification on the claim that no quorum having been attained to ratify such amendments. Upon such circumstance, it was but proper for the COMELEC to prefer more definitive proof from the Drilon wing that the amendments were indeed ratified. However, outside of the affidavits, no proof at all was submitted establishing the ratification of the 1999 amendments. On the other hand, the evidence submitted to prove the ratification of the 2004 amendments was the minutes of the meeting of the National Executive Council on 30 November 2004 wherein it was reflected that the adoption of the changes was approved by 2/3 of the membership of the Council, as required by the Salonga Constitution.[24] However, in light of the contrary allegation that the quorum requirement was not met during the meeting, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for having insisted on more conclusive proof, such as the attendance sheet during the said meeting.
Tinga, J., concur.
Nevertheless, I write separately to elucidate on the issue of the COMELEC's jurisdiction to adjudicate the leadership dispute within the Liberal Party and the factual issues concerning the Constitution of the Liberal Party.
I.
As indicated in the Court's Resolution dated 13 March 2007, a majority has affirmed the COMELEC's jurisdiction over the petition filed by Senator Franklin Drilon. Thus, the question of jurisdiction is no longer under consideration. Still, I wish to share my views on why the COMELEC's jurisdiction should be affirmed in this case.
The parties do not challenge, in fact implicitly concede, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the leadership controversy submitted to it by Senator Drilon, as the questions they have actually raised before this Court are limited as to the specific manner by which COMELEC exercised its jurisdiction. An argument insisting on the absolute lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve leadership disputes, fosters a radical and retrogressive shift in jurisprudence that heralds the severe diminution of the capability of the COMELEC, the body tasked since 1940 by the Filipino people through the Constitution, to oversee the conduct of orderly elections. The trust reposed on the COMELEC by the sovereign people through their Constitution cannot be lightly disregarded. In line with the wise balance engendered by the constitutional principle of judicial review, errors of the COMELEC are correctible by this Court, a power that is founded on specific provisions of the Constitution, and entrenched as well by precedents A contrary holding would result in the sort of chaos that guts the constitutional imperative that elections in this country would be free, honest and orderly.
A submission had been made that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the leadership dispute in the Liberal Party, including questions pertaining to the validity of amendments to its Constitution and the determination of which set of persons should be recognized as the Party's leaders due the "state interest to insure maximum freedom of association to political parties," encompassed in Section 8, Article III of the Constitution, otherwise known as the "freedom of association clause."
Yet this proposition ultimately treats the Liberal Party no better than it would a privately organized club such as the Rotary. While both the Rotary Club and the Liberal Party are privately organized associations, thus engendering a general policy of non-interference on the part of the courts unless statutory rights and privileges are involved, the fact that the Liberal Party has since 1946 participated in the country's electoral processes, however, is of such sufficient import as to vest jurisdiction in the COMELEC over the instant petitions in accordance with the 1987 Constitution. For what ultimately is at stake is not a mere matter of bragging rights among the contending factions, but significant rights under our election laws affecting the conduct and outcome of elections and on that basis may be extended or adjudicated by the COMELEC alone.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is primarily laid by the Constitution, with statutes such as the Omnibus Election Code augmenting it. At present, there is no need to look beyond the Constitution to discern that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition filed by Senator Franklin Drilon. Said petition had sought to enjoin the camp of Mayor Lito Atienza from acting as the newly-elected officers of the Liberal Party on the ground that their election on 2 March 2006 is void. The resolution of such petition necessitated a determination of the state of the extant Constitution of the Party, as well as the validity of the amendments thereto which were proposed in 2004.
The first solid foundation in the 1987 Constitution for the COMELEC's jurisdiction is found in Section 2(1), Article IX-C, which reads:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following powers and functions:This provision was favorably cited by the Court in Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC,[1] or the LDP case, as a means of affirming the COMELEC's jurisdiction therein over the dispute between two competing factions of the petitioner-party. It might be said that LDP did not involve a dispute on the LDP's Constitution or on the legitimacy of the incumbent party officers. However, in resolving the dispute in the LDP case, the Court did categorically state:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
The COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections."[2] (Emphasis supplied)Certainly, if the Court had reversed its course, it could no longer be said that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" falls within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
It was also raised Kalaw v. COMELEC[3] had no value as precedent for this case. Kalaw stands as one of the many precedents that definitively established the constitutional authority of the COMELEC to resolve a leadership dispute within a party. Even though Kalaw was resolved by way of a minute resolution, and minute resolutions are generally not considered as decisions,[4] there is no dispute that the rationale for the holding in Kalaw was expressly adopted and incorporated by the Court in LDP, thereby leaving no doubt as to its present doctrinal weight.
Nor is it material in Kalaw that from the minute resolution it could not be ascertained if Eva Estrada Kalaw was a hold-over party president, if she was invoking a different party constitution, or if she had been ousted as party president. That is of no consequence. What is both indubitable and significant is that the adversaries of Kalaw in the case had sought to enjoin her "from usurping or using the title or position of President of the Liberal Party." Indeed, it was a classic case of a leadership dispute involving the legitimacy of a claimant to an internal party office. The explicit holding of the Court that the COMELEC had jurisdiction to resolve such dispute should bear influence in this case, especially as such holding was reaffirmed in LDP. Declared the Court:
On the merits, we hold that the respondent [COMELEC] has jurisdiction to hear and decide SP Case No. 85-021 in view of its powers under Article IX-C, Section 2 of the Constitution to, among others, enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, decide all questions affecting elections, register and regulate political parties, and insure orderly elections. These powers include the determination of the conflicting claims made in SP Case No. 85-021, which are likely to cause confusion among the electorate if not resolved. Additionally, the COMELEC is mandated by the Election Code to inter alia require candidates to specify their political party affiliation in their certificates of candidacy, allow political parties to appoint watchers, limit the expenditures of each political party, determine whether or not a political party shall retain its registration on the basis of its showing in the preceding elections, etc. These matters include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution of such controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into wings under separate leaders each claiming to be president of the entire party.[5] (Emphasis supplied.)Kalaw notably cited Section 2(1), Article IX-C as the constitutional basis for the COMELEC's jurisdiction. In Palmares v. COMELEC,[6] a case which also invoked Kalaw as supporting precedent, another constitutional provision was invoked as establishing the COMELEC's jurisdiction to resolve "the issue of leadership in a political party". Justice Garcia primarily relies on Palmares in asserting the COMELEC's jurisdiction "over the issue of leadership in a political party."[7] The provision is Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which reads in part:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following powers and functions:Thus, the Court explained in Palmares:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
. ..[T]hat the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of leadership in a political party. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties [Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.] Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of a party and the responsibility for the acts of such political party must be fixed in certain persons acting as its officers. In the exercise of the power to register political parties, the COMELEC must determine who these officers are. Consequently, if there is any controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in a proper case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political parties.[8]Again, even as Palmares was decided by way of minute resolution, the quoted portion was likewise cited in full by the Court in LDP,[9] thus leaving no doubt as to its value as precedent.
A more telling and consequential as precedent on this point is Sumulong v. COMELEC,[10] which concerned a leadership dispute within the Popular Front Party. The COMELEC, then a newly-formed constitutional body, declined to pass upon the question which of the competing factions was entitled to use the name Popular Front Party "because this question in the opinion of this [COMELEC] properly pertains to the courts of justice."[11] The Court expressly rebuffed the COMELEC, as it stressed the legal mandate of the poll body "to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections" and "all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officers."[12] The Court, through Justice Laurel, explained:
Although the fourth part of the instructions refers to the question of "as to which of the two factions of the so-called Popular Front Party, one headed by Sumulong and the other headed by Abad Santos, is entitled to use the name Popular Front Party," "a matter which, in the opinion of the Commission on Elections, "pertains to the courts of justice" "the pleadings and the records disclose that the real question is as to who, upon the evidence presented, is the duly chosen and authorized head of the Popular Front Party and as such head is entitled to represent the directorate in the matter of the appointment of the third inspector of election to which the minority party is entitled under the law. The determination of this question of fact is necessarily involved in the appointment required to be made of the inspectors of election for the minority party. The appointing power must so ascertain, subject to the supervisory and reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections. For uniformity of action and in view of the urgency of the situation, this matter may now be speedily determined by the Commission in the public interest.[13]The precedents make it clear that it is the Constitution, the very same charter that guarantees the right of free association, that establishes the awesome jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties involved in the electoral process. The competency of the COMELEC to regulate the internal affairs of political parties to a limited extent is established by the Constitution. Hence, there is no need for a law to expressly authorize the poll body to exercise such jurisdiction. It is in that perspective that the references to American jurisprudence and doctrines should be seen, as there is no constitutional equivalent to the COMELEC in the U.S. Federal Constitution.
Both Section 2(1) and 2(5), Article IX-C clearly provide the linkage between the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and its mandate to oversee an orderly and fair elections. Such mandate tempers any insistence that a political party must be left on its own devices in resolving its leadership disputes, for if the inability of the party to engage in self-reparation leaves a disorderly and unfair election as a consequence, it is the entire electorate that suffers in the ultimate reckoning.
It cannot be denied that at the time Drilon filed the petition with the COMELEC, the proximate relation between the leadership dispute and the forthcoming electoral exercise already existed. By the time the Court resolves this petition, the fact of the dispute could have already caused repercussions in the orderly conduct of the 2007 national elections. The so-called "Drilon wing" has already proclaimed its own senatorial candidates affiliated with the "opposition bloc,"[14] while the "Atienza wing" has reportedly coalesced with pro-administration parties.[15] At the very least, it is clear that the Drilon wing will seek entitlement to the rights and privileges due the Liberal Party under the law. At worst, the Atienza wing will compete with the Drilon wing for such rights and privileges.
Imagine the consequences if the Court had ruled that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the present leadership dispute. As no definitive means is provided as to how the leadership dispute would be resolved, two competing factions of the Liberal Party will claim entitlement to all the rights and privileges due the Liberal Party as a duly registered political party participating in the 2007 elections. It would have been unlikely that a resolution would ensue before the May elections. The problems in the offing would conceivably extend to such issues as which "legitimate faction" shall be entitled to copies of the election returns, pollwatchers and such other rights and privileges provided in the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws.
I concede that from the Constitution itself, the COMELEC should not wade into every intra-party dispute that is presented to it. Sinaca v. COMELEC,[16] which did not involve a leadership issue, is an example of such a case. However, as presaged by precedents such as Sumulong, Kalaw, Palmares and LDP, there should be no doubt that where the dispute bears a proximate relation to the exercise by the political party of its rights and privileges under the law with respect to a national or local election, then the COMELEC may exercise its jurisdiction under Section 2(1) or 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. In other words, where the dispute involves an issue of leadership within a political party or any question the adjudication of which is essential to the determination of whether a political party or which faction in representation of the political party should be accorded the rights and privileges to which political parties are entitled under the law, the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the dispute.
