May 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 187502 : May 30, 2011]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VERSUS ARNOLD ADORAY Y ENRERAS AND ALEXANDER DAGAMI Y ELIAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
G.R. No. 187502 � THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versus ARNOLD ADORAY y ENRERAS and ALEXANDER DAGAMI y ELIAS, accused-appellants.
RESOLUTION
On appeal is the December 19, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 02670 affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, convicting appellants of murder.
The prosecution was able to prove the following facts.
Michael Thomas Dunn (Dunn) and the victim, Steven Alston Davis (Davis), were friends and business partners who put up a software firm in Makati City and resided therein in the same apartment located at 5958 Fermina Street. In the evening of July 17, 2002, Dunn went to the airport to pickup his girlfriend Jennifer Castillo (Castillo) who was scheduled to arrive at 11:50 p.m. from Hong Kong. Davis in the meantime, went to sleep already and did not accompany Dunn to the airport as he and Dunn had some beers prior to going home. Around 1:00 a.m., Dunn and Castillo arrived at the apartment. When Dunn and Castillo were about to sleep at around 2:10 a.m., the door to their room opened slowly and they noticed a strange flashing light. Thinking it was Davis, Dunn invited the person in. However, three men suddenly entered the room. One of them turned on the lights. Dunn identified two of them as appellants Arnold Adoray (Adoray) and Alexander Dagami (Dagami), but he did not know the identity of the third person who turned on the lights.
Dunn thought that the three were robbers so he raised his hands and pleaded with them not to hurt him and his girlfriend. Adoray pointed a gun at him while Dagami took his wallet and asked for the car keys. Dagami then left the room and four or five seconds later, Dunn heard three to four successive gunshots. After that, he saw Dagami hurriedly make his way towards the stairs, followed by the latter's companions. After the three had run away, Dunn proceeded to check on Davis in the latter's room. There, he saw Davis lying supinely on the bed, with his right hand outstretched.
With Dunn's help and after some investigation, the police were able to identify two of the three assailants. On August 14, 2002, Dunn and a team of police operatives from the Makati CID went to Sta. Maria Subdivision in Angeles City. As they entered the gate of the subdivision, the police told Dunn to look at the guard who was then raising the barrier to the entrance. Dunn identified the guard, who later turned out to be Dagami, as the man who took his wallet. Then on August 16, 2002, Dunn went to the Balibago Police Station to identify the other suspect who was caught. Dunn positively identified Adoray as the person who pointed a gun at him during the incident. During trial, it was also proven that Adoray is the paramour of Davis' estranged wife, Evelyn. Robin Butas (Butas), the husband of Evelyn's sister, testified in rebuttal that he and his wife lived with Evelyn and that Adoray, who frequented the house, had an intimate relationship with Evelyn. Butas added that Adoray and Dagami knew each other since the latter was staying in Adoray's house. In the night of July 17, 2002, at around 11:00 p.m., Butas together with appellants and Evelyn went to Makati City and they only returned to Angeles City the following morning.
Appellants, for their part, raised the defense of denial and alibi. According to the defense witnesses, Adoray had been suffering from flu since July 16, 2002. Adoray himself testified that he was sick from July 15 to 18, 2002. Even the supervising officer of the security agency where Adoray worked testified that Adoray was sick so he went to Pampanga at 12:00 noon on July 17, 2002. When the supervising officer arrived in Pampanga, however, he did not see Adoray anymore when he inspected the guards. Adoray also claimed that he came to know Dagami only on July 23, 2002 when the latter applied for a job in the security agency. Dagami, on the other hand, claimed that he was hired by the security agency on July 25, 2002. Dagami testified that before he transferred to his new job, he was guarding an apartment from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Dagami further averred that he was forced by the police to testify against Adoray and Evelyn and to point to them as the masterminds behind the crime. When he refused, the police allegedly tortured him.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder qualified by treachery. It sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of Davis in the amount of P50,000.00. The RTC gave full credence to Dunn's testimony, and noted that appellants� alibi was not fully substantiated.
