June 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 173612 : June 16, 2008] DOMINADOR MALANA AND RODEL TIAGA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES :
[G.R. No. 173612 : June 16, 2008]
DOMINADOR MALANA AND RODEL TIAGA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 16 June 2008:
G.R. No. 173612 (Dominador Malana and Rodel Tiaga v. People of the Philippines). � In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 April 2008 and Amplification of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 April 2008, petitioners essentially question this Court�s affirmation of the finding of facts made by the Court of Appeals and the trial court. The motion does not advance any new factual perspective or substantial argument to merit favorable action. To put matters finally to rest, however, the Court engages in a more detailed fashion to address some points reiterated by petitioners.
To begin with, petitioners seek to hide behind the constitutional presumption of innocence when their guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. They cannot succeed. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof that, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[1] On the whole, the prosecution�s evidence passed the test of moral certainty and is sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption of innocence. The testimony of Suzette Roxas (Suzette), corroborated by Vicente Roxas, Jr. (Vicente), is replete with details. She was positive, clear and convincing during the direct examination, and unwavering during the cross-examination.
Petitioners refer to alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution�s witnesses in a last-ditch effort to demolish their credibility. However, the alleged inconsistencies concern only minor collateral matters. They do not relate to the essential elements of the crime.
First, petitioners harp on the impossibility of entering the Roxas�s house since there were two doors. i.e., the main living room door and the outside door.[2] The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that there is absolutely nothing on record stating that the outside door alluded to by petitioners was indeed locked at the time of the incident.[3] Vicente simply testified that the lock of the first door was connected to the concrete floor and that the door could be opened only from the inside.[4] Vicente�s answers related to the questions propounded regarding the locking mechanism of the outside door. From the context of the cross-examination, no testimony has been given that the outside door was locked at the time in the first place, contrary to petitioners� conclusion. The defense counsel should have asked directly whether or not the outside door was then locked. Moreover, based on the positive, categorical and consistent identification by the prosecution witnesses that petitioners Dominador Malana (Dominador) and Rodel Tiaga (Rodel) were the two of the three assailants who barged into their house, in tandem with the fact of entry itself, the manner of effecting the entry into the house from the outside door is immaterial. Even if the outside door were locked, effecting the entry would not be impossible.
Petitioners contend that it was highly improbable for them to enter the Roxas�s residence and risk their life and limb in so doing when it could have been far easier and safer to throw the �dynamite� from the outside.[5] The argument is neither here nor there. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the fact that petitioners pointed out the availability of a better method of committing the crime does not render the prosecution�s evidence less credible. The fact remains that petitioners had been seen and were in fact identified by Suzette and Vicente, who have no reason to testify against them if they were not the real culprits.[6]
More fundamentally, there is no definitive testimony that the explosive used were dynamites. As the trial court observed, nobody said at the trial that what exploded inside the house of the victims were dynamites except Suzette who, testifying as a layman, said that the container with a wick lit by Rodel was a �dynamite� because it had a wick. The trial court observed that the explosive used was more like a home-made incendiary bomb, a Molotov cocktail or a gasoline bomb. Suzette testified that the container burst into flames (�nagliyab�). It was an explosion of flames that engulfed practically the whole house, burning the roof and her mother, whose entire body from the neck down was scorched and charred.[7] For, if the explosives were dynamites then Suzette and her baby should have been blown to pieces. Suzette�s description of the event, �sabay pasok, sabay haggis, sabay putok,� was simply a terse but apt statement that captured the speed that punctuated the attack. Furthermore, Suzette�s testimony should be taken in its entirety. It is replete with details on how petitioners and a third man barged into their house when her mother opened the main door. While the latter was only about two steps away from the main door, petitioners threw explosives which burst into flames, and they immediately fled the crime scene.[8] They were able to flee before the flames spread inside the house.[9]