Thus, I agree that it was necessary for the COMELEC to ascertain which Constitution of the Liberal Party is binding on it, as that is the only way to determine the status of Drilon as Party President, and the validity of the election of the Atienza slate.
II.
Even as the Constitution establishes the broad jurisdiction of the COMELEC over leadership disputes, the exercise of such jurisdiction does not correspond to an extraordinary grant of corrective powers to the poll body in resolving the dispute. The internal affairs of political parties, which may very well include leadership disputes, are sheltered by the constitutional right to free association. The ability of the COMELEC to "interfere" in these internal affairs, even if predicated on its broad constitutional jurisdiction, is limited to those reliefs which are absolutely necessary in resolving the rights and privileges due the political party with respect to a Philippine election.
I submit the following standards: (1) the COMELEC should exercise its jurisdiction only if the dispute presented before it bears proximate relation to the rights and privileges accorded to the political party under the election laws in view of its participation in the elections; and (2) the COMELEC should adjudicate the leadership dispute by simply evaluating the evidence on record and applying the laws in point for the purpose of determining which of the competing factions should be accorded the right to claim such rights and privileges.
The basis of the second standard is clear in law and jurisprudence. Section 8, Article III of the Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the people "to form x x x associations x x x for purposes not contrary to law." Such right to free association becomes especially compelling when it pertains to the right of people of common interests, beliefs and aspirations to organize themselves into a political party to better influence the polity. Our constitutional democracy was the offspring of the rebellion against a system that had infringed on political dissent, hence the particular guarantee that cherishes the inalienable right of political organization acquires special reverence among the constitutional values.
The Liberal Party is a privately organized political party, formed under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association, which in turn bears facets of the right to privacy.[17] As such, State interference with the Party's internal organization should be kept at a minimum, and only when due.
It is when the Liberal Party seeks participation in a Philippine election that a degree of state interference is due. The mechanics involved in the conduct of a peaceful, orderly and honest electoral exercise in this country necessarily requires a degree of state regulation of the participants thereto in order that chaos would not ensue. As such, there is a system in place, also recognized by the Constitution, that requires the accreditation of political parties in order that they may be guaranteed certain rights and privileges, such as the right to poll watchers or a copy of election returns. The particular problem posed by leadership disputes consists in the determination of which persons may exercise such rights and privileges in behalf of the party. Left unresolved, the problem would explode at election time itself, at a moment when the COMELEC is already burdened with the task of overseeing the conduct of elections and the tabulations afterwards. Since disorderly elections strike at the heart of democratic governance, there is a necessary cession of certain political guarantees such as free association for the preservation of an unimpeachable election.
Still, it should not follow that the right of the State, through the COMELEC, to ensure free, honest and orderly elections leads to the axiomatic trampling of the rights of free association. If possible, the balance should be drawn to accommodate both constitutional principles. It should only be when there is no viable way to uphold the right of free association even as the State regulates the electoral exercise, that the need arises to ascertain which principle should prevail and which principle should yield.
When is the COMELEC, in adjudicating a leadership dispute, deemed as infringing the right of free association? The boundary is breached when the disputants themselves are compelled to perform an extra positive act or explicit move for the purpose of resolving the controversy. The extent by which the COMELEC may act in settling the impasse is limited to a dispassionate recital of the correct state of facts based on the records and evidence before it, as well as the corresponding legal principles that come into play following the determined facts.
The precedents I cited tellingly impart that that from the recognition of the COMELEC's jurisdiction over leadership disputes within political parties, it does not necessarily follow that the COMELEC may exercise extraordinary powers of compulsion in order to resolve such disputes.
The Court in Sumulong[18] and Kalaw[19] recognized that the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to resolve the leadership question in a political party, particularly through the determination of the critical factual predicates. Thus, Sumulong observed that "[w]ho constitute the party directorate and who are its authorized representatives for this purpose involve an ascertainment of fact which must be made by the appointing power, subject to the supervisory and reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections."[20] However, in a similar vein, the Court held in Kalaw that "[the] ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution of such controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into two wings under separate leaders each claiming to be president of the entire party " involves questions of fact which should be examined and decided by the respondent COMELEC and not by this Court."[21]
In LDP,[22] there was sufficient basis on the record for the COMELEC, and ultimately the Court, to make the factual determination as to who between the LDP Party Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the certificates of candidacy upon the competing claims of both sides. In concluding therein that it was the LDP Party Chairman who held such right over the Secretary General, the Court relied on the language of the party constitution and the facts on record.
However, LDP reflects not only the correct attitude of the Court, but also the wrong-headed approach enacted by the COMELEC which significantly was rebuked by the Court. The COMELEC in LDP had allowed for the official recognition of two wings within the LDP rather than resolving which of the two wings was actually entitled to "represent" the party in the 2004 elections. This novel resolution was struck down by the Court, relying on a straightforward determination of which of the two "wings", under the party constitution, bore the authority to authenticate the candidates of the political party. The "Solomonic" solution of the COMELEC entailed additional steps other than a singular determination of the facts and laws involved in order to resolve the leadership dispute at hand.
I agree with the opinion of Justice Garcia when it upholds the COMELEC's conclusions that Senator Drilon can no longer be legally deemed as the Party President, and that the Atienza slate was not legally elected to Party offices either. These conclusions were derived from the evaluation of the COMELEC of the evidence presented by the parties before it, in conformity with the long-recognized role of the poll body as a trier of fact.
I wish to dwell upon the issue pertaining to Senator Drilon's claim of present incumbency as party president, which in turn hinges on the valid ratification of amendments to the party constitution. With respect to Senator Drilon's claims before the COMELEC that he is entitled to remain as Party President, the duty falls upon his side to prove the factual basis that establishes this argument. In particular, he would have to prove that the Liberal Party Constitution was indeed amended in 1999 and 2004.
It should be borne in mind that the enactment of the constitution of a political party does not require the concurrence of any government body, including the COMELEC, before it can be implemented. Indeed, any legislation that would require a political party to submit its constitution for approval to the COMELEC or any other arm of government would be unconstitutional, noxious as it would be to the constitutional guarantee of free association. Yet since a party constitution does not necessitate any imprimatur from the COMELEC, there can be no prima facie assumption entertained by the COMELEC that a constitution presented to it has indeed been duly ratified or amended.
If there is no dispute raised before the COMELEC as to the validity of a party constitution or its amendments, then the poll body should take in such unanimity as sufficient proof that the party charter has indeed been duly ratified or amended. However, if, as in this case, competing factions of a political party do present varying claims as to whether a particular constitution has been amended or ratified, the COMELEC is well empowered and obligated to require the parties to submit proof of their respective claims, and to evaluate the evidence following the appropriate legal guidelines under the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
In the present dispute, both parties do admit the existence of the same Liberal Party Constitution prior to the said 1999 and 2004 amendments, referred to in the record as the Salonga Constitution. The question lies in the valid ratification of these two sets of amendments, to which the Drilon camp attests while the Atienza side disputes the same. While affidavits have been presented attesting to the ratification of said amendments[23], there are also affidavits disclaiming such ratification on the claim that no quorum having been attained to ratify such amendments. Upon such circumstance, it was but proper for the COMELEC to prefer more definitive proof from the Drilon wing that the amendments were indeed ratified. However, outside of the affidavits, no proof at all was submitted establishing the ratification of the 1999 amendments. On the other hand, the evidence submitted to prove the ratification of the 2004 amendments was the minutes of the meeting of the National Executive Council on 30 November 2004 wherein it was reflected that the adoption of the changes was approved by 2/3 of the membership of the Council, as required by the Salonga Constitution.[24] However, in light of the contrary allegation that the quorum requirement was not met during the meeting, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for having insisted on more conclusive proof, such as the attendance sheet during the said meeting.
Tinga, J., concur.
Endnotes:
[1] G.R. No. 161265, 24 February 2004, 423 SCRA 665.
[2] Id. at 675-676.
[3] G.R. No. 80218, 5 November 1987.
[4] See Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 440, 446 (1998).
[5] Supra note 3 at 2-3. It was Kalaw who questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the leadership dispute in her answer. The COMELEC denied Kalaw's motion to declare the case terminated. The case reached the Court on Kalaw's petition. The Court dismissed her petition on the ground that the "conflict involves questions of fact which should be examined and decided by the respondent COMELEC and not by this Court."
[6] G.R. Nos. 86177-78, August 31, 1989.
[7] Infra.
[8] Id.
[9] Supra note 1 at 676-677.
[10] 70 Phil. 703 (1940).
[11] Id. at 706.
[12] Id. Emphasis supplied. In Sec. 2(3), Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the word "administrative" modifying "decisions" which appeared in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions was removed. It now reads in part: "(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections . . ."
[13] Id. at 718.
[14] See e.g., http://www.liberalparty.ph/news/News_LP2007/LP%20proclaims%20
Kiko%20and%20Noynoy. html, Last visited, 25 February 2007.
[15] See "Defensor: Rivalries at local level could affect Team Unity victory", http: //www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx? StoryId=67532, Last visited, 25 February 2007
[16] 373 Phil. 896 (1999).
[17] See Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
[18] Supra note 10.
[19] Supra note 3.
[20] Sumulong v. COMELEC, supra note 10 at 719.
[21] Supra note 3.
[22] Supra note 1.
[23] Particularly the affidavits executed by Senators Jovito Salonga, Wigberto Ta�ada, Governor Raul Daza and Secretary Florencio Abad
[24] Notably, the Salonga Constitution required a 2/3rds approval of the Executive Committee, the National Executive Council having been an innovation of the 1999 amendments.
S E P E R A T E O P I N I O N
GARCIA, J.:
I vote to affirm the assailed Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc with modification.
Before the Court are these two petitions for certiorari[1] and prohibition, with application for injunctive relief, to nullify and set aside a portion of the Resolution[2] dated October 13, 2006, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC or COMMISSION) en banc in SPP No. 06-002, an action to nullify the election of officers of the Liberal Party (LP) held on March 2, 2006.
The assailed October 13, 2006 Resolution (the subject resolution, hereinafter) nullified the election of officers aforestated, ordered the holding of a new but COMELEC-supervised party election and declared Senator Franklin M. Drilon as LP President in a hold-over capacity.
The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174992, has Sen. Drilon, purporting to represent the LP as its incumbent president, principally seeking a modification of that portion of the subject resolution imposing and calling an election of officers for the LP. In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 175546, Mayor Joselito L. Atienza of Manila and thirteen others elected in the March 2, 2006 elections (hereinafter "Mayor Atienza, et al.") � the same individuals impleaded as respondents in SPP No. 06-002 and in G.R. No. 174992 - except from the nullification of the March 2, 2006 elections in question and the declaration that Sen. Drilon is the hold-over LP President after July 24, 2006.
