January 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 123346 : January 29, 2008] MANOTOK REALTY, INC., ET AL. V. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION:
[G.R. No. 123346 : January 29, 2008]
MANOTOK REALTY, INC., ET AL. V. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder; for your information, is a resolution of the Cort En Banc dated January 29, 2008
G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok Realty, Inc., et al. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation); G.R. No. 134385 (Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs ofJoseDimson, et al.); and G.R. No. 148767 (Sto. Nino Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation) (Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner-Intervenor). - This treats of the respective motions for reconsideratjon filed by respondents CLT Realty Corporation,[1] Heirs of Jose B. Dimson[2] and intervenors Florentina David, et al.[3] seeking the reversal of the Court's Resolution dated 14 December 2007.
The motions raise no substantial argument that warrants the reconsideration of the Resolution. Nonetheless, the Court deems it proper and opportune to stress or reiterate certain points, thus:
First. None of the motions for reconsideration contests the finding that there is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 the date of registration of which is 3 May 1917.[4] That finding was extremely crucial for the Court, the linchpin in fact which all succeeding conclusions and instructions emanated from. It differs from the earlier premise that informed the previous cases of MWSS v. Court of Appeals[5] and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals[6] that there were two OCTs No. 994, one dated 3 May 1917 and the other 19 April 1917. For that reason, the Court could no longer rely on the two cases as precedents in the cases at bar. Also for the same reason, the Court was unable to affirm its earlier Decision dated 29 November 2005, the herein assailed rulings of the Court o[ Appeals, the decisions of the trial courts that granted respondents' respective complaints, or even the Commissioners' Reports that were submitted at the trial of one of those cases.[7] All of them proceeded from the now disproven premise that there were two competing mother titles. The present motions again rely on the same rulings and findings, yet they are unable to refute the key documented postulate, i.e., there is only one OCT No. 994 and it is dated 3 May 1917, that has left said rulings and findings misinformed, baseless and unreliable.
Second. The certificates of title forming the basis of respondents' respective complaints all acknowledged the inexistent OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the mother title. For that reason, the Court seriously considered ordaining the outright dismissal of their complaints because the causes of action are unsubstantiated. But in the end, only Justice Renato Corona voted in that wise. The majority agreed on an opinion that acknowledged the inexistence of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, but nonetheless remanded the cases to the Court of: Appeals for reception and evaluation of evidence, to allow for a full ventilation of the conflicting claims of the parties to the subject properties.
The Court is cognizant of the issues raised with respect to the validity of the titles held by petitioners Manotok Realty Inc., Manotok Estate Corporation and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, issues which were discussed at length in the assailed lower court rulings and the Dissenting Opinion, and presently reiterated in the motions for reconsideration. It is indeed possible, following the reception and evaluation of evidence by the Court of Appeals, that the Court may affirm the cited flaws in petitioners' titles and act accordingly, though without necessarily ruling in respondents' favor absent evidence that substantiates their claims to the properties aside from the obviously defective titles in their names. Respondents are free to reiterate their challenges against petitioners' titles, such as those raised in the present motions, or to contest whatever evidence petitioners may submit to the Court of Appeals.
Third. Both respondents challenge the creation of a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, arguing that it was in disregard of the rule on the raffling of cases. It bears emphasis that the Special Division constituted by the Court will not be retrying the case and consequently promulgating a new decision. Its functions are limited to the reception of evidence, including ruling on questions of aclmissibility, and the evaluation of certain factual issues as enumerated in Part VIII of our Resolution. In short, the Special Division will be performing the functions of a trier of fact which this Court itself is unable to engage in. But after the Special Division shall have completed its task, it is this Court which will deliberate on and promulgate the ultimate ruling on these cases.
By way of precedent, this Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2002 in A.M. No. 02-1-07,8 specifically designated three particular members of the Sandiganbayan to comprise the Special Division that would try the criminal cases then pending against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. There being a precedent where the Court designated the particular magistrates who would and did try the cases against a criminal defendant, there should be less room for objection to the Court's designation of the members of the Special Division who are not going to be trying the cases, but merely accepting and evaluating the evidence which the parties may choose to adduce before said Division.
