Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2008 > June 2008 Resolutions > [GR. No. 170167 : June 30, 2008] SPOUSES JESSE AND BESSIE YAP VS. ELISA CHUA AND EVELYN TE :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated 30 June 2008.

GR. No. 170167 - SPOUSES JESSE and BESSIE YAP versus ELISA CHUA and EVELYN TE.

Before us in a motion for reconsideration or our resolution dated June 5, 2006 which denied with finality petitioners� omnibus motion and motion for reconsideration.

Under a rediscounting scheme, petitioner Jesse Yap issued several post-dated crossed checks to respondent Elisa Chua in exchange for financing petitioners� business ventures. However, these checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for various reasons.

As petitioners refused and failed to pay their obligations despite repeated demands, respondent Chua filed a collection suit against them in the regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 23. The RTC decided in favor of respondent Chua, ordering petitioners to pay P32,558,332 as principal, P150,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, P1,000,000 as attorney�s fees, and the cost of suit.^[1] This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification.^[2] The CA found petitioners liable to respondent Chua only for the amount of P31,016,666, representing the value six crossed checks, and set aside the awards of attorney�s fees, moral and exemplary damages. Hence, this petition.

In our resolution dated February 27, 2006, we denied the petition for lack of sufficient showing that the CA committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise of the Court�s discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Petitioners sought reconsideration of that resolution but we denied it in our June 5, 2006 resolution:

Acting on petitioners� omnibus motion and motion for reconsideration dated 25 March 2006 of the resolution dated 27 February 2006 which denied the petition for review on certiorari for lack of sufficient showing that Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment, the Court resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, the basic issues raised therein having been duly considered and passed upon by the Court in the aforesaid resolution and no substantial argument having been adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought.

Petitioners are in this Court again raising the same arguments which have already been passed upon. Thus, this motion for reconsideration must be denied with finality.

The present motion for reconsideration partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:

Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. � Not second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

In other words, a second motion for reconsideration is proscribed.

True, there are exceptional cases when this Court has entertained a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there extraordinary persuasive reasons.^[3] However, this is not one of those cases.

The arguments set forth in this motion are a mere reiteration of the same ones raised in petitioners� first motion for reconsideration which this Court has already passed upon and found to be unsubstantial. Petitioners� rehash of their rejected arguments will not obliterate their essential and egregious speciousness; and under no circumstances may they or any other litigant or counsel be allowed to engage the Court in interminable squabbling about the correctness of its orders and dispositions.^[4]

Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,^[5] applying then Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of the Court,^[6] aptly provided the policy of this Court on these motions:

The propriety of acceptability of such a second motion for reconsideration is not contingent upon the averment of �new� grounds to assail the judgment, i.e., grounds other than those theretofore presented and rejected. Otherwise, attainment of finality of a judgment might be stayed off indefinitely, depending on the party�s ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving and formulating �additional flaws� or �newly discovered errors� therein, or thinking up some injury or prejudice to the rights of the movant of reconsideration. �Piece-meal� impugnation of a judgment by successive motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his motion all the grounds therefore, and those not so included are deemed waived and cease to be available for subsequent motions

For all litigation must come to an end at some point, in accordance with establishment rules of procedure and jurisprudence. As a matter of practice and policy, courts must dispose of every case as promptly as possible; and in fulfillment of their role in the administration of justice, they should brook no delay in the termination of cases by stratagems or maneuvering of parties or their lawyers.

More importantly, petitioners� first motion for reconsideration was already denied �with finality.� The phrase �with finality� emphasizes the important and effect of the denial, i.e., that the Court will entertain and consider no further arguments or submissions respecting the correctness of its final ruling; that, in the Court�s considered view, nothing more is left to be discussed, clarified or done in the case, all issues raised having been passed upon and definitely resolved, and any other which could have been raised, but were not, having been waived and no longer being available as ground for a second motion.^[7] Simply stated, a denial with finality stresses that the case is deemed closed.

But even if we were to decide this motion on its merits, still it would not prosper. The main issue in the case lies in whether or not petitioners are liable for the checks issued by petitioner Jesse Yap to respondent Chua. The resolution of this matter calls for a review of facts which is not within the purview of a petition for review. Issues of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of the Court as this mode is generally confined to questions of law.^[8] Factual findings of the trial court, if confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive.^[9] While the Court has recognized Several exceptions to this rule,^[10] none of the established exceptions is applicable here.

Lastly, petitioners claim that a prejudicial question exists in this case which will materially affect the criminal case they filed against respondents. Similarly, they assert that there is another case pending in the RTC of Makati City, Branch 66 involving the annulment and discharge of the checks which is also prejudicial to this case.

The term �prejudicial question� has a definite meaning in law.^[11] It is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.^[12] It comes into play generally in a situation where civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because how the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.^[13] The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.^[14]

A careful perusal of the records reveals that the checks involved in this case are not the same as those in the criminal case. Therefore, no prejudicial question can arise.

As regards the case filed in the RTC of Makati City, that case and this one are both civil on nature. There is no prejudicial question to speak of when the two cases are civil in nature.^[15] Moreover, it is apparent that the former action was instituted merely to frustrate the Court�s ruling in the case at bar. It is but a canny and preemptive maneuver on the part of the petitioner to delay, if not prevent, the execution of a judgment adverse to his interests.^[16] It bears stressing that the complaint in the Makati court was filed during the pendency of the appeal and six years after the instant case was commenced. It cannot then possibly prejudice a decided case.

At any rate, the two cases can proceed in their own respective directions independently of each other.^[17]

WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

No further pleadings will be entertained in this case. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Penned by Judge Jose S. Majaducon. Rollo, pp. 130-144.

^[2] In its March 31, 2005 decision and October 19, 2005 resolution, both penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of the Twenty-First Division of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City. Id., pp. 63-85.

^[3] Fortich v, Corona, 371 Phil. 672, 681 (1999).

^[4] Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, March 1996, 254 SCRA 234, 247.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Section 1. Motion for rehearing. � A motion for re-rehearing or reconsideration shall be made exparte and filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final order or judgment. No more than one motion for re-rehearing or reconsideration shall be filed without express leave of court. A second motion for reconsideration may be presented within (15) days from notice of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has been pending.

^[7] Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra note 4, at pp. 243-244.

^[8] JMM Promotions Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 1 (2002)

^[9] Lubos v. Galupo, 424 Phil. 665 (2002).

^[10] These exceptions are (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner�s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

^[11] Bernardo v. CA, 388 Phil. 793, 826 (2000).

^[12] Sabandal v. Hon. Tongco, 419 Phil. 13, 17 (2001).

^[13] Carlos v. CA, 335 Phil. 490, 498-499 (1997).

^[14] Id.

^[15] Id.

^[16] Manalo v. CA, 419 Phil. 215, 232 (2001).

^[17] Id.