To put matters in the proper perspective, it should be pointed out that the instant controversy features individual respondents in the first petition becoming the petitioners in the second, while the virtual petitioner (Sen. Drilon) in the first petition is named respondent in the second. Then too, Sen. Drilon's claim in the first petition that he represents the entire LP finds opposition from the petitioners in the other recourse. Accordingly, to obviate confusion, the first petition shall simply be referred to as the Drilon petition, while the second, as the Atienza petition.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to these consolidated cases are as follows:
In January 1992, the LP, a registered national political party headed at that time by then Senator Jovito Salonga, filed with the COMELEC its Constitution[3] (hereafter the "1992 LP or the Salonga Constitution" for convenience ). Article 29, Section B thereof provides that the "constitution may be amended by the vote of two thirds of the Executive Committee at a meeting called for the purpose by the [party] President." Thereafter, or during the watch of then Gov. Raul Daza (hereinafter Daza), several amendments to the said constitution were introduced. On November 30, 2004, or during the term of Sen. Drilon as LP President, additional amendments were made. Among others, the amendments adverted to consisted of the reduction of the term of office of party officials from four (4) to three (3) years and the creation of new positions, e.g., Chairman, and party organs, such as the National Executive Council (NECO) which is vested with the power to amend the LP Constitution by a vote of 2/3 of all its members in a meeting called for the purpose by the party president.[4] Like what the parties conveniently referred to as the Daza amendments or Constitution, the opposing private parties herein, owing to differing positions on whether or not the amendments were duly ratified, disagree on the effectiveness of the November 30, 2004 or the so called "Drilon Constitution."[5]
Meanwhile, on July 24, 2002, the LP elected then Congressman Florencio Abad as LP President. Per the Salonga Constitution, Article 9 of which gives a 4-year round of duty to the party president and other officers,[6] Mr. Abad may serve, as such president, up to July 24, 2006. He, however, resigned before he could complete his term, paving the way for the election on September 8, 2004 of Sen. Drilon as LP president,[7] among other officers.
Subsequently, certain political events rocked political alliances and tested party loyalties. So it was that on July 8, 2005, in a press conference held at the Club Filipino in Greenhills, Metro Manila, Sen. Drilon, joined by some LP stalwarts, called on President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to step down.[8] This anti-administration stance which the Drilon group announced as the alleged LP position did not sit well with Mayor Atienza and a score of LP members. They denounced what amounted to a withdrawal of support for Pres. Arroyo as having been effected without due consultation, let alone clearance from the proper body within the party.[9]
Calls[10] made for the convening of the NECO to define the party's stand vis-�-vis the action taken by the Drilon group went unheeded, dashing hopes to avert a looming party split.
On March 2, 2006, Mayor Atienza hosted a party conference at the Manila Hotel to discuss local autonomy and party matters. Apart from party members, in attendance in that gathering were a majority of the following: LP Congressmen, NECO members and local chief executives nationwide.[11] Albeit an election was not part of the stated agenda, the conference culminated with a motion to declare all LP positions vacant, followed by the election of Mayor Atienza, et al., as LP president and officers, respectively, the electing organ being allegedly the party"s National Assembly.[12] Later developments saw Mayor Atienza convening on March 22, 2006 the LP NECO which then affirmed the actions/decisions reached in the March 2, 2006 conference.[13]
Sen. Drilon's reaction was swift. For on March 3, 2006, he, as "LP President," filed a Petition[14] with the COMELEC against Mayor Atienza, et al., to nullify what he dubbed as the "romp" March 2, 2006 Manila Hotel elections and to enjoin the latter, as respondents therein, from holding themselves and acting as newly-elected party officers. In the petition, docketed as SPP No. 06-002, Sen. Drilon tagged the elections adverted to as unlawful and/or without binding effect on the LP for the following reasons:
To the answers, Sen. Drilon filed separate replies. Separate rejoinders to the replies followed.
The COMELEC heard the parties on oral arguments on April 27, 2006 and June 8, 2006. In the course thereof, they adopted as their common evidence a souvenir program marked as Exh. "1" and Exh. "A."[16]
After the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2006 the subject resolution[17] invalidating, as earlier narrated, the March 2, 2006 elections of Mayor Atienza, et al., as new LP officers. It also held that Sen. Drilon only serves as LP President in a hold-over capacity, elected as he was to that position under the 1992 Salonga Constitution to serve the unexpired portion of Rep. Abad's July 2002 to July 2004 term. To write finis to the issue of LP leadership which, to the COMELEC, will likely confront [it] again in the future if left unresolved, the COMELEC ordered a Commission-supervised intra-party election. In full, the fallo of the subject resolution reads:
Following the filing of the petition in G.R. No. 174992 (Drilon petition), the Court issued on November 9, 2006 a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the COMELEC "from proceeding with and supervising the elections set on November 13, 2006." Shortly thereafter, Mayor Atienza, et al., and the COMELEC filed their respective comments with prayer to lift the TRO. In January 2007, Mayor Atienza, et al., interposed their own certiorari petition,[24] docketed as G.R. No. 175546 (Atienza petition).
Per its en banc Resolution of January 16, 2007, the Court ordered the consolidation of these two petitions.
In G.R. No. 174992, Sen. Drilon submits as ground for allowing his petition the following:
The threshold issue tendered in both recourses turns on the Salonga LP Constitution, as differentiated, for the nonce, from the Daza and Drilon LP Constitutions.
Sen. Drilon disputes the COMELEC's holding that the Salonga Constitution is the effective charter determinative of, or to govern, the issue of the LP leadership. Pressing on, he questions the finding that he is just a hold-over LP president. It is Sen. Drilon's posture that the LP's effective constitution that should measure all acts of its officials is not the Salonga Constitution, as concluded by the COMELEC, but that charter as amended since November 30, 2004 under which he was party president with a fix term until November 30, 2007. He would thus fault the COMELEC in its holding that the Salonga Constitution has not been effectively amended and that then Rep. Abad was elected LP president, served and, halfway thru his term, resigned as such under the aegis of the Salonga Constitution in which case his successor, i.e., Sen. Drilon, shall, consistent with Section F (1) thereof, only serve the remaining period of the Abad July 24, 2002 � July 24, 2006 unexpired term, thus:
We stress right off that the twin certiorari proceedings before us seek to annul, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the subject COMELEC resolution. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in a whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[25] The abuse must be patent or of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[26] The respective arguments of both petitioners shall be assayed using this unbending yardstick.
The first ground set forth in the Drilon petition entails a review of the basis for the COMELEC's conclusion that: the Salonga Constitution, as submitted to the Commission in 1992, is of governing sway, the same having not been validly amended. At this point, we cannot condemn and dismiss this determination as capricious or arbitrary, for, contrary to what Sen. Drilon presently alleges, the same conclusion was reached taking into account and upon analysis of the Minutes of the several NECO meetings he invokes to prove the fact of valid amendments. The following excerpts of the assailed subject resolution could not be any clearer:
What are appended to the memorandum instead are three (3) sets of SWORN STATEMENT all executed on February 19, 2007 by Jovito R. Salonga, Raul A. Daza and Florencio B. Abad, respectively. In gist, the affiants, who at one time or another serverd as LP President, depose that the Salonga Constitution had been amended with the notice and 2/3 votes requirements being complied. All three also attest that among the significant amendments were the reduction of the term of office of the party officers from four (4) to three (3) years with the first of such terms counted from September 30, 2001 and the replacement of the Executive Committee by the NECO. They also declare being present when, on September 8, 2004, the NECO elected Sen. Drilon as LP President to serve until November 30, 2007.
As pieces of evidence, the adverted sworn statements of the three (3) honorable gentlemen are of little provative value. In the first place, they are presented in lieu of the testimony of the declarants themselves. Secondly, these sworn statements could have been presented � but were not � during the oral arguments before the COMELEC, or at least before this Court. In that manner, the COMELEC or the Court would have had the opportunity to elicit relevant information either from the concerned party or his counsel. Then too, the opposing party could, if so minded, offer rebutting evidence. And corollary to the second, the sworn statements appeared to have been prepared and now submitted after Sen. Drilon realized that he cannot, even if perhaps he wanted to, present the necessary documentation evidencing the notice of meeting to amend and the members of the LP Executive Committee who attended and voted to amend.
At any rate, notwithstanding the oral arguments it conducted, the Court still went out of its usual way to accord the concerned parties - Sen. Drilon more particularly because he has the burden of proof on the matter of ratification - ample opportunity to prove the fact that the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had been duly ratified. Towards this end, we issued a Resolution on March 13, 2007 remanding the cases to the COMELEC en banc for it �
As borne by the "COMPLIANCE" subsequently submitted to the Court by the COMELEC en banc, what were presented thereto by the parties mostly consisted of sworn statements. For his part, Sen. Drilon submitted the joint or separate Affidavits (Exhs. "A" "B" "C" and sub-marked documents) of past LP Presidents, to wit: Sen. Salonga, Messrs. Daza, Abad and Wigberto E. Tanada. Also submitted were other exhibits (Exhs. "D" to "J") purportedly documenting activities of the LP under its President, Sen. Drilon, wherein Atienza et al., appear to have attended and/or participated in. Exhibits "1" "2" "3", corresponding to the Affidavits of Eleazar P. Quinto, who claim to have served under the successive presidents of the LP, Mayor Atienza and Rep. Abayon, respectively, all dated March 16, 2007, comprise the totality of the countervailing evidence of Mayor Atienza et al.
In the same "COMPLIANCE", the COMELEC en banc found, as it did earlier, against the idea of valid ratification of the Salonga Constitution, as Sen. Drilon posits at every turn. And in a virtual repeat of its findings embodied in the assailed resolution and the premises holding them together, the COMELEC stated that the exhibits thus submitted neither prove that the purported Daza/Drilon amendments were ratified nor do they give rise to estoppel. In the precise words of the COMELEC en banc in its aforesaid "COMPLIANCE"-
The invocation of estoppel is quite misplaced. As a principle of equity, the real office of the doctrine of estoppel is limited to supplying the deficiency in the law; it cannot supplant a positive law or a governing rule.[33] It can be invoked only in highly exceptional cases, but should not be given effect beyond what is necessary to accomplish justice between the parties.[34] Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his conduct, representation, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.[35] The essential elements of estoppel in respect to the party claiming it are: a) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; b) bona fide reliance, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereof of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.[36]
Sen. Drilon cannot plausibly claim for himself the benefit of estoppel, knowing as he did and does or at least expected to know that the 2/3 votes needed for an amendment to the LP Constitution to be ratified has not been met. Mayor Atienza, et al., therefore, cannot be adjudged to have placed themselves in estoppel to deny and question the efficacy of the amendments to the Salonga Constitution. Accordingly, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for making short shrift of Sen. Drilon's estoppel angle with the following line:
Just as the COMELEC correctly resolved the impasse on the issue of ratification of the LP charter amendments against the backdrop of the Salonga Constitution, so should the same approach and basis be taken and used to test the validity of the contentious March 2, 2006 elections. For, as the Court instructed in Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) v. COMELEC,[43] the COMELEC, in pursuit of its mandate flowing from its regulatory and enforcement powers, needs only to turn, at the first instance, to the party constitution to resolve issues brought to it involving party leadership, the ascertainment of its legitimate officers and their powers. Then too, just like the conclusion of the COMELEC on the ratification issue, the question of whether or not the March 2, 2006 elections in question hewed with the prescriptions of the Salonga Constitution involves factual matters. And contrary to Mayor Atienza's group's assertion under the first ground of their own petition, the elections thus conducted were not, as categorically declared by the COMELEC, in accordance with, but in gross violation of, the procedures defined in the LP Constitution and, therefore, invalid. We reproduce with approval the COMELEC's detailed explanation:
It cannot be overemphasized at this juncture that, as held in Palmares v. Comelec,[47] the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of leadership in a political party. And as LDP[48] instructs that poll body ought to look, if appropriate, into the Party's Constitution to resolve such issue and to determine the extent of the powers of a party's legitimate officers. Any suggestion, therefore, that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to decide which of the conflicting constitutions, clashing provisions or their amendments, as the case may be, is applicable to a given juridical issue should be rejected. Else, the COMELEC would virtually be denied the tools to carry out its jurisdictional mandate categorically articulated in Palmares.