Last. Concerning the allegations raised by respondent Heirs of Dimson with respect to their requested inhibition of the ponente of the assailed Resolution, the same were already raised in their previous Motion for Inhibition dated 21 September 2007, which was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 16 October 2007. Suffice it to say, the Court undertook such action after hearing the explanation of the ponente. Thereafter, the Court through a significant majority, signed in concurrence with the challenged Resolution authored by the ponente. To mandate, as respondent Heirs of Dimson would like to, the ponente to recite to their satisfaction the reasons against inhibition, would create an unfortunate and highly improper scenario where a magistrate whose voluntary disqualification is sought would be coerced into a defensive position every time such a motion is filed.
WHEREFORE, the subject motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. (The Justices who filed their respective concurring and dissenting opinions to the Resolution promulgated on December 14, 2007 maintain their respective positions).
G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok Realty, Inc., et al. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation); G.R. No. 134385 (Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs ofJoseDimson, et al.); and G.R. No. 148767 (Sto. Nino Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation) (Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner-Intervenor). - This treats of the respective motions for reconsideratjon filed by respondents CLT Realty Corporation,[1] Heirs of Jose B. Dimson[2] and intervenors Florentina David, et al.[3] seeking the reversal of the Court's Resolution dated 14 December 2007.
The motions raise no substantial argument that warrants the reconsideration of the Resolution. Nonetheless, the Court deems it proper and opportune to stress or reiterate certain points, thus:
First. None of the motions for reconsideration contests the finding that there is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 the date of registration of which is 3 May 1917.[4] That finding was extremely crucial for the Court, the linchpin in fact which all succeeding conclusions and instructions emanated from. It differs from the earlier premise that informed the previous cases of MWSS v. Court of Appeals[5] and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals[6] that there were two OCTs No. 994, one dated 3 May 1917 and the other 19 April 1917. For that reason, the Court could no longer rely on the two cases as precedents in the cases at bar. Also for the same reason, the Court was unable to affirm its earlier Decision dated 29 November 2005, the herein assailed rulings of the Court o[ Appeals, the decisions of the trial courts that granted respondents' respective complaints, or even the Commissioners' Reports that were submitted at the trial of one of those cases.[7] All of them proceeded from the now disproven premise that there were two competing mother titles. The present motions again rely on the same rulings and findings, yet they are unable to refute the key documented postulate, i.e., there is only one OCT No. 994 and it is dated 3 May 1917, that has left said rulings and findings misinformed, baseless and unreliable.
Second. The certificates of title forming the basis of respondents' respective complaints all acknowledged the inexistent OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the mother title. For that reason, the Court seriously considered ordaining the outright dismissal of their complaints because the causes of action are unsubstantiated. But in the end, only Justice Renato Corona voted in that wise. The majority agreed on an opinion that acknowledged the inexistence of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, but nonetheless remanded the cases to the Court of: Appeals for reception and evaluation of evidence, to allow for a full ventilation of the conflicting claims of the parties to the subject properties.
The Court is cognizant of the issues raised with respect to the validity of the titles held by petitioners Manotok Realty Inc., Manotok Estate Corporation and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, issues which were discussed at length in the assailed lower court rulings and the Dissenting Opinion, and presently reiterated in the motions for reconsideration. It is indeed possible, following the reception and evaluation of evidence by the Court of Appeals, that the Court may affirm the cited flaws in petitioners' titles and act accordingly, though without necessarily ruling in respondents' favor absent evidence that substantiates their claims to the properties aside from the obviously defective titles in their names. Respondents are free to reiterate their challenges against petitioners' titles, such as those raised in the present motions, or to contest whatever evidence petitioners may submit to the Court of Appeals.
