Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions

G.R. No. 196844 (Ligaya Gundaya and Gerry Mae Gundaya v. People of the Philippines) - We resolve the Petition for Certioriari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by accused Ligaya and Gerry Mae Gundaya, from the 31 March 2010 Decision and 28ApriI 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00299-MIN.^[1]

The MTC Ruling

In its Joint Decision promulgated 6 July 2005,^[2] the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tagum City, Davao del Norte found accused petitioners Ligaya and Gerry Mae guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 17 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), or the Bouncing Checks Law. The court was convinced that when both accused issued 17 Network Rural Bank checks, they knew fully well that they did not have sufficient funds in their account. They were sentenced to pay a fine double the amount of each check, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

The RTC Ruling

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the MTCC's findings and rejected accused-appellants' contention that they received no notice of dishonor.^[3] The trial court also ruled that the evidence clearly established that the checks had been issued for a valuable consideration, as payment of accused-appellants' obligation to the private complainant. However, the RTC reduced the amount of the fine from double the amount of each check issued, to the equivalent amount thereof, and deleted the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

The CA Ruling

In dismissing the accused's Petition filed under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the CA upheld the RTC and ruled that the demand letter sent by private complainant to the accused was equivalent to the notice of dishonor required to be furnished to the accused under B.P. 22. Neither B.P. 22 nor Central Bank Circular No. 693 requires the notice to be identical in form and content with the notice of dishonor normally required of a drawee bank. In the subsequent Resolution, the CA ruled that the two civil cases filed by the accused can never give rise to a valid prejudicial question that would warrant a suspension of the criminal proceedings since: a) it is an indispensable requirement that the civil action must be instituted prior to the criminal action; b) the supposed prejudicial question should have been raised before the prosecution had rested its case pursuant to Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure; and c) the judicial discretion to suspend criminal proceedings lay with the trial court, and it was too late for petitioners to raise the issue in a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

The petition is defective. No competent evidence of the identities of affiants of the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping was shown. The said attachments indicated only the Residence Certificate numbers of both accused, and not government-issued identifications as required by the law.

In any case, the Petition lacks merit. Accused petitioners merely raise the same two issues which have been thoroughly resolved by the CA, anchored on the same facts found by the MTCC and the RTC.

On the first ground, we are not convinced that the civil cases^[4] filed by petitioners posed a prejudicial question that should have suspended the present criminal case. The first civil case was filed on 18 April 2002 by the accused petitioners themselves, seeking an accounting of their loan, a return of the replaced checks, and damages. The second action for specific performance was filed only on 20 April 2007. The CA saw through petitioners' belated contention and correctly ruled that Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 are applicable to this case. 

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.�A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. 

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.�The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Not only should the petition be filed before the prosecution rests, the civil action itself should be instituted prior to the criminal case. The more essential question is whether there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.^[5] If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither would there be a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action could, according to law, proceed independently of each other.^[6]

In this case, the actions for accounting and specific performance to compel the return of the replaced checks do not touch in any way upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issues of whether the checks are replacement checks, or whether they should be returned to the accused, are in no way determinative of their guilt or innocence. The gravamen of the offense in B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks.^[7]

On the second ground, the CA correctly ruled that accused petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of the funds, because they had immediately been informed thereof by complainant through a demand letter. The presumption of knowledge of the accused, as stated in Section 2 of the law, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor; and that within five days from receipt thereof, he or she failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.^[8]

The only formal requirement for this notice is that it be in writing, and no other.^[9] In this case, private complainant, through his lawyer, sent a letter of demand which was dated 15 March 2002 and received by the accused on 19 March 2002.^[10] The letter consisted of three pages, indicating each check by its check number, the date for each one, and its amount. That the accused petitioners received the letter is evidenced by the signature of Ligaya Gundaya appearing on its face.^[11]cralaw

There being no reversible error attributable to the appellate court, its findings are affirmed, and the present Petition is denied.

WHEREFORE, the 31 March 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00299-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Carpio, J., on official leave; Del Castillo, J., designated additional member per S.O. No. 1084, Reyes, J., on leave; Mendoza, J., designated additional member per S.O. No. 1107.

Very truly yours,

MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Division Clerk of Court

By:

(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

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^[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and concurred in by Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Angelita A. Gacutan.

^[2] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26863-02, 26864-02, 26865-02, 26866-02, 26961-02, 26968-02, 27187-02, 27188-02, 26969-02, 26970-02, 26971-02, 27106-02, 27107-02, 27108-02, 27109-02, 27110- 02, and 27111-02; penned by Judge Ismael L. Salubre.

^[3] Docketed as Criminal Case No. 14739-14754, promulgated on 10 February 2006, penned by Judge Danilo C. Belo.

^[4] Docketed as Civil Case Nos. 2002-108 and 3857.

^[5] Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 773, 781-782, citing Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 490, 499 (1997) and Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 (1995).

^[6] Jesse Y. Yap v. Judge Monico G. Cabales, G.R. No. 159186, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 426.

^[7] Id. at 434.

^[8] Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 441, 456-457, citing Lao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, 20 June 1997, 274 SCRA 572, 584.

^[9] Azarcon v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185906, 29 June 2010, 622 SCRA 341, citing Domagsang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 75, 83

^[10] Rollo, p. 75.

^[11] Id.