Given the above perspective and going to the next issue raised in the Atienza petition, the Court is at a loss to understand the ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC for its declaration that Sen. Drilon, after July 24, 2006, is a hold-over LP President until such time that a replacement � and a new set of officers � shall have been validly elected.
Mayor Atienza, et al., have blamed Sen. Drilon for causing the problem within the party. He then proceeds to point out that under the LP Constitution - "[A]ny officer of the Party shall forfeit his office by any act antagonistic to its objectives or inimical to its interest ... as may [be] determined by the Executive Committee."[49] This cited provision, however, is not a winning card for the Atienza group. For one, the Executive Committee does not appear to have made any determination of culpability. Moreover, in the field of perspectives, what is an antagonistic-to-a-cause act to one group may be a call for political ideals to another.
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the election of new LP officers the COMELEC called and set undermines, as Sen. Drilon insists, the constitutional guarantee to free association. To Sen. Drilon, such call is antithetical to the general rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of associations like political parties, a view shared by some members of the Court. He adds that party elections and the details of their conduct are strictly internal party affairs that should concern only the party and its members; and that COMELEC's decision to call elections for the party is unreasonable and contrary to law and ergo should be struck down.[50]
Sen. Drilon's contention is valid to a point. However, the COMELEC's order for a commission-supervised intra-party election does not, under the peculiar backdrop for which it was called, amount to an unwarranted interference to justify the issuance of the corrective writ of certiorari.
At bottom, the instant petitions involve a leadership fight and the Court is asked to determine the LP's legitimate officers who will provide directions to the party and its members in its quest for political victory. The dispute is certainly not, as some members of the Court tend to view it to be, about whether the Drilon faction was right and the Atienza faction was wrong, or vice versa, in withdrawing political support from President Arroyo, albeit Sen. Drilon's call for President Arroyo to step down triggered the parting of ways between the two factions. The matter of whom to support is doubtless not a justifiable issue and the COMELEC or the Court would be flirting with jurisdictional disaster if it as much as try to influence either camp to throw its lot for or against the administration. To be sure, Sen. Drilon did not, at the first instance, invoke the COMELEC's jurisdiction to protect and support his and his group's decision to withdraw political support from the President. At the end of the day, what Sen. Drilon asked of the COMELEC was to recognize his right to act as LP President and to declare Mayor Atienza's election as such illegal. To say that the senator repaired to the COMELEC and then to this Court for a confirmatory ruling on the propriety of his decision to withdraw political support from the President is to read in his basic petition and other pleadings something not validly deducible therefrom. And if the argument on propriety is pursued to its logical conclusion, the COMELEC and even this Court would then be made to appear as possessing the power to decide the propriety of political alignments within a party. The absurdity of the notion needs no belaboring.
Political parties, being a basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus, are affected with public interest. Government draws its strength from the support of political parties.[51] They are, to borrow from Justice Jose C. Vitug,[52] an important feature in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power, parties add an important dimension of stability to a political system and help organize the government and electorate by, among others, recruiting candidates, educating the public and providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. Accordingly, the law accords special treatment to registered political parties and their candidates,[53] both as to privileges conferred and obligations imposed and with respect to regulation.
Considering the role political parties play in the political life of a democratic society and in the running of government, it is not surprising that the Constitution would invest a body, like the COMELEC, the power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of an election, take measures to ensure orderly elections and register political parties.[54] Party registration enables the government, through the COMELEC, to supervise and regulate the activities of various elements participating in an election.[55] From this mix, but more particularly from its power to register political parties, the COMELEC is possessed with jurisdiction to resolve issues of political leadership in a political party or, in the concrete, to determine its legitimate officers who shall act on behalf and be responsible for the acts of a political party,[56] such as who, or which between two factions, is entitled to nominate election inspectors,[57] or to endorse and sign party nominations.
In the light of the foregoing doctrinal holdings, the COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction when it ordered the conduct of a Commission-supervised election of LP officers to take over from the hold-over party president and other officers.
The allegation that such order constitutes interference in purely party affairs cannot, following the teaching of Palmares, Kalaw and LDP, be accorded tenability. And lest it be overlooked, the call for an LP election was obviously made in a bid to restore some sanity, if not order, in the party. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that both the Drilon and Atienza camps are allied with different political parties and support, for the most part, different candidates. Lending urgent dimension to the call are the following realities stated or deducible from the subject resolution or the records:
With the view we take of the case, the COMELEC was acting within its discretion to step in, when so asked, and call a party election to determine, once and for all, who are the legitimate officers of the LP and in the process obviate confusion among the LP members, the electorate and the public in general. Anything less would only defer the resolution of an issue which would likely develop roots and branches that will bear the seeds of complicated future litigations which, in all likelihood, would again confront the Commission. In making the call, the COMELEC obviously was guided by the lesson of Palmares:
Lastly, Sen. Drilon bewails the fact that the COMELEC set the time and place for a party election when what he simply wanted was for the Commission to nullify the elections of Atienza, et al., during the March 2, 2006 conference and to enjoin them from representing themselves as party officers. Sen. Drilon thus claims that the COMELEC committed a bad procedurally erroneous action.
Again we disagree.
As may be noted, Atienza, et al., in their Answer,[66] Rejoinder[67] and Memorandum,[68] filed with the COMELEC, raised as one of the issues for the COMELEC's resolution, the matter of the expiration of Sen. Drilon's term of office. The same issue took the stage during the oral argument before the COMELEC when the counsel for Mayor Atienza, et al., answered in the affirmative the following query of COMELEC Chairman Abalos: "So aside from the issue of ratification you are now coming up with another issue as to whether the term of President Drilon has already expired ...."[69] And as earlier narrated, Atienza, et al., in their answer sought, as one of its alternative prayers, the convening of the National Convention and for COMELEC to supervise the holding of new intra-party elections in order to settle the leadership dispute once and for all. An almost identical alternative relief is embodied in Rep. Abayon's answer.[70]
Under Section 5, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court, when issues not alleged in the original pleadings of the parties are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, the court acquires jurisdiction over the issues which shall then be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Consistent with this rule is our holding that the trial court may not grant a relief on the basis of an issue not previously raised in the pleadings; that what is not juridically presented cannot be juridically decided,[71] necessarily implying that an issue juridically presented can juridically be decided, provided that full opportunity is accorded the opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence.[72]
In net effect, the calling by the COMELEC of an intra-party election was within the scope of the pleadings, the issues made and the law. It cannot be nullified for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court ends this ponencia with some observations.
Sen. Drilon faults the COMELEC for meddling with purely internal party affairs when the latter scheduled an election to peremptorily resolve clashing claims over the LP presidency. Yet, it was he who first voluntarily submitted to and invoked the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to confirm his election and to disregard the election of the other wing when he felt his leadership was threatened and in fact was no longer recognized by the Atienza group.
Mayor Atienza, et al., on the other hand, also fault the COMELEC for declaring invalid the elections of March 2, 2006, foisting on the Court the argument that said election was a valid exercise of the party's constituent powers, rooted in their freedom of association and political rights. Yet, in their Answer[73] to Petition,[74] in SPP No. 06-002, Mayor Atienza, et al., prayed, as an alternative relief, for the Commission "to initiate the convening of the National Convention to supervise the holding of an election in order to settle the leadership dispute once and for all," impliedly, but doubtless, admitting the nullity of the impugned elections held on March 2, 2006.
The ironies of the fault-finding postures of the contending parties are not lost on the Court.
Accordingly, I vote that the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated October 13, 2006 be AFFIRMED with the modification on when the elections of LP officers are to be conducted. In lieu of November 23, 2006, as originally scheduled, the Commission shall reset such election on such a date and time it may deem appropriate taking into account the convenience of the participants involved and, more particularly, the holding of the national and local elections in May 2007. ACCORDINGLY, the petitions in G.R. No. 174992 and G.R. No. 175546 are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on November 9, 2006 in G.R. No. 174992 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Before the Court are these two petitions for certiorari[1] and prohibition, with application for injunctive relief, to nullify and set aside a portion of the Resolution[2] dated October 13, 2006, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC or COMMISSION) en banc in SPP No. 06-002, an action to nullify the election of officers of the Liberal Party (LP) held on March 2, 2006.
The assailed October 13, 2006 Resolution (the subject resolution, hereinafter) nullified the election of officers aforestated, ordered the holding of a new but COMELEC-supervised party election and declared Senator Franklin M. Drilon as LP President in a hold-over capacity.
The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174992, has Sen. Drilon, purporting to represent the LP as its incumbent president, principally seeking a modification of that portion of the subject resolution imposing and calling an election of officers for the LP. In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 175546, Mayor Joselito L. Atienza of Manila and thirteen others elected in the March 2, 2006 elections (hereinafter "Mayor Atienza, et al.") � the same individuals impleaded as respondents in SPP No. 06-002 and in G.R. No. 174992 - except from the nullification of the March 2, 2006 elections in question and the declaration that Sen. Drilon is the hold-over LP President after July 24, 2006.