Third. Both respondents challenge the creation of a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, arguing that it was in disregard of the rule on the raffling of cases. It bears emphasis that the Special Division constituted by the Court will not be retrying the case and consequently promulgating a new decision. Its functions are limited to the reception of evidence, including ruling on questions of aclmissibility, and the evaluation of certain factual issues as enumerated in Part VIII of our Resolution. In short, the Special Division will be performing the functions of a trier of fact which this Court itself is unable to engage in. But after the Special Division shall have completed its task, it is this Court which will deliberate on and promulgate the ultimate ruling on these cases.
By way of precedent, this Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2002 in A.M. No. 02-1-07,8 specifically designated three particular members of the Sandiganbayan to comprise the Special Division that would try the criminal cases then pending against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. There being a precedent where the Court designated the particular magistrates who would and did try the cases against a criminal defendant, there should be less room for objection to the Court's designation of the members of the Special Division who are not going to be trying the cases, but merely accepting and evaluating the evidence which the parties may choose to adduce before said Division.
Last. Concerning the allegations raised by respondent Heirs of Dimson with respect to their requested inhibition of the ponente of the assailed Resolution, the same were already raised in their previous Motion for Inhibition dated 21 September 2007, which was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 16 October 2007. Suffice it to say, the Court undertook such action after hearing the explanation of the ponente. Thereafter, the Court through a significant majority, signed in concurrence with the challenged Resolution authored by the ponente. To mandate, as respondent Heirs of Dimson would like to, the ponente to recite to their satisfaction the reasons against inhibition, would create an unfortunate and highly improper scenario where a magistrate whose voluntary disqualification is sought would be coerced into a defensive position every time such a motion is filed.
WHEREFORE, the subject motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. (The Justices who filed their respective concurring and dissenting opinions to the Resolution promulgated on December 14, 2007 maintain their respective positions).
The Court further Resolved to NOTE the following pleadings:Puno, C.J., Santiago, Carpio and Nachura, JJ., no part. Nazario, J. on official leave.
(a) Compliance, dated January 2, 2008, filed by counsel for intervenors Forentina David, et al., stating that said counsel received a copy of the Notice of Judgment and the decision promulgated on December 14, 2007 attached therewith on December 26, 2007;
(b) Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution of December 14, 2007, dated January 97 2008 filed by counsel for respondent Heirs of Jose B. Dimson;
(c) Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution of December 14, 2007, dated January 8, 2008 filed by counsel for intervenors (in G.R. No. 134385) Florentina David, et al.;
(d) Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, dated January 9, 2008 filed by Atty. Hector B. Centeno, 25 Saleng St., Veterans Village, Project 7, Quezon City, as counsel for party-intervenor Bartoiome Rivera, with the conformity of Romuio B. Estrella, in behalf of party-intervenor Bartoiome Rivera; and
(e) Entry of Apperance, dated January 9, 2008, filed by Augusto M. Macam of Macam Raro Ulep Law Offices, Unit 1008, 10/F Atlanta Center, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, as counsel for party-intervenor Bartoiome Rivera, with the conformity of Romulo B. Estrella in behalf of party-intervenor Bartolome Rivera, and requesting that they be furnished with copies of all processes, orders and resolutions at the given address;
(f) Compliance dated January 16, 2008, filed by counsel for intervenor Bartolome Rivera, et al., stating that on December 28, 2007, they received a copy of the Notice of Judgment and decision promulgated on December 14, 2007.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA V. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA V. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Dated 17 January 2008.
[2] Dated 9 January 2008.
[3] Dated 8 January 2008.
[4] See Decision, pp. 13-15.
[5] G.R. No. 103559, 17 November 1992, 215 SCRA 783.
[6] 330 Phil. 8 (1996).
[7] In G.R. No. 123346.
[8] RE: REQUEST OF ACCUSED THROUGH COUNSEL FOR CREATION OR A SPECIAL DIVISION TO TRY THE PLUNDER CASE (SB CRIM. CASE NO. 26558 AND RELATED CASES).