The trial court did not err in disregarding the testimony of SPO2 Jesus Mamaril (Mamaril), a supposed bomb specialist presented by the defense as expert witness. He testified that the blasting effect of dynamites placed in a container would be more powerful because of inside compression and that it would have been physically impossible for petitioners to escape from the house unhurt due to �pressure impact,�[10] that characterized a dynamite explosion. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, the bomb expert is not qualified to make such statements as he never saw the actual explosives used in this case, much less was he ever privy to the investigation of the explosion.[11] Hence, his opinions based on hypothetical questions were correctly disregarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, it is axiomatic that courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may have probative value, the weight assigned to them would depend on the judge.[12] Between the testimony of Mamaril who merely based his opinions on hypothetical questions propounded by the defense counsel without knowledge of the kind of explosives used, and the testimony of Suzette, the principal eyewitness whose testimony was corroborated by Vicente and other physical evidence, the latter has more probative value. Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving more weight to Suzette�s testimony.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in not giving probative value to the affidavit of Joseph Malana Villanueva (Joseph) which pointed to Salvador Villafuerte, Roman Villafuerte, Boyet Villafuerte, and Mondring Erederos as the perpetrators of the crime. The affidavit was admitted in evidence only as part of the testimonies of the witnesses who referred to it, even though the affiant was not presented in court.[13] The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Thus, the Court stressed the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. The weight to be given to evidence, once admitted, is a matter of judicial evaluation in accordance with the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.[14] The trial court could not evaluate the truth or falsity of Joseph�s statements nor could the prosecution subject him to the rigors of cross-examination as he was not presented as a witness. The Court of Appeals was also correct in not giving credence to the defense�s story that the Villafuerte brothers were the real perpetrators of the crime as it is human nature for culprits to pin the blame on others rather than on themselves.[15]
As a last attempt to evade responsibility for the heinous crime, petitioners wrote a letter dated 16 October 2006[16] to the Court, attaching thereto a letter dated 23 April 2004[17] allegedly written by
Suzette retracting her previous testimony.[18] The Court of Appeals correctly observed that there was no tinge of doubt in Suzette�s testimony as she would not have lightly accused petitioners if they were not the true malefactors of the crime committed. Indeed, as a direct victim who lost her left leg to the crime, as a mother who had to bear the sight of her eight-month old baby injured by burns and as a daughter who witnessed her own mother burn to death, Suzette could never have just pointed to anyone as responsible for the crime. There could have been no other overriding reason for Suzette�s damning testimony against petitioners save for the purpose of making sure that justice be done and the culprits of the crime be held accountable and be meted their proper punishment for their dastardly deed. Suzette�s relationship to the victims of this case, including her personal injury, in accord with human nature, ensured that she would have the most interest in telling the truth, rather than lie and send innocent men to rot in jail.[19]
Even if it were true that Suzette retracted her testimony, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony. It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties. Any recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity for the party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness.[20] In the interest of fair play, the alleged letter of Suzette could have been presented, at the latest, to the Court of Appeals before it rendered its decision. It is doctrinal that the Court is not a trier of facts. In contrast, the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.[21] In this case, Suzette was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on the authenticity of the alleged letter. The unauthenticated letter, even if we could admit it in evidence, has no probative value at all.
Petitioners insist that this Court apply the equipoise rule and acquit them.[22] However, the equipoise rule only finds application when the evidence on an issue of facts is in equipoise, or that is, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates in which case, the party having the burden of proof loses.[23] In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioners are the perpetrators of the dastardly crime against which the presumption of innocence has been overthrown by the prosecution. In People v. Ca�ete,[24] as partially quoted by petitioners, the Court held that:
WHEREFORE, petitioners� Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 April 2008, together with their Amplification of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 April 2008, is DENIED with FINALITY.
G.R. No. 173612 (Dominador Malana and Rodel Tiaga v. People of the Philippines). � In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 April 2008 and Amplification of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 April 2008, petitioners essentially question this Court�s affirmation of the finding of facts made by the Court of Appeals and the trial court. The motion does not advance any new factual perspective or substantial argument to merit favorable action. To put matters finally to rest, however, the Court engages in a more detailed fashion to address some points reiterated by petitioners.
To begin with, petitioners seek to hide behind the constitutional presumption of innocence when their guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. They cannot succeed. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof that, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[1] On the whole, the prosecution�s evidence passed the test of moral certainty and is sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption of innocence. The testimony of Suzette Roxas (Suzette), corroborated by Vicente Roxas, Jr. (Vicente), is replete with details. She was positive, clear and convincing during the direct examination, and unwavering during the cross-examination.
Petitioners refer to alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution�s witnesses in a last-ditch effort to demolish their credibility. However, the alleged inconsistencies concern only minor collateral matters. They do not relate to the essential elements of the crime.