To put matters in the proper perspective, it should be pointed out that the instant controversy features individual respondents in the first petition becoming the petitioners in the second, while the virtual petitioner (Sen. Drilon) in the first petition is named respondent in the second. Then too, Sen. Drilon's claim in the first petition that he represents the entire LP finds opposition from the petitioners in the other recourse. Accordingly, to obviate confusion, the first petition shall simply be referred to as the Drilon petition, while the second, as the Atienza petition.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to these consolidated cases are as follows:
In January 1992, the LP, a registered national political party headed at that time by then Senator Jovito Salonga, filed with the COMELEC its Constitution[3] (hereafter the "1992 LP or the Salonga Constitution" for convenience ). Article 29, Section B thereof provides that the "constitution may be amended by the vote of two thirds of the Executive Committee at a meeting called for the purpose by the [party] President." Thereafter, or during the watch of then Gov. Raul Daza (hereinafter Daza), several amendments to the said constitution were introduced. On November 30, 2004, or during the term of Sen. Drilon as LP President, additional amendments were made. Among others, the amendments adverted to consisted of the reduction of the term of office of party officials from four (4) to three (3) years and the creation of new positions, e.g., Chairman, and party organs, such as the National Executive Council (NECO) which is vested with the power to amend the LP Constitution by a vote of 2/3 of all its members in a meeting called for the purpose by the party president.[4] Like what the parties conveniently referred to as the Daza amendments or Constitution, the opposing private parties herein, owing to differing positions on whether or not the amendments were duly ratified, disagree on the effectiveness of the November 30, 2004 or the so called "Drilon Constitution."[5]
Meanwhile, on July 24, 2002, the LP elected then Congressman Florencio Abad as LP President. Per the Salonga Constitution, Article 9 of which gives a 4-year round of duty to the party president and other officers,[6] Mr. Abad may serve, as such president, up to July 24, 2006. He, however, resigned before he could complete his term, paving the way for the election on September 8, 2004 of Sen. Drilon as LP president,[7] among other officers.
Subsequently, certain political events rocked political alliances and tested party loyalties. So it was that on July 8, 2005, in a press conference held at the Club Filipino in Greenhills, Metro Manila, Sen. Drilon, joined by some LP stalwarts, called on President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to step down.[8] This anti-administration stance which the Drilon group announced as the alleged LP position did not sit well with Mayor Atienza and a score of LP members. They denounced what amounted to a withdrawal of support for Pres. Arroyo as having been effected without due consultation, let alone clearance from the proper body within the party.[9]
Calls[10] made for the convening of the NECO to define the party's stand vis-�-vis the action taken by the Drilon group went unheeded, dashing hopes to avert a looming party split.
On March 2, 2006, Mayor Atienza hosted a party conference at the Manila Hotel to discuss local autonomy and party matters. Apart from party members, in attendance in that gathering were a majority of the following: LP Congressmen, NECO members and local chief executives nationwide.[11] Albeit an election was not part of the stated agenda, the conference culminated with a motion to declare all LP positions vacant, followed by the election of Mayor Atienza, et al., as LP president and officers, respectively, the electing organ being allegedly the party"s National Assembly.[12] Later developments saw Mayor Atienza convening on March 22, 2006 the LP NECO which then affirmed the actions/decisions reached in the March 2, 2006 conference.[13]
Sen. Drilon's reaction was swift. For on March 3, 2006, he, as "LP President," filed a Petition[14] with the COMELEC against Mayor Atienza, et al., to nullify what he dubbed as the "romp" March 2, 2006 Manila Hotel elections and to enjoin the latter, as respondents therein, from holding themselves and acting as newly-elected party officers. In the petition, docketed as SPP No. 06-002, Sen. Drilon tagged the elections adverted to as unlawful and/or without binding effect on the LP for the following reasons:
In their consolidated Answer[15] wherein they asked, as alternative prayers to a dismissal action, the COMELEC to uphold the action by the party's Leaders' Assembly on March 2, 2006 or to initiate and supervise the holding of a leadership-settling elections, Mayor Atienza, et al., countered:
- Absent of notice of election of party officers to the officers/members of the NECO and National Political Council (Napolco); Election of party officers were not mentioned in the March 2, 2006 conference invitation.
- The incumbent party officers of the party and NECO members were elected for a three (3) year term commencing November 30, 2004, when the NECO confirmed their September 8, 2006 election, or up to November 30, 2007;
- The NECO and Napolco were not properly convened in accordance with the LP Constitution, which has been amended on November 30, 2004. Mayor Atienza cannot call the convening of the NECO.
- The so-called "National Assembly" which elected Mayor Atienza, et al., is a non-existent body.
In his separate answer, Congressman Harlin Abayon virtually adopted all the allegations and counter-arguments his co-respondents in SPP No. 06-002 earlier raised.
- A majority of (a) LP Congressmen, (b) a majority of the NECO members and (c) LP local executives nationwide attended the March 2, 2006 Manila Hotel assembly and the elections held on that date were the inevitable result of the collective protest of majority of the party members which effectively cut short the 3-year term of Sen. Drilon;
- The election of a new set of national officers was ratified by the NECO on March 22, 2006;
- The LP is governed by the "Salonga Constitution," the "Daza amendments" and the"Drilon amendments" not having been duly ratified; and
- Sen. Drilon never submitted himself to an election after serving the unexpired term of his predecessor (Rep. Abad).
To the answers, Sen. Drilon filed separate replies. Separate rejoinders to the replies followed.
The COMELEC heard the parties on oral arguments on April 27, 2006 and June 8, 2006. In the course thereof, they adopted as their common evidence a souvenir program marked as Exh. "1" and Exh. "A."[16]
After the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2006 the subject resolution[17] invalidating, as earlier narrated, the March 2, 2006 elections of Mayor Atienza, et al., as new LP officers. It also held that Sen. Drilon only serves as LP President in a hold-over capacity, elected as he was to that position under the 1992 Salonga Constitution to serve the unexpired portion of Rep. Abad's July 2002 to July 2004 term. To write finis to the issue of LP leadership which, to the COMELEC, will likely confront [it] again in the future if left unresolved, the COMELEC ordered a Commission-supervised intra-party election. In full, the fallo of the subject resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition, viz:Apropos the scheduled election decreed, the COMELEC set the ensuing terms of reference[18] to be observed:
1) Invalidating the election of respondents [Mayor Atienza et al.] conducted on March 2, 2006;
2) Enjoining respondents from representing themselves as officers of the party and performing the duties and functions of the officers they were allegedly elected to occupy in the March 2, 2006 elections; and
3) Setting the elections of LP officers on November 23, 2006, at 10:00 a.m. at the Manila Hotel at the expense of the LP to be supervised by the Commission.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring ours.)
The provisions of the Salonga Constitution shall be used in the selection of the new offices. The positions to be filled up are those indicated in Article 9, Section B of the Salonga Constitution ...;[19] The participants in the election are the members of the NECO (equivalent to the Executive Committee under the Salonga Constitution) indicated in the souvenir program that was adopted ... as a common exhibit.[20] (Words in parenthesis in the original.)Subsequently, Mayor Atienza, et al., moved for a clarification on the mechanics of and participants in the scheduled election,[21] stating that what they agreed upon as a common exhibit was the entire list of party officers appearing in said exhibit plus all elected party officials, i.e., down to municipal councilors. The COMELEC, however, pursuant to Rule 13, Section 1, of its Rules of Procedure on Prohibited Pleadings[22] denied the motion partaking as it did of a motion for reconsideration of an en banc Commission ruling, adding the observation that a national convention is not the body empowered to elect the LP officers.[23]
Following the filing of the petition in G.R. No. 174992 (Drilon petition), the Court issued on November 9, 2006 a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the COMELEC "from proceeding with and supervising the elections set on November 13, 2006." Shortly thereafter, Mayor Atienza, et al., and the COMELEC filed their respective comments with prayer to lift the TRO. In January 2007, Mayor Atienza, et al., interposed their own certiorari petition,[24] docketed as G.R. No. 175546 (Atienza petition).
Per its en banc Resolution of January 16, 2007, the Court ordered the consolidation of these two petitions.
In G.R. No. 174992, Sen. Drilon submits as ground for allowing his petition the following:
On the other hand, Mayor Atienza, et al., in their petition in G.R. No. 175546, submit that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: 1) when it declared invalid the [LP's] election of new officers on March 2, 2006, and 2) when it declared that private respondent [Sen. Drilon] remained the interim President of the [LP] until July 24, 2006 and was thereafter the holdover President.
- COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IGNORING THE VARIOUS MINUTES OF NECO MEETINGS AS PROOF OF APPROVAL OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE PARTY CHARTER. WHAT IS MORE, LP's ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP, RESPONDENTS [MAYOR ATIENZA, ET AL.] INCLUDED, ACQUIESCED AND ACCEPTED THE AMENDMENTS TO ITS CHARTER AS OF 30 NOVEMBER 2004; and
- CALLING FOR AND SUPERVISING THE ELECTION OF PARTY OFFICERS ON A SPECIFIC TIME AND PLACE NOT ONLY OFFENDS THE RULE OF LAW, IT ALSO UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREE ASSOCIATION.
The threshold issue tendered in both recourses turns on the Salonga LP Constitution, as differentiated, for the nonce, from the Daza and Drilon LP Constitutions.
Sen. Drilon disputes the COMELEC's holding that the Salonga Constitution is the effective charter determinative of, or to govern, the issue of the LP leadership. Pressing on, he questions the finding that he is just a hold-over LP president. It is Sen. Drilon's posture that the LP's effective constitution that should measure all acts of its officials is not the Salonga Constitution, as concluded by the COMELEC, but that charter as amended since November 30, 2004 under which he was party president with a fix term until November 30, 2007. He would thus fault the COMELEC in its holding that the Salonga Constitution has not been effectively amended and that then Rep. Abad was elected LP president, served and, halfway thru his term, resigned as such under the aegis of the Salonga Constitution in which case his successor, i.e., Sen. Drilon, shall, consistent with Section F (1) thereof, only serve the remaining period of the Abad July 24, 2002 � July 24, 2006 unexpired term, thus:
SECTION F. ... -The Court is not persuaded.
- The Party President. " The Party President shall be the highest official ".
xxx xxx xxx
In case of vacancy in the office of the Party President � the Executive Committee shall ... meet and elect ... a new President to serve the remaining period of the unexpired term.
We stress right off that the twin certiorari proceedings before us seek to annul, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the subject COMELEC resolution. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in a whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[25] The abuse must be patent or of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[26] The respective arguments of both petitioners shall be assayed using this unbending yardstick.
