June 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[A.M. OCA-IPI-07-2716-RTJ : June 02, 2008] UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY TOMAS R. LEONIDAS V. JUDGE WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 111, PASAY CITY :
[A.M. OCA-IPI-07-2716-RTJ : June 02, 2008]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY TOMAS R. LEONIDAS V. JUDGE WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 111, PASAY CITY
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 02 June, 2008:
A.M. OCA-IPI-07-2716-RTJ (Union Bank of the Philippines represented by Tomas R. Leonidas v. Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan, Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City). � Under consideration is the administrative Complaint[1] dated 24 October 2007 filed by Union Bank of the Philippines (complainant) against Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan, Presiding Judge of Brach 111 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (respondent) charging the latter with gross ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. 07-0261 entitled �Union bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Eduardo and Alejandra Macapagal, and John Doe� for collection of a sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
The aforementioned civil case stemmed from a chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle executed by the Macapagal spouses in favor of complainant. When the spouses defaulted in their obligation, complainant foreclosed the chattel mortgage. When the spouses refused to turn over the motor vehicle, complainant filed a complaint against them which case was raffled to respondent�s sala.
Subsequently, respondent ordered the issuance of a writ of replevin as prayed for in the complaint. Said writ was successfully implemented by the sheriff as the subject motor vehicle was seized from the Macapagal spouses and turned over to the complainant. When the spouses failed to file their answer, complainant filed a notice of dismissal. In an Order[2] dated 23 April 2007, respondent denied the notice of dismissal in view of the need for complainant to prove entitlement to possession of the chattel pursuant to Section 9,[3] Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. She further directed complainant to take the necessary steps to prosecute the case for otherwise, it would be dismissed for failure to prosecute with the consequent return of the chattel to defendants. In a subsequent Order[4] dated 29 June 2007, respondent dismissed the civil case for complainant�s failure to prosecute the same and accordingly directed the return of the motor vehicle to the Macapagal spouses.
Complainant moved for a reconsideration of the two orders arguing that a notice of dismissal under Section 1,[5] Rule 17 of the Rules of Court ipso facto dismisses the case. As dismissal is a matter of right for the plaintiff, complainant argued that a judicial order or action from judge is no longer necessary. It contended that since the case is already dismissed by the filing of the notice of dismissal, there is no more case to prosecute; hence the court lost its jurisdiction or power to issue ancillary order in relation thereto. It further maintained that its possession of the motor vehicle is legally supported by the writ of replevin as well as the parties� promissory note with chattel mortgage wherein it was stipulated that in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgaged property would be delivered to the mortgagee. It claimed that then orders of the respondent deprived it of its rightful physical possession of the motor vehicle which is tantamount to allowing or abetting the Macapagal spouses� violation of their contract. It further argued that the court has no violation of their contract. It further argued that the court has not power to interfere with the conditions and stipulations in contracts so long as they are not contrary to law, public policy, public order, good morals or good customs. It maintained that respondent should not have denied its notice of dismissal and subsequently ordered the return of the motor vehicle to the Macapagal spouses for failure of complainant to prosecute. It submitted that she should have confirmed the notice of dismissal and left it to the spouses to file the appropriate action in court should they desire to retrieve possession of the replevied property. It concluded that respondent�s issuance possession of the orders was an unwarranted exercise of oppressive judicial power and bereft of any factual or legal basis.
Respondent denied complainant�s motion for reconsideration. Instead of appealing therefrom, complainant filed the instant administrative case, accusing respondent of gross ignorance of the law committed with bad faith and malice and seeking her dismissal from the service.