First, petitioners harp on the impossibility of entering the Roxas�s house since there were two doors. i.e., the main living room door and the outside door.[2] The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that there is absolutely nothing on record stating that the outside door alluded to by petitioners was indeed locked at the time of the incident.[3] Vicente simply testified that the lock of the first door was connected to the concrete floor and that the door could be opened only from the inside.[4] Vicente�s answers related to the questions propounded regarding the locking mechanism of the outside door. From the context of the cross-examination, no testimony has been given that the outside door was locked at the time in the first place, contrary to petitioners� conclusion. The defense counsel should have asked directly whether or not the outside door was then locked. Moreover, based on the positive, categorical and consistent identification by the prosecution witnesses that petitioners Dominador Malana (Dominador) and Rodel Tiaga (Rodel) were the two of the three assailants who barged into their house, in tandem with the fact of entry itself, the manner of effecting the entry into the house from the outside door is immaterial. Even if the outside door were locked, effecting the entry would not be impossible.
Petitioners contend that it was highly improbable for them to enter the Roxas�s residence and risk their life and limb in so doing when it could have been far easier and safer to throw the �dynamite� from the outside.[5] The argument is neither here nor there. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the fact that petitioners pointed out the availability of a better method of committing the crime does not render the prosecution�s evidence less credible. The fact remains that petitioners had been seen and were in fact identified by Suzette and Vicente, who have no reason to testify against them if they were not the real culprits.[6]
More fundamentally, there is no definitive testimony that the explosive used were dynamites. As the trial court observed, nobody said at the trial that what exploded inside the house of the victims were dynamites except Suzette who, testifying as a layman, said that the container with a wick lit by Rodel was a �dynamite� because it had a wick. The trial court observed that the explosive used was more like a home-made incendiary bomb, a Molotov cocktail or a gasoline bomb. Suzette testified that the container burst into flames (�nagliyab�). It was an explosion of flames that engulfed practically the whole house, burning the roof and her mother, whose entire body from the neck down was scorched and charred.[7] For, if the explosives were dynamites then Suzette and her baby should have been blown to pieces. Suzette�s description of the event, �sabay pasok, sabay haggis, sabay putok,� was simply a terse but apt statement that captured the speed that punctuated the attack. Furthermore, Suzette�s testimony should be taken in its entirety. It is replete with details on how petitioners and a third man barged into their house when her mother opened the main door. While the latter was only about two steps away from the main door, petitioners threw explosives which burst into flames, and they immediately fled the crime scene.[8] They were able to flee before the flames spread inside the house.[9]
The trial court did not err in disregarding the testimony of SPO2 Jesus Mamaril (Mamaril), a supposed bomb specialist presented by the defense as expert witness. He testified that the blasting effect of dynamites placed in a container would be more powerful because of inside compression and that it would have been physically impossible for petitioners to escape from the house unhurt due to �pressure impact,�[10] that characterized a dynamite explosion. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, the bomb expert is not qualified to make such statements as he never saw the actual explosives used in this case, much less was he ever privy to the investigation of the explosion.[11] Hence, his opinions based on hypothetical questions were correctly disregarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, it is axiomatic that courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may have probative value, the weight assigned to them would depend on the judge.[12] Between the testimony of Mamaril who merely based his opinions on hypothetical questions propounded by the defense counsel without knowledge of the kind of explosives used, and the testimony of Suzette, the principal eyewitness whose testimony was corroborated by Vicente and other physical evidence, the latter has more probative value. Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving more weight to Suzette�s testimony.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in not giving probative value to the affidavit of Joseph Malana Villanueva (Joseph) which pointed to Salvador Villafuerte, Roman Villafuerte, Boyet Villafuerte, and Mondring Erederos as the perpetrators of the crime. The affidavit was admitted in evidence only as part of the testimonies of the witnesses who referred to it, even though the affiant was not presented in court.[13] The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Thus, the Court stressed the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. The weight to be given to evidence, once admitted, is a matter of judicial evaluation in accordance with the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.[14] The trial court could not evaluate the truth or falsity of Joseph�s statements nor could the prosecution subject him to the rigors of cross-examination as he was not presented as a witness. The Court of Appeals was also correct in not giving credence to the defense�s story that the Villafuerte brothers were the real perpetrators of the crime as it is human nature for culprits to pin the blame on others rather than on themselves.[15]
As a last attempt to evade responsibility for the heinous crime, petitioners wrote a letter dated 16 October 2006[16] to the Court, attaching thereto a letter dated 23 April 2004[17] allegedly written by
Suzette retracting her previous testimony.[18] The Court of Appeals correctly observed that there was no tinge of doubt in Suzette�s testimony as she would not have lightly accused petitioners if they were not the true malefactors of the crime committed. Indeed, as a direct victim who lost her left leg to the crime, as a mother who had to bear the sight of her eight-month old baby injured by burns and as a daughter who witnessed her own mother burn to death, Suzette could never have just pointed to anyone as responsible for the crime. There could have been no other overriding reason for Suzette�s damning testimony against petitioners save for the purpose of making sure that justice be done and the culprits of the crime be held accountable and be meted their proper punishment for their dastardly deed. Suzette�s relationship to the victims of this case, including her personal injury, in accord with human nature, ensured that she would have the most interest in telling the truth, rather than lie and send innocent men to rot in jail.[19]
Even if it were true that Suzette retracted her testimony, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony. It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties. Any recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity for the party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness.[20] In the interest of fair play, the alleged letter of Suzette could have been presented, at the latest, to the Court of Appeals before it rendered its decision. It is doctrinal that the Court is not a trier of facts. In contrast, the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.[21] In this case, Suzette was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on the authenticity of the alleged letter. The unauthenticated letter, even if we could admit it in evidence, has no probative value at all.
