April 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 163562 : April 16, 2007] PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. CARLOS ANG GOBONSENG, JR. :
[G.R. No. 163562 : April 16, 2007]
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. CARLOS ANG GOBONSENG, JR.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 16 APRIL 2007
G.R. No. 163562 - (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Carlos Ang Gobonseng, Jr.)
Before us is this motion for reconsideration of our decision dated July 21, 2006 which granted the petition for review filed by petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent Carlos Ang Gobonseng, Jr. submits that the Court may have violated its own rule on factual determination when it delved on the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) vis-a-vis that of the trial court. Pressing the point, Gobonseng presents the following arguments: (1) his claim for rentals from petitioner Pilipinas Shell for the use and occupancy of the lot in question, i.e., Lot No. 853-A on which a gasoline refilling station stands, has factual and legal basis; (2) the efficacy of the trial court decision is seriously impaired by the fact that the ponente thereof did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses and merely took over from a colleague; (3) the reinstatement of the trial court's decision Without qualifications is improper and without sufficient basis from the records; and (4) the award made by the CA in his favor should not only be affirmed but should also be increased.
Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:
On November 13, 1992, respondent Gobonseng filed a civil suit for collection of rentals and damages against Tan Pastor and Pilipinas Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 10389.
On March 15, 1999, the RTC, basically on the premise that the gas station on the subject lot was operated by Tan Pastor as a dealer-owned station and that Pilipinas Shell merely provides the gas station with the necessary equipment and facilities, rendered judgment for Pilipinas Shell, holding that Gobonseng has no cause of action. In addition, the RTC ordered Gobonseng to pay Pilipinas Shell and the heirs of Tan Pastor the amount of P150,000.00. On appeal, the CA reversed said decision and ordered Pilipinas Shell to compensate Gobonseng with interest for the use and occupation of the subject lot and to pay attorney's fees.
Aggrieved by the CA's decision, Pilipinas Shell came to us via a petition for review which, as earlier indicated, we granted, reinstating the earlier trial court decision which dismissed Gobonseng's collection suit against Pilipinas Shell.
Hence, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by Gobonseng.
After another hard look at the case, we find no compelling reason to reconsider our Decision of July 21, 2006.
As may be observed, Gobonseng has not presented any issue other than what he had previously raised before the trial court, the CA or this Court. Moreover, the arguments he presently advances have, save for a procedural matter, been considered, discussed at length and/or passed upon by the trial court, by the CA and by this Court.
As a matter of sound practice, the Court, not being a trier of facts, usually limits its inquiry to legal matters. This rule admits, however, of exceptions, three of which[1] find application in the instant case, thus prompting us to re-evaluate the factual findings made by the trial court and the CA. It bears stressing that the Court, in the interest of substantial justice, can, as it did, embark on the assessment and examination of the evidence adduced during the proceedings at the trial court. The Court thereafter, reviewed the evidence presented and revisited the applicable pertinent rules.
Consequently, we find that there are convincing evidence in the records to prove that the gasoline station previously operated by Tan Pastor was dealer-owned. This, being the crux determinative of Gobonseng's entitlement to the payment of rentals for the use and occupation of the subject property, is our conclusion after going through the evidence presented before the trial court as well as the pleadings filed by the parties before the appellate court. The Court need not belabor anew the premises holding the conclusion together except to state the following:
1. As testified to in open court by Gobonseng himself, he had been in the actual and physical possession of the subject lot from 1982 to 1991. He had never made any demands on Tan Pastor or Pilipinas Shell for the payment of rentals during the said period, much less institute any action in court to enforce payment thereof.
2. Pilipinas Shell presented sufficient proof that the gasoline station located at the subject lot was dealer-owned, as certified by the President of the Shell Dealers Association of the Philippines. For Gobonseng's part, he failed to adduce convincing evidence that it is otherwise. All he had to offer in support of his claims is the fact that he is the registered owner of the subject lot since 1982 by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale he and Tan Pastor previously executed.
As we explained in our July 21, 2006 decision, however, the ownership of the subject lot is a non-issue. In fine, his claim for rentals rests not on the issue of ownership. His entitlement to rentals must, under the premises, have some factual or legal basis which he has yet to establish by competent and convincing evidence.
3. A piece of evidence both Gobonseng and Tan Pastor presented in the proceedings below is the Agreement dated January 30, 1992, wherein they declared that they had "no more further claimes (sic) against each other, and waived, abandoned, relinquished, any such claim or claims."
As we see it, by the evidence presented by both parties in the proceedings below and more so by his own acts, the bar of estoppel had already set in for Gobonseng. By the operation of the equitable principle of estoppel, Gobonseng is legally precluded from going back on his own acts and representations, to the prejudice of those relying on them.[2]
Given the above perspective, and absent a showing that the Court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts of weight and circumstance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case, the desired reconsideration cannot be granted.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163562 - (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Carlos Ang Gobonseng, Jr.)