In her Comment,[6] respondent quoted her Order[7] denying complainant�s motion for reconsideration where she explained the raison d��tre behind her action. She stressed that the court�s confirmation of the dismissal is necessary before the case can be dismissed on plaintiff�s notice of dismissal; hence, its filing does not automatically dismiss the case. Respondent submitted that the court can immediately confirm the notice but it will nevertheless require the return of the subject chattel for lack of evidence to confirm plaintiff�s possession of the same. She argued that replevin is merely a provisional remedy and does not confer complainant the right to possess the chattel pending determination of the issue as to who between the parties is entitled to its possession. She pointed out that complainant cannot by the simple expedient of filing a notice of dismissal avoid its burden of proving its case of recovery of possession over the chattel. Respondent argued that the complainant and its counsel were given several opportunities to question the orders but complainant ignored the warning and did not even bother to appear at the hearing on its motion for reconsideration. She further argued that the challenged orders were issued in the exercise of her judicial functions acting within her legal powers and jurisdiction and as such she cannot be held administratively responsible therefore. Citing this Court�s circular recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment,[8] it prayed that complainant be required to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded and baseless administrative complaint in lieu of an appeal or petition for certiorari.
In its Report[9] dated 29 February 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of merit. The OCA found, to wit:
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.[12]
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the OCA is APPROVED. The administrative complaint against Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature. The complainant is hereby DIRECTED to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded and baseless administrative complaint against respondent. Velasco, Jr., J., on official leave; Reyes, J., designated additional member pursuant to Special Order No. 504. Carpio Morales, J., on official leave; De Castro, J., designated additional member pursuant to Special Order No. 505.
A.M. OCA-IPI-07-2716-RTJ (Union Bank of the Philippines represented by Tomas R. Leonidas v. Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan, Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City). � Under consideration is the administrative Complaint[1] dated 24 October 2007 filed by Union Bank of the Philippines (complainant) against Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan, Presiding Judge of Brach 111 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (respondent) charging the latter with gross ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. 07-0261 entitled �Union bank of the Philippines vs. Spouses Eduardo and Alejandra Macapagal, and John Doe� for collection of a sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
The aforementioned civil case stemmed from a chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle executed by the Macapagal spouses in favor of complainant. When the spouses defaulted in their obligation, complainant foreclosed the chattel mortgage. When the spouses refused to turn over the motor vehicle, complainant filed a complaint against them which case was raffled to respondent�s sala.
Subsequently, respondent ordered the issuance of a writ of replevin as prayed for in the complaint. Said writ was successfully implemented by the sheriff as the subject motor vehicle was seized from the Macapagal spouses and turned over to the complainant. When the spouses failed to file their answer, complainant filed a notice of dismissal. In an Order[2] dated 23 April 2007, respondent denied the notice of dismissal in view of the need for complainant to prove entitlement to possession of the chattel pursuant to Section 9,[3] Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. She further directed complainant to take the necessary steps to prosecute the case for otherwise, it would be dismissed for failure to prosecute with the consequent return of the chattel to defendants. In a subsequent Order[4] dated 29 June 2007, respondent dismissed the civil case for complainant�s failure to prosecute the same and accordingly directed the return of the motor vehicle to the Macapagal spouses.
Complainant moved for a reconsideration of the two orders arguing that a notice of dismissal under Section 1,[5] Rule 17 of the Rules of Court ipso facto dismisses the case. As dismissal is a matter of right for the plaintiff, complainant argued that a judicial order or action from judge is no longer necessary. It contended that since the case is already dismissed by the filing of the notice of dismissal, there is no more case to prosecute; hence the court lost its jurisdiction or power to issue ancillary order in relation thereto. It further maintained that its possession of the motor vehicle is legally supported by the writ of replevin as well as the parties� promissory note with chattel mortgage wherein it was stipulated that in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgaged property would be delivered to the mortgagee. It claimed that then orders of the respondent deprived it of its rightful physical possession of the motor vehicle which is tantamount to allowing or abetting the Macapagal spouses� violation of their contract. It further argued that the court has no violation of their contract. It further argued that the court has not power to interfere with the conditions and stipulations in contracts so long as they are not contrary to law, public policy, public order, good morals or good customs. It maintained that respondent should not have denied its notice of dismissal and subsequently ordered the return of the motor vehicle to the Macapagal spouses for failure of complainant to prosecute. It submitted that she should have confirmed the notice of dismissal and left it to the spouses to file the appropriate action in court should they desire to retrieve possession of the replevied property. It concluded that respondent�s issuance possession of the orders was an unwarranted exercise of oppressive judicial power and bereft of any factual or legal basis.