The first ground set forth in the Drilon petition entails a review of the basis for the COMELEC's conclusion that: the Salonga Constitution, as submitted to the Commission in 1992, is of governing sway, the same having not been validly amended. At this point, we cannot condemn and dismiss this determination as capricious or arbitrary, for, contrary to what Sen. Drilon presently alleges, the same conclusion was reached taking into account and upon analysis of the Minutes of the several NECO meetings he invokes to prove the fact of valid amendments. The following excerpts of the assailed subject resolution could not be any clearer:
Petitioner [LP] claims that the Salonga Constitution has been amended first under the tenure of then LP President Raul Daza in 1997 [then] ... again amended by 2/3 of all the members of the NECO on November 30, 2004. In support thereof, petitioner submitted as proof the Minutes of Meeting of the [ NECO] held on November 30, 2004 .... Page 5 of the said Minutes states that Gov. Daza noticed ... that amendments could only be ratified by a 2/3 vote of the total membership of the NECO. He asked if the required 2/3 was present. xxx. The Secretariat made a head count and replied that there were thirty six (36) members ... present. Gov. Daza then suggested that the basis be the attendance sheet because some of the members of the NECO go out periodically ....Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Sen. Drilon, through counsel, conceded during the oral arguments before the Court that on him rests the burden of proving that indeed the Salonga Constitution had been properly amended and/or superseded.[28] He too admitted not knowing who were then the members of the LP Executive Committee when the Salonga Constitution was amended, let alone those who attended such meeting called, if one was called, for the purpose of such amendment. Needless to stress, the Senator had no knowledge as to who among the attendees voted to amend.[29] He, however, undertook to attach in his memorandum the necessary proof of such matters as the membership of the then LP Executive Committee, the notice of the meeting to amend, the members of the committee who attended and that, on the basis of the attendance, two thirds of members voted to amend.[30] Sadly, the promised evidence did not accompany the memorandum thus submitted.
xxx xxx xxx
However, as regards the first amendment under the Daza term, petitioner [LP] failed to submit any evidence to substantiate its claim that the amendments were validly ratified. There was merely a bare assertion ..... This is also true as regards the amendments during the term of Sen. Drilon. Petitioner failed to submit as evidence the attendance sheet referred to by Gov. Daza. In fact, petitioner failed to present any document that would show the signatures attesting to the fact that 2/3 of the NECO approved the amendments to the LP Constitution. xxx. Absent this attendance sheet or any document or proof showing that at least 2/3 of the members of the NECO attended the November 30, 2004 meeting, any allegation by the petitioner that 2/3 of the NECO was present and approved the amendments is a barren assertion lacking in proof. xxx.
xxx. Petitioner [LP] ... cites ... as indicative of the acquiescence of the respondents to the [1999 and November 30, 2004] amendments, to wit: (a) the Minutes of the Meeting of the NECO ... on November 28, 2003 which shows ... that respondents Atienza [et al.] ... were present at these (sic) meeting whereby the LP Constitution was amended creating the positions of Chairman and Vice-Chairman ...; (b) Minutes of the NECO Meeting on September 8, 2004 which shows that respondents were present ... and none of them questioned the election of Mayor Atienza as Chairman ...;(c) the Minutes of the NECO Meeting on November 30, 2004 shows that: ... the LP Constitution was amended and that respondents [who were present then] never questioned the proceedings. xxx.[27] (Underscoring in the original; bracketed words added.)
What are appended to the memorandum instead are three (3) sets of SWORN STATEMENT all executed on February 19, 2007 by Jovito R. Salonga, Raul A. Daza and Florencio B. Abad, respectively. In gist, the affiants, who at one time or another serverd as LP President, depose that the Salonga Constitution had been amended with the notice and 2/3 votes requirements being complied. All three also attest that among the significant amendments were the reduction of the term of office of the party officers from four (4) to three (3) years with the first of such terms counted from September 30, 2001 and the replacement of the Executive Committee by the NECO. They also declare being present when, on September 8, 2004, the NECO elected Sen. Drilon as LP President to serve until November 30, 2007.
As pieces of evidence, the adverted sworn statements of the three (3) honorable gentlemen are of little provative value. In the first place, they are presented in lieu of the testimony of the declarants themselves. Secondly, these sworn statements could have been presented � but were not � during the oral arguments before the COMELEC, or at least before this Court. In that manner, the COMELEC or the Court would have had the opportunity to elicit relevant information either from the concerned party or his counsel. Then too, the opposing party could, if so minded, offer rebutting evidence. And corollary to the second, the sworn statements appeared to have been prepared and now submitted after Sen. Drilon realized that he cannot, even if perhaps he wanted to, present the necessary documentation evidencing the notice of meeting to amend and the members of the LP Executive Committee who attended and voted to amend.
At any rate, notwithstanding the oral arguments it conducted, the Court still went out of its usual way to accord the concerned parties - Sen. Drilon more particularly because he has the burden of proof on the matter of ratification - ample opportunity to prove the fact that the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had been duly ratified. Towards this end, we issued a Resolution on March 13, 2007 remanding the cases to the COMELEC en banc for it �
Acting on the aforementioned Resolution, the COMELEC en banc appeared to have forthwith issued an Order requiring the parties to submit "evidence to prove that the Daza/Drilon amendments to the LP (Salonga) Constitution have been duly ratified."
- To receive further evidence on and resolve on the basis thereof the factual issue of whether or not the Daza/Drilon amendments to the LP (Salonga) Constitution have been ratified; and
- To submit to the Court its report thereon within five (5) days from notice hereof.
As borne by the "COMPLIANCE" subsequently submitted to the Court by the COMELEC en banc, what were presented thereto by the parties mostly consisted of sworn statements. For his part, Sen. Drilon submitted the joint or separate Affidavits (Exhs. "A" "B" "C" and sub-marked documents) of past LP Presidents, to wit: Sen. Salonga, Messrs. Daza, Abad and Wigberto E. Tanada. Also submitted were other exhibits (Exhs. "D" to "J") purportedly documenting activities of the LP under its President, Sen. Drilon, wherein Atienza et al., appear to have attended and/or participated in. Exhibits "1" "2" "3", corresponding to the Affidavits of Eleazar P. Quinto, who claim to have served under the successive presidents of the LP, Mayor Atienza and Rep. Abayon, respectively, all dated March 16, 2007, comprise the totality of the countervailing evidence of Mayor Atienza et al.
In the same "COMPLIANCE", the COMELEC en banc found, as it did earlier, against the idea of valid ratification of the Salonga Constitution, as Sen. Drilon posits at every turn. And in a virtual repeat of its findings embodied in the assailed resolution and the premises holding them together, the COMELEC stated that the exhibits thus submitted neither prove that the purported Daza/Drilon amendments were ratified nor do they give rise to estoppel. In the precise words of the COMELEC en banc in its aforesaid "COMPLIANCE"-
THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES CONSISTING OF DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS DO NOT PROVE THAT THE DAZA/DRILON AMENDMENTS TO THE LP (SALONGA) CONSTITUTION WERE RATIFIED.There can be no dispute that the COMELEC's holding on the inadequacy of Sen. Drilon's evidence to support his claim respecting the effective amendment of the Salonga Constitution is factual in nature. Sen. Drilon, therefore, faces an insurmountable bar. For, it is settled that the corrective hand of certiorari is available only upon showing of a capricious and arbitrary exercise of discretion. Judicial review by the Court in electoral and allied cases does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the COMELEC based its determination. We said as much in Dagloc v. COMELEC:[31]
xxx What exactly these documents and evidence are upon which the COMELEC en banc based its resolution, and how they have been appreciated in respect of their sufficiency, are beyond this Court's scrutiny. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed ... except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC ... on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The factual finding of the COMELEC en banc is therefore binding on the Court.Sen. Drilon submits the notion of estoppel in pais, arguing that Mayor Atienza, et al., are barred from impugning the validity of the claimed amendments introduced into the Salonga Constitution because: firstly, Eleazar Quinto, as LP Director-General allied with Mayor Atienza, prepared the Minutes of three (3) separate NECO meetings[32] during which time the amendments in questions were introduced; and secondly, Mayor Atienza, et al., participated in these meetings, particularly that held on November 30, 2004. To Sen. Drilon, those participants are deemed to have accepted the amended charter, rendering it fully efficacious as of that date.
The invocation of estoppel is quite misplaced. As a principle of equity, the real office of the doctrine of estoppel is limited to supplying the deficiency in the law; it cannot supplant a positive law or a governing rule.[33] It can be invoked only in highly exceptional cases, but should not be given effect beyond what is necessary to accomplish justice between the parties.[34] Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his conduct, representation, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.[35] The essential elements of estoppel in respect to the party claiming it are: a) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; b) bona fide reliance, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereof of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.[36]
Sen. Drilon cannot plausibly claim for himself the benefit of estoppel, knowing as he did and does or at least expected to know that the 2/3 votes needed for an amendment to the LP Constitution to be ratified has not been met. Mayor Atienza, et al., therefore, cannot be adjudged to have placed themselves in estoppel to deny and question the efficacy of the amendments to the Salonga Constitution. Accordingly, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for making short shrift of Sen. Drilon's estoppel angle with the following line:
Estoppel must be proved by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence in all its elements. Here, petitioner [Sen. Drilon or LP], as the party claiming the estoppel, has knowledge, or at least the means of knowledge of the truth of the facts in question, to wit, the ratification or lack thereof of the amendments to the LP Constitution, both during the Daza term and Drilon term. Petitioner cannot feign lack of knowledge or at least the means to ascertain the same if indeed the amendments were validly ratified. As party officers ... occupying important positions ..., they (sic) must have known, or at the very least, the means to ascertain the same. (Word in bracket added.)Much has been made by Sen. Drilon about Mayor Atienza and Rep. Abayon having been elected, during the period material, to positions[37] that never existed in the Salonga Constitution, the stated point being that these positions were creations by amendments of the Salonga Constitution.[38] The Court cannot bring itself to agree that said positions came to be necessarily by way of amendments to the Salonga Constitution. For, albeit the positions of Chairman and Vice President for Policy and Platform are indeed not specifically included in the list of electable officers in the Salonga Constitution, it does not necessarily follow that said positions exist precisely because the same charter underwent valid amendments. As it were, new positions could be added to those existing under the Salonga Constitution without in any way touching any of its provisions. Article 9, Section B thereof, provides for this contingency:
B. OFFICERS. The following officers shall be elected by the Executive Committee: Party President, Executive Vice President ... Treasurers and such other officers as may be necessary. (Emphasis added.)The Court has taken stock of the fact that Atienza, et al., had, in pars. 61, 67 and 80 of their Answer,[39] made reference to certain provisions[40] of the "Party Constitution" which are peculiar to and appear only in the Daza-Drilon Constitution. While it may indeed be viewed as an admission, the reference adverted to nonetheless does not detract from the fact that these amendments to the Salonga Constitution were not, as the COMELEC found, validly ratified. Mayor Atienza, et al., alleged so in their answer, thus:
32. However, these amendments in the party Constitution were never ratified by the NECO, as required by the very Constitution which Mr. Drilon invokes. As a matter of fact, and of record, the only Constitution that has been duly ratified is the Constitution under the presidency of former Senator Jovito R. Salonga. (Underscoring in the original)So did Rep. Harlan:
It must be mentioned that the Constitution relied upon by the Petitioner [Drilon] has not been ratified by any Party organ or the constituency of the Party itself. The Constitution that is still effective as of this time is the [LP] Constitution during the term of the Hon. Jovito Salonga ....[41] (Words in bracket added.)Besides, during the oral arguments before the Court, counsel for Atienza, et al., explained that the references to or the reproduction of certain provisions of the Drilon Constitution in their answer to the Drilon petition in the COMELEC en banc case was merely to highlight the fact that even Sen. Drilon himself refused to abide with the very Drilon amendments to the LP Constitution.[42]
Just as the COMELEC correctly resolved the impasse on the issue of ratification of the LP charter amendments against the backdrop of the Salonga Constitution, so should the same approach and basis be taken and used to test the validity of the contentious March 2, 2006 elections. For, as the Court instructed in Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) v. COMELEC,[43] the COMELEC, in pursuit of its mandate flowing from its regulatory and enforcement powers, needs only to turn, at the first instance, to the party constitution to resolve issues brought to it involving party leadership, the ascertainment of its legitimate officers and their powers. Then too, just like the conclusion of the COMELEC on the ratification issue, the question of whether or not the March 2, 2006 elections in question hewed with the prescriptions of the Salonga Constitution involves factual matters. And contrary to Mayor Atienza's group's assertion under the first ground of their own petition, the elections thus conducted were not, as categorically declared by the COMELEC, in accordance with, but in gross violation of, the procedures defined in the LP Constitution and, therefore, invalid. We reproduce with approval the COMELEC's detailed explanation:
We now go to the ... issue [on] the validity or invalidity of the March 2, 2006 elections .... xxx.It will not avail Mayor Atienza any to argue that the elections thus conducted on March 2, 2006 were affirmed and ratified on March 26, 2006 by the NECO. We can concede the plausibility of validly ratifying the election and other actions taken on March 2, 2006. Common sense, however, dictates that, for purposes of ratification, the ratifying medium must, in the LP's hierarchical set up, be superior to the agent whose act is to be approved, confirmed or ratified. Stated differently, the act of a higher party organ cannot be ratified by an inferior organ. As aptly observed by the COMELEC:[44]
In their Rejoinder, [Mayor Atienza et al.] allege that the "National Assembly", the body that elected [them] ..., should be taken in the context of, or used interchangeably with, the "National Directorate" ... [which under the LP Constitution ] ... is the highest policy and decision making body of the LP. The question now that has to be answered is: Was the assembly properly convened? A reading of the LP Constitution ... readily reveals it was not. Article 8 of the LP Constitution states as follows:"Art. 8. The National DirectorateSECTION B. POWERS � [It] shall have over-all administration, direction, control and supervision of the Party and its organs ... through the Party President ....