Petitioners insist that this Court apply the equipoise rule and acquit them.[22] However, the equipoise rule only finds application when the evidence on an issue of facts is in equipoise, or that is, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates in which case, the party having the burden of proof loses.[23] In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioners are the perpetrators of the dastardly crime against which the presumption of innocence has been overthrown by the prosecution. In People v. Ca�ete,[24] as partially quoted by petitioners, the Court held that:
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The prosecution must prove that the crime charged or necessarily included therein was committed and that the accused was precisely the perpetrator of the crime. It is required that the identity of the accused as the perpetrator must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; that every circumstance favoring his innocence be taken into account. The proof against him must not be permitted to sway judgment.[25] If the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.[26] The overriding consideration is not whether doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[27]To recapitulate, the evidence is clear and convincing that one of the victims was killed, while the other, who could have died had it not been for timely medical intervention was seriously burned and dismembered, and that petitioners were two of the three perpetrators of the crime. Indeed, the evidence of the petitioners� guilt is beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, petitioners� Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 April 2008, together with their Amplification of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 April 2008, is DENIED with FINALITY.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI-YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI-YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] People v. Gapasan, G.R. No. 110812, 29 March 1995, 243 SCRA 53, 62.
[2] Rollo, pp. 349-352.
[3] Id. at 80-81.
[4] TSN, 8 June 2001, p.2.
[5] Rollo, pp. 361, 371-372.
[6] Id. at 81-82.
[7] CA rollo, p.35.
[8] TSN, 6 July 2001, pp. 5-10.
[9] CA rollo, pp. 35-36
[10] Id. at 34-35.
[11] Rollo, p.83.
[12] See Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc. et. al., G.R. No. 132607, 5 May 1999, 306 SCRA 762, 777; Heirs of Severa Gragorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117609, 29 December 1998, 300 SCRA 565, 574-575.
[13] Rollo, pp. 357-358.
[14] People v. Turco, Jr., G.R. No. 137757, 14 August 2000, 337 SCRA 714, 730-731. See also Ayala Land Inc., v. ASB Realty Corporation and E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 153667, 11 August 2005, citing Permanent Savings and Load Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, 23 September 2004, 439 SCRA 1; PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518, o0 October 1998, 297 SCRA 402; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102786, 15 August 1998, 294 SCRA 196.
[15] Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 128517, 10 September 1998, 295 SCRA 334, 356 citing People v. Sarmiento, 69 Phil. 740, 742, June 17, 1940 and People v. Madangan, 52 Phil. 62, September 12, 1928.
[16] Rollo, pp. 138-139.
[17] Id. at 140-141.
[18] Id. at 363-365.
[19] Id. at 76-77.
[20] People v. Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, 19 November 1996, 332 Phil. 384, 396. See also Concepcion v. People, G.R. No. 131728, 9 March 1998; People v. Montejo, G.R. No. 133475, 26 March 2001.
[21] Republic Act No. 7902, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. � The Court of Appeals shall exercise: x x x x
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those failing within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
[22] Rollo, pp. 365-367, 372.
[23] See Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 160328, 4 February 2005, 450 SCRA 495, 506; People v. Pabiona, et. al., G.R. No. 145803, 30 June 2004, 433 SCRA 301, 322; Bernandino et. al., v. People, G.R. No. 170453, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 237, 252.
[24] G.R. No. 128321, 11 March 2004, 425 SCRA 353, 363.
[25] People v. Mejia, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 1194-7, 7 July 1997), 275 SCRA 127.
[26] People v. Manambit, G.R. Nos. 72744-45, 18 April 1997, 271 SCRA 344.
[27] People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102366, 3 October 1997, 280 SCRA 160.