Respondent denied complainant�s motion for reconsideration. Instead of appealing therefrom, complainant filed the instant administrative case, accusing respondent of gross ignorance of the law committed with bad faith and malice and seeking her dismissal from the service.
In her Comment,[6] respondent quoted her Order[7] denying complainant�s motion for reconsideration where she explained the raison d��tre behind her action. She stressed that the court�s confirmation of the dismissal is necessary before the case can be dismissed on plaintiff�s notice of dismissal; hence, its filing does not automatically dismiss the case. Respondent submitted that the court can immediately confirm the notice but it will nevertheless require the return of the subject chattel for lack of evidence to confirm plaintiff�s possession of the same. She argued that replevin is merely a provisional remedy and does not confer complainant the right to possess the chattel pending determination of the issue as to who between the parties is entitled to its possession. She pointed out that complainant cannot by the simple expedient of filing a notice of dismissal avoid its burden of proving its case of recovery of possession over the chattel. Respondent argued that the complainant and its counsel were given several opportunities to question the orders but complainant ignored the warning and did not even bother to appear at the hearing on its motion for reconsideration. She further argued that the challenged orders were issued in the exercise of her judicial functions acting within her legal powers and jurisdiction and as such she cannot be held administratively responsible therefore. Citing this Court�s circular recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment,[8] it prayed that complainant be required to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded and baseless administrative complaint in lieu of an appeal or petition for certiorari.
In its Report[9] dated 29 February 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of merit. The OCA found, to wit:
�The instant complaint substantially raises issues to were earlier brought forth by herein complainant in its Motion for Reconsideration filed before the court. A reading of the Order of the court, dated 30 August 2007, resolving said incident reveals that respondent squarely disposed off those points in question. Failing to get a favorable resolution, complainant now brings before us the instant complaint that in effect opens for review said issues. This must fail. This Office is not competent to pass upon matters done by judges in the latter�s exercise of their judicial prerogative. The matters raised therein are judicial issues arising from respondent�s exercise of her judicial discretion.This Court finds the recommendations of the OCA to be in accordance with law and the facts of the case. Whether or not respondent complied with the procedural rules and whether or not she erred in the exercise of her judicial discretion by denying complainant�s notice of dismissal and motion for reconsideration are matters that cannot be taken up in an administrative proceeding. These are clearly matters for judicial adjudication. A party�s remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, lies with the proper reviewing court, not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint.[11] It is axiomatic that, where some other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not thex x x Moreover, for liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not prosper against a judge acting in good faith. Complainant has not shown even an iota of evidence that respondent was impelled by malice, bad faith or less than good intention or motive in issuing the questioned Orders.[10]
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.[12]
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the OCA is APPROVED. The administrative complaint against Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature. The complainant is hereby DIRECTED to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded and baseless administrative complaint against respondent. Velasco, Jr., J., on official leave; Reyes, J., designated additional member pursuant to Special Order No. 504. Carpio Morales, J., on official leave; De Castro, J., designated additional member pursuant to Special Order No. 505.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp.1-7.
[2] Id. at 27.
[3] Sec. 9. Judgment. � After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of possession to and the value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as either party may prove, with costs.
[4] Rollo, p. 28.
[5] SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. � A complainant may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.
[6] Id. at 41-52.
[7] Id. at 34-39.
[8] A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which took effect on 3 November 2003.
[9] Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[10] Id. at 63-64.
[11] Atty. Hilario v. hon. Ocampo III, 422 Phil. 593, 606 (2001) citing Dionisio v. Escano, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400, February 1, 1999, 302 SCRA 411; See Philippine Geriatrics Foundation Inc. v. Layosa, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1249, September 4, 2001, 364 SCRA 287.
[12] Atty. Hilario vs. Hon. Ocampo III , supra citing Santos v. Orlino, Adm. Mar. No. RTJ-98-1418, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 101.