SECTION A. Composition � The National Directorate shall be composed of: xxx.The National Directorate, therefore, has a defined ... membership. It does not loosely consist of "majority of the LP Congressmen, majority of the [NECO], and majority of the LP local chief executives nationwide". Moreover, [it] may only be convened upon the call of the party President or by the Executive Committee ... In this case, the Assembly on March 2, 2006 was convened by ... Mayor Atienza who is not the Party President [therefore] not ... empowered to do so.xxx xxx xxx
Section C. Meetings � The National Directorate may meet at least once every four years upon the call of the Party President or, in case of his refusal ..., upon call of the Executive Committee at a meeting called for the purpose."
It is therefore plain that the National Directorate was not properly convened. The "National Assembly" that conducted the elections on March 2, 2006 cannot be considered as the [LP] National Directorate ....
Moreover, there was absolutely no notice that elections would be held on March 2, 2006 at the Manila Hotel. In the letter/invitation of .... Mayor Atienza .... [n]owhere does it state that an election of party officers will be held. (Bracketed words added.)
xxx the body that was convened on March 2, 2006 and which performed the act sought to be ratified was the [LP] National Directorate � albeit denominated at the first instance as "National Assembly" by respondents (Mayor Atienza et al.). Respondent Abayon classified the assembly ... as a "National Assembly", a body superior to any of the organ mentioned in the Party's Constitution. As can be gleaned from the LP Constitution, the National Directorate is the highest policy-and decision-making body of the LP. How then can the NECO, a body lower that the National Directorate, ... ratify the act of a higher body? This certainly presents an absurd situation whereby an inferior body ratifies the act of a higher body. Thus the invalidity of the March 2, 2006 election was not cured by the supposed ratification of the NECO xxx .(Footnotes in the original omitted; words in bracket added.)Lest it be overlooked, Mayor Atienza, et al., have been unmoving in their stand about the Salonga Constitution remaining operative all along, particularly as regards the provisions on tenure and terms of office of party officers. They have in fact defended at every turn the COMELEC's ruling on the matter in their favor.[45] Pursuant to the Salonga Constitution, Sen. Drilon's election on September 8, 2004 as LP President to fill up an interim vacancy created by the resignation of then Rep. Abad was for a term corresponding to the unexpired portion of the latter's term ending July 24, 2006. And in line with the same constitution, party officers shall serve their fixed term until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.[46]
It cannot be overemphasized at this juncture that, as held in Palmares v. Comelec,[47] the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of leadership in a political party. And as LDP[48] instructs that poll body ought to look, if appropriate, into the Party's Constitution to resolve such issue and to determine the extent of the powers of a party's legitimate officers. Any suggestion, therefore, that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to decide which of the conflicting constitutions, clashing provisions or their amendments, as the case may be, is applicable to a given juridical issue should be rejected. Else, the COMELEC would virtually be denied the tools to carry out its jurisdictional mandate categorically articulated in Palmares.
Given the above perspective and going to the next issue raised in the Atienza petition, the Court is at a loss to understand the ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC for its declaration that Sen. Drilon, after July 24, 2006, is a hold-over LP President until such time that a replacement � and a new set of officers � shall have been validly elected.
Mayor Atienza, et al., have blamed Sen. Drilon for causing the problem within the party. He then proceeds to point out that under the LP Constitution - "[A]ny officer of the Party shall forfeit his office by any act antagonistic to its objectives or inimical to its interest ... as may [be] determined by the Executive Committee."[49] This cited provision, however, is not a winning card for the Atienza group. For one, the Executive Committee does not appear to have made any determination of culpability. Moreover, in the field of perspectives, what is an antagonistic-to-a-cause act to one group may be a call for political ideals to another.
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the election of new LP officers the COMELEC called and set undermines, as Sen. Drilon insists, the constitutional guarantee to free association. To Sen. Drilon, such call is antithetical to the general rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of associations like political parties, a view shared by some members of the Court. He adds that party elections and the details of their conduct are strictly internal party affairs that should concern only the party and its members; and that COMELEC's decision to call elections for the party is unreasonable and contrary to law and ergo should be struck down.[50]
Sen. Drilon's contention is valid to a point. However, the COMELEC's order for a commission-supervised intra-party election does not, under the peculiar backdrop for which it was called, amount to an unwarranted interference to justify the issuance of the corrective writ of certiorari.
At bottom, the instant petitions involve a leadership fight and the Court is asked to determine the LP's legitimate officers who will provide directions to the party and its members in its quest for political victory. The dispute is certainly not, as some members of the Court tend to view it to be, about whether the Drilon faction was right and the Atienza faction was wrong, or vice versa, in withdrawing political support from President Arroyo, albeit Sen. Drilon's call for President Arroyo to step down triggered the parting of ways between the two factions. The matter of whom to support is doubtless not a justifiable issue and the COMELEC or the Court would be flirting with jurisdictional disaster if it as much as try to influence either camp to throw its lot for or against the administration. To be sure, Sen. Drilon did not, at the first instance, invoke the COMELEC's jurisdiction to protect and support his and his group's decision to withdraw political support from the President. At the end of the day, what Sen. Drilon asked of the COMELEC was to recognize his right to act as LP President and to declare Mayor Atienza's election as such illegal. To say that the senator repaired to the COMELEC and then to this Court for a confirmatory ruling on the propriety of his decision to withdraw political support from the President is to read in his basic petition and other pleadings something not validly deducible therefrom. And if the argument on propriety is pursued to its logical conclusion, the COMELEC and even this Court would then be made to appear as possessing the power to decide the propriety of political alignments within a party. The absurdity of the notion needs no belaboring.
Political parties, being a basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus, are affected with public interest. Government draws its strength from the support of political parties.[51] They are, to borrow from Justice Jose C. Vitug,[52] an important feature in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power, parties add an important dimension of stability to a political system and help organize the government and electorate by, among others, recruiting candidates, educating the public and providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. Accordingly, the law accords special treatment to registered political parties and their candidates,[53] both as to privileges conferred and obligations imposed and with respect to regulation.
Considering the role political parties play in the political life of a democratic society and in the running of government, it is not surprising that the Constitution would invest a body, like the COMELEC, the power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of an election, take measures to ensure orderly elections and register political parties.[54] Party registration enables the government, through the COMELEC, to supervise and regulate the activities of various elements participating in an election.[55] From this mix, but more particularly from its power to register political parties, the COMELEC is possessed with jurisdiction to resolve issues of political leadership in a political party or, in the concrete, to determine its legitimate officers who shall act on behalf and be responsible for the acts of a political party,[56] such as who, or which between two factions, is entitled to nominate election inspectors,[57] or to endorse and sign party nominations.
In the light of the foregoing doctrinal holdings, the COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction when it ordered the conduct of a Commission-supervised election of LP officers to take over from the hold-over party president and other officers.
The allegation that such order constitutes interference in purely party affairs cannot, following the teaching of Palmares, Kalaw and LDP, be accorded tenability. And lest it be overlooked, the call for an LP election was obviously made in a bid to restore some sanity, if not order, in the party. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that both the Drilon and Atienza camps are allied with different political parties and support, for the most part, different candidates. Lending urgent dimension to the call are the following realities stated or deducible from the subject resolution or the records:
The foregoing realities cannot simply be brushed aside and taken in isolation of the general proposition that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to intervene in purely internal party affairs. After all, general propositions do not settle concrete questions as each case must have to be viewed in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining therein. Ex facto jus oritur. Each case should be considered according to its facts.[60] And to borrow from Justice Laurel's ponencia in Angara v. Electoral Commission,[61] any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
- A hiatus in the LP leadership exists even as Sen. Drilon holds the position of party president in a hold-over capacity which cannot certainly be so in perpetuity.
- The clamor to convene the LP National Directorate or what passes as its equivalent under the organizational set up of the LP to resolve basic differences merited inaction from Sen. Drilon or at least received without any sense of urgency. Under the Party (Salonga) Constitution, the LP National Directorate could only meet if called by the Party President or by the Executive Committee,[58] which Sen. Drilon is not minded to convene and only the Party President could convene the Executive Committee and no one else.[59]
- A persistent sense of distrust and antagonism between the two factions exist. Bridges had been burned and the rift appears to have widen beyond repair in the immediate future. One faction cannot be expected to defer to the other for it to conduct/administer the election of party officers.
- The in-fighting between the two camps over who are the real and legitimate officers of the LP has caused confusion not only among the LP members but also to the electorate. As brought out during the oral arguments conducted by the Court, problems as to who shall sign nominations of party candidates for public office, vouchers for the expenditures of party funds, naming of election inspectors for the party, and a host of related matters, continue to plague the party and assume urgency as the holding of the May 10, 2007 national and local elections draws nearer.