On appeal, the CA affirmed appellants' conviction. The appellate court found that the RTC did not err in relying on Dunn's positive identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, and held that the out-of-court identification done was proper. The CA held that Dunn had more than sufficient time to see appellants' faces and observe their appearance during the incident because of their close proximity to him during the robbery and the illumination in the room. The CA noted that Dunn's attention was fully focused on the appellants the whole time as they moved about the room and poked their guns at him and his girlfriend. Moreover, Dunn's prior description, which was made into a cartographic sketch, was accurate and has a striking resemblance to Dagami. Thus, the out-of-court identification was merely a confirmation of Dunn's statements to the police and a part of police investigation. The CA also noted that Dunn unequivocally identified appellants in open court as the culprits and even specified their participation in the robbery.
As regards appellants' defense of alibi, the CA agreed with the RTC that appellants' alibi was not substantiated. The CA held that Dagami failed to account for his whereabouts from 7:00 p.m. on July 17, 2002 up to the next morning. His roving supervisor dropped him off at his post at 7:00 p.m. then left, and it was not physically impossible for Dagami to be at the crime scene considering that the distance between Makati City and Angeles City can be traversed with a motor vehicle in one to two hours. Moreover, the logbook presented by the defense to prove Dagami's whereabouts was inexplicably torn at the pages containing the entries for July 16 and 17, 2002. The rebuttal witnesses, Butas and his wife, also debunked Dagami's defense and confirmed that he and Adoray were acquaintances. Adoray meanwhile similarly failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
After careful consideration of the parties' submissions and a thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the CA committed no reversible error in affirming appellants' conviction for murder. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA.[3] Here, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the said rule that factual findings of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal.
Appellants failed to show how the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence. The RTC found Dunn's testimony and his positive identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the crime credible and not tainted with bad faith or any motive other than a sincere desire to bring his friend's murderers to justice. As to the allegedly suggestive out-of-court identification of appellant Dagami by Dunn who was shown the guards in the subdivision, the same deserves scant consideration. Dunn instantly recognized appellant upon seeing him. Even assuming arguendo that appellants' out-of-court identification was irregular as appellants claim, this identification did not foreclose the admissibility of the independent eyewitness in-court identification made by Dunn.[4] Dunn's testimony cured any flaw that may have attended his initial identification of appellant Dagami at the subdivision. As against the positive identification by Dunn, appellants' bare denial carries no evidentiary weight or probative value, especially so because they failed to prove the same. It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[5] For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed.[6] Such physical impossibility, however, was not shown to have existed in this case.
As to the damages awarded, a modification is proper. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.
In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime, and proof of an accused's responsibility therefor. Similarly, moral damages are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim, and these do not require any allegation or proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs.[7] We, therefore, award P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Davis.
As to actual damages, the records are bereft of evidence as to the amount of burial expenses spent by the heirs of Davis. However, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we award temperate damages of P25,000.00 to the heirs of Davis.[8] Likewise, we include an award of exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Davis in light of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. An aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. The award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is, therefore, proper under current jurisprudence.[9]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed December 19, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 02670 finding appellants Arnold Adoray y Enreras and Alexander Dagami y Elias guilty is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellants Arnold Adoray y Enreras and Alexander Dagami y Elias are hereby further ordered to pay the heirs of Steven Alston Davis the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-23. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring.[2] CA rollo, pp. 34-38. Penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr.
[3] People v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. 176742, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 682, 696-697, citing People v. Belga, G.R. No. 129769, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 678, 684-685 and People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.
[4] People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 186493, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 741, 751.
[5] People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, February 9, 2011, p. 7.
[6] People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754, 765.
[7] People v. Del Rosario, supra note 5 at 10.
[8] See People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 339177, August 11, 2003, 408 SCRA 571, 581.
[9] People v. Dadulla, G.R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, p. 12.