Before us is this motion for reconsideration of our decision dated July 21, 2006 which granted the petition for review filed by petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent Carlos Ang Gobonseng, Jr. submits that the Court may have violated its own rule on factual determination when it delved on the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) vis-a-vis that of the trial court. Pressing the point, Gobonseng presents the following arguments: (1) his claim for rentals from petitioner Pilipinas Shell for the use and occupancy of the lot in question, i.e., Lot No. 853-A on which a gasoline refilling station stands, has factual and legal basis; (2) the efficacy of the trial court decision is seriously impaired by the fact that the ponente thereof did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses and merely took over from a colleague; (3) the reinstatement of the trial court's decision Without qualifications is improper and without sufficient basis from the records; and (4) the award made by the CA in his favor should not only be affirmed but should also be increased.
Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:
On November 13, 1992, respondent Gobonseng filed a civil suit for collection of rentals and damages against Tan Pastor and Pilipinas Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 10389.
On March 15, 1999, the RTC, basically on the premise that the gas station on the subject lot was operated by Tan Pastor as a dealer-owned station and that Pilipinas Shell merely provides the gas station with the necessary equipment and facilities, rendered judgment for Pilipinas Shell, holding that Gobonseng has no cause of action. In addition, the RTC ordered Gobonseng to pay Pilipinas Shell and the heirs of Tan Pastor the amount of P150,000.00. On appeal, the CA reversed said decision and ordered Pilipinas Shell to compensate Gobonseng with interest for the use and occupation of the subject lot and to pay attorney's fees.
Aggrieved by the CA's decision, Pilipinas Shell came to us via a petition for review which, as earlier indicated, we granted, reinstating the earlier trial court decision which dismissed Gobonseng's collection suit against Pilipinas Shell.
Hence, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by Gobonseng.
After another hard look at the case, we find no compelling reason to reconsider our Decision of July 21, 2006.
As may be observed, Gobonseng has not presented any issue other than what he had previously raised before the trial court, the CA or this Court. Moreover, the arguments he presently advances have, save for a procedural matter, been considered, discussed at length and/or passed upon by the trial court, by the CA and by this Court.
As a matter of sound practice, the Court, not being a trier of facts, usually limits its inquiry to legal matters. This rule admits, however, of exceptions, three of which[1] find application in the instant case, thus prompting us to re-evaluate the factual findings made by the trial court and the CA. It bears stressing that the Court, in the interest of substantial justice, can, as it did, embark on the assessment and examination of the evidence adduced during the proceedings at the trial court. The Court thereafter, reviewed the evidence presented and revisited the applicable pertinent rules.
Consequently, we find that there are convincing evidence in the records to prove that the gasoline station previously operated by Tan Pastor was dealer-owned. This, being the crux determinative of Gobonseng's entitlement to the payment of rentals for the use and occupation of the subject property, is our conclusion after going through the evidence presented before the trial court as well as the pleadings filed by the parties before the appellate court. The Court need not belabor anew the premises holding the conclusion together except to state the following:
1. As testified to in open court by Gobonseng himself, he had been in the actual and physical possession of the subject lot from 1982 to 1991. He had never made any demands on Tan Pastor or Pilipinas Shell for the payment of rentals during the said period, much less institute any action in court to enforce payment thereof.
2. Pilipinas Shell presented sufficient proof that the gasoline station located at the subject lot was dealer-owned, as certified by the President of the Shell Dealers Association of the Philippines. For Gobonseng's part, he failed to adduce convincing evidence that it is otherwise. All he had to offer in support of his claims is the fact that he is the registered owner of the subject lot since 1982 by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale he and Tan Pastor previously executed.
As we explained in our July 21, 2006 decision, however, the ownership of the subject lot is a non-issue. In fine, his claim for rentals rests not on the issue of ownership. His entitlement to rentals must, under the premises, have some factual or legal basis which he has yet to establish by competent and convincing evidence.
3. A piece of evidence both Gobonseng and Tan Pastor presented in the proceedings below is the Agreement dated January 30, 1992, wherein they declared that they had "no more further claimes (sic) against each other, and waived, abandoned, relinquished, any such claim or claims."
As we see it, by the evidence presented by both parties in the proceedings below and more so by his own acts, the bar of estoppel had already set in for Gobonseng. By the operation of the equitable principle of estoppel, Gobonseng is legally precluded from going back on his own acts and representations, to the prejudice of those relying on them.[2]
Given the above perspective, and absent a showing that the Court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts of weight and circumstance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case, the desired reconsideration cannot be granted.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] When the findings of facts are conflicting; (2) When the Findings are contrary to the trial court; and (3) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
[2] Philippine National Bank v. Giovanni Palma, et al., G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 307.