With the view we take of the case, the COMELEC was acting within its discretion to step in, when so asked, and call a party election to determine, once and for all, who are the legitimate officers of the LP and in the process obviate confusion among the LP members, the electorate and the public in general. Anything less would only defer the resolution of an issue which would likely develop roots and branches that will bear the seeds of complicated future litigations which, in all likelihood, would again confront the Commission. In making the call, the COMELEC obviously was guided by the lesson of Palmares:
xxx. Consequently, if there is any controversy as to [party leadership], the COMELEC may, in a proper case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to regulate political parties.Sen. Drilon cites but to our mind cannot seek refuge in Sinaca v. Mula,[62] where the Court, citing US decisional law, held that "political parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision ... [and] without undue interference."[63] For, at bottom, what Sinaca contextually frowned upon was undue intervention by the COMELEC and eventually the courts on what is a purely internal party concern. The charged issue of party leadership which, if left unaddressed, tends to erode the stability of the political system, as here, would be a different matter. Thus, in the LDP case, the doctrine of non-interference expounded in Sinaca was declared inapplicable where the issue of leadership is involved:
Sinaca, unlike previous cases, did not involve the question of party identity or leadership; hence, it was not necessary for the COMELEC to delve therein. ....[64]To repeat, COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders. And in line with the plenitude of its powers and functions which have been expanded since the days of the 1935 Constitution and the superseded Revised Election Code, the COMELEC is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free and orderly and honest elections."[65] Given these postulates, can it not be assumed that, since the COMELEC has a legal duty to perform, the law accords it with the tools and wherewithal to fulfill the task? Stated differently, since the COMELEC has been conferred the jurisdiction to resolve question of party leadership, would it not be reasonable to conclude that the jurisdictional grant carries with it the authority to take such measures to enable it to provide complete relief, if proper, to the suitors, like calling a party election? The obvious answer to each question should be in the affirmative. For otherwise, would not the COMELEC's supervisory and regulatory power over political parties flowing from its express power to register political parties be rendered illusory? It seems plain that directing the LP to convene its voting delegates and to conduct a party election under the supervision of an disinterested third party is a mode of settling what to the Court is a festering leadership dispute. Discord amongst leaders and members of a political party likely to engender confusion among the electorate should ideally be nipped in the bud at the first opportunity. At the end of the day, the election set would not be an act of interference, or at least not an undue interference in party affairs. The elections called and set will not be a case of COMELEC dictating the leadership make-up of the party. The proper party members will do the choosing of who their officers will be.
Lastly, Sen. Drilon bewails the fact that the COMELEC set the time and place for a party election when what he simply wanted was for the Commission to nullify the elections of Atienza, et al., during the March 2, 2006 conference and to enjoin them from representing themselves as party officers. Sen. Drilon thus claims that the COMELEC committed a bad procedurally erroneous action.
Again we disagree.
As may be noted, Atienza, et al., in their Answer,[66] Rejoinder[67] and Memorandum,[68] filed with the COMELEC, raised as one of the issues for the COMELEC's resolution, the matter of the expiration of Sen. Drilon's term of office. The same issue took the stage during the oral argument before the COMELEC when the counsel for Mayor Atienza, et al., answered in the affirmative the following query of COMELEC Chairman Abalos: "So aside from the issue of ratification you are now coming up with another issue as to whether the term of President Drilon has already expired ...."[69] And as earlier narrated, Atienza, et al., in their answer sought, as one of its alternative prayers, the convening of the National Convention and for COMELEC to supervise the holding of new intra-party elections in order to settle the leadership dispute once and for all. An almost identical alternative relief is embodied in Rep. Abayon's answer.[70]
Under Section 5, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court, when issues not alleged in the original pleadings of the parties are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, the court acquires jurisdiction over the issues which shall then be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Consistent with this rule is our holding that the trial court may not grant a relief on the basis of an issue not previously raised in the pleadings; that what is not juridically presented cannot be juridically decided,[71] necessarily implying that an issue juridically presented can juridically be decided, provided that full opportunity is accorded the opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence.[72]
In net effect, the calling by the COMELEC of an intra-party election was within the scope of the pleadings, the issues made and the law. It cannot be nullified for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court ends this ponencia with some observations.
Sen. Drilon faults the COMELEC for meddling with purely internal party affairs when the latter scheduled an election to peremptorily resolve clashing claims over the LP presidency. Yet, it was he who first voluntarily submitted to and invoked the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to confirm his election and to disregard the election of the other wing when he felt his leadership was threatened and in fact was no longer recognized by the Atienza group.
Mayor Atienza, et al., on the other hand, also fault the COMELEC for declaring invalid the elections of March 2, 2006, foisting on the Court the argument that said election was a valid exercise of the party's constituent powers, rooted in their freedom of association and political rights. Yet, in their Answer[73] to Petition,[74] in SPP No. 06-002, Mayor Atienza, et al., prayed, as an alternative relief, for the Commission "to initiate the convening of the National Convention to supervise the holding of an election in order to settle the leadership dispute once and for all," impliedly, but doubtless, admitting the nullity of the impugned elections held on March 2, 2006.
The ironies of the fault-finding postures of the contending parties are not lost on the Court.
Accordingly, I vote that the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated October 13, 2006 be AFFIRMED with the modification on when the elections of LP officers are to be conducted. In lieu of November 23, 2006, as originally scheduled, the Commission shall reset such election on such a date and time it may deem appropriate taking into account the convenience of the participants involved and, more particularly, the holding of the national and local elections in May 2007. ACCORDINGLY, the petitions in G.R. No. 174992 and G.R. No. 175546 are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on November 9, 2006 in G.R. No. 174992 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Endnotes:
[1] Under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 703 et seq.
[3] Id. at 503 et seq.
[4] Sec. 67 of the Amended LP Constitution, Rollo (G.R. No. 175546), p. 93.
[5] Annex "L," Petition (G.R. No. 175546), Rollo (G.R. No. 175546), pp. 78 et seq.
[6] Art. 9, SEC. D. TENURE. � All Party officers ... shall hold office for four years and until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, unless sooner removed or separated for cause.
[7] Minutes of the NECO Meeting, Rollo (G.R. No. 175546), pp. 48 et seq.
[8] Annex "1" Comments, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 835 et seq.
[9] Comments of Mayor Atienza, et al., p. 5; Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), p. 778.
[10] Memorandum dated July 11, 2005 of then LP Sec-Gen. Benigno Aquino III, Rollo (G. R. No. 174992), pp. 848 et seq.; Resolutions dated November 26, 2005 of the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI) and Kalipi Council of Ladies, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 482 & 483.
[11] Annexes "8," "8-A" to "C," Comments of Mayor Atienza, et al., Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 852 et seq.
[12] Annex "R," Atienza's Petition; Rollo (G.R. No. 175546), p 152-154; COMELEC Resolution, p. 11.
[13] Per minutes of the NECO March 22, 2006 meeting, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 898 et seq.
[14] Annex "A," Drilon's Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 34 et seq.
[15] Annex "C," Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 62 et seq.
[16] TSN, June 8, 2002, p. 15; Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 1000 & 1084.
[17] Supra note 1.
[18] Page 16 of the COMELEC Resolution; Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), p. 718.
[19] President, Executive Vice-President or Executive Vice-Presidents, Vice Presidents, Secretary General, Deputy and Assistant Deputy Secretary General, Treasurer and such other officers as may be necessary.
[20] Supra note 16.
[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 1429 et seq.
[22] Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed � The following pleadings are not allowed: xxx; d. motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution ... except in election offense cases.
[23] Per Order dated November 7, 2006, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 1422 et seq.
[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 175546), pp. 3 et seq.
[25] Garcia v. HRET, G.R. No. 134792, August 12, 1999, 312 SCRA 353, citing cases.
[26] Pure Foods Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78591, March 21, 1989, 171 SCRA 415; Toyota Autoparts, Phils., Inc. v. Director of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 131047, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 95.
[27] Pages 6-7; Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 708-709.
[28] TSN, February 13, 2007, pp. 152-153.
[29] Id. at 155-166.
[30] Id. at 170.
[31] G. R. Nos. 154442-47, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 574, 594, citing Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999, 304 SCRA 170.
[32] November 28, 2003, September 8, 2004 and November 30, 2004.
[33] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116111, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 366.
[34] C & S Fishfarm Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 122720, December 16, 2002, 394 SCRA 82, citing 28 Am Jur, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 3.
[35] Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123817, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 88, citing cases.
[36] PNB v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 307.
[37] Party Chairman and Vice-President for Policy, Platform and Advocacy.
[38] Pages 4 &5 of the Consolidated Reply, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 1396-97.
[39] Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 80, 82 & 86.
[40] Sec. 6, Art. I; Sec. 24, Art. IV; Secs. 28 and 30, Art. V.
[41] Rollo (G.R. No. 175546), p. 202.
[42] TSN, February 13, 2007, pp. 291-293.
[43] G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 665.
[44] COMELEC October 13, 2006 Resolution, pp. 11-12.
[45] Comments to Sen. Drilon's Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 788-799.
[46] Supra note 6.
[47] G.R. Nos. 86177-78, August 31, 1969, citing Kalaw v. Comelec, G.R. No. 80218, November 5, 1987.
[48] Supra note 43.
[49] Art. 27, Sec. A, Party Constitution.
[50] Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 21-23.
[51] Peralta v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30.
[52] Justice Vitug's separate opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698, 738.
[53] Supra note 43.
[54] Sec. 2, Art. IX-C.
[55] Agpalo, Comments on the Omnibus Election Code, 1998 ed., p. 108.
[56] Palmares v. Comelec, supra, citing Kalaw v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80218, November 5, 1987.
[57] Sotto v. COMELEC, 76 Phil. 516 (1946).
[58] Art. 8, Sec. C.
[59] Art. 9, Sec. E. � The Executive Committee shall meet on call of the Party President, the time and place of the session to be specified in the call.
[60] People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-28810, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 90.
[61] G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1931, 63 SCRA 139 cited in La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004, 421 SCRA 148.
[62] G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266.
[63] Id. at 280.
[64] Supra note 43, 423 SCRA 665, 678.
[65] Sanchez v. COMELEC, G.R. L-55513, June 19, 1982, 114 SCRA 454, citing Cauton v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27,1967, 19 SCRA 911.
[66] Supra note 15.
[67] Annex "H," to Sen. Drilon's Petition, Rollo (G.R. 174992), pp. 258 et seq.
[68] Annex "K," ibid; Rollo (G.R. No. 174992) pp. 490 et seq.
[69] TSN, June 1, 2006, pp. 20-21; Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 945-946
[70] Rollo (G.R. No. 174992), pp. 198 et seq.
[71] Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142037, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 397.
[72] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 8th Revised Ed., p. 191.
[73] Supra note 15.
[74] Supra note 14.
