February 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 176383 : February 15, 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. FLORDELIZA LADORES SUERTE-FELIPE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
"G.R. No. 176383 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. FLORDELIZA LADORES SUERTE-FELIPE, Accused-Appellant. -The accused challenges the affirmance of her conviction for parricide by the Court of Appeals (CA) through the decision promulgated on October 30, 2006.[1] She had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, in Quezon City (RTC), and punished with reclusion perpetua.
The information dated February 21, 2001 averred as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of December 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together with two other persons whose true names, whereabouts and identities have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation and by taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one ULYSSES SUERTE FELIPE Y OCONER, husband of accused FLORDELIZA LADORES-SUERTE FELIPE, while victim was on board a Meralco service car and was stopped at Madeliene St. Parkway Village, Brgy. Apolonio Samson, this City, thereafter, FLORDELIZA LADORES- SUERTE FELIPE in conspiracy with another accused, acted as look out, by then and there one of which shooting him several times with a gun, hitting him on the trunk, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of ULYSSES SUERTE FELIPE Y OCONER.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The State's evidence was summed up by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the appellee's brief[3] thus:
Ulysses Suerte Felipe (the victim), a Manila Electric Company (Meralco) patrolman, told his co-employees at their office at about noontime of December 13, 2000 that he was going out to see appellant Flordeliza Ladores-Suerte Felipe, his estranged wife. He left driving a Meralco van in the early afternoon of the same day and proceeded to Madeleine St., Parkway Village, Quezon City.
Prosecution witness Rodolfo Roque, company driver of Dynaflex Plastics, saw the Meralco van being driven by the victim pass by and park about ten (10) meters ahead where his Isuzu truck was. From the driver's seat, Rodolfo Roque's attention was caught by a pretty woman in a black blouse and pants walking towards the Meralco van. The woman boarded the passenger's front seat. A few minutes later, Rodolfo Roque saw the woman alight from the Meralco van at about the same time that a man walked towards the side of the said van's driver. Rodolfo Roque then heard gun shots. Rodolfo Roque saw a man flag down a tricycle which he and the woman boarded. The man he saw walking towards the driver also boarded the same tricycle as it passed by him. The tricycle then sped away. As soon as the group left, Rodolfo Roque hurriedly approached the Meralco van and saw the bloodied victim slumped on his seat. Rodolfo Roque was positive that the woman he saw boarding the Meralco van and then left onboard the tricycle was the same woman in several pictures shown to him at Camp Karingal by police investigators. She turned out to be appellant Flordeliza Ladores-Suerte Felipe.[4]
On the other hand, the Defense offered alibi. She synthesized her evidence in the appellant's brief, viz:
On the day her husband was killed, she was in Bagong Barrio, Gapan Nueva Ecija. She went there the day before, December 12, 2000 to have her cellphone casings designed by Edwin Manalang. She learned that it was the birthday of Edwin and his mother was preparing food to celebrate the occasion but some friends passed by for him to register and they went to Cabanatuan City. He said he would not stay long for the registration and would return later but was not able to do so. She slept over and the following morning the drinking party started. She showed pictures taken by Edwin's sisters-in-law, Edith and Bernadette during the occasion where she appeared (see pictures marked Exhs. 6-10). She left for Penaranda with Edwin at about 6:00 p.m. arriving there at 7:00. She avers that she saw Roque for the first time only in Binangonan on February 2, 2001. Roque was with Edith and her husband. It was there that Edith pointed her to Roque saying, "that woman is Flordeliza with big eyes short hair, fair complexioned.�[5]
The CA recounted the testimonies of other Defense witnesses, viz:
EDWIN MANALANG testified that on 12 December 2000, the Appellant visited him at his house in Bagong Barrio, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Since he had to go to Cabanatuan to register for a sportsfest, he left the Appellant at his house. When he returned the following day, he was informed by his wife that the Appellant stayed with them for the night and was then still sleeping. He further said that when he woke up, the appellant was already entertaining his visitors who came over for his belated birthday celebration. Per CARMELITA MANALANG, she herself asked the Appellant to stay for the birthday celebration of his son on 13 December 2000 and that the Appellant was with them during the celebration. These were confirmed by the Appellant.
RICHARD CADERAO, a tricycle driver, disclosed that while he was driving, he noticed a Meralco pickup van park along Madeliene Street. He was flagged down by a man and then saw a female alight from the Meralco vehicle. The woman subsequently made a motion to the man on the left side of the pickup and the man approached the Meralco vehicle and fired at the driver. Said woman boarded his tricycle and so did the two (2) men. They alighted in Roosevelt Avenue. He confirmed that the Appellant was not the same woman he saw at the crime scene.[6]
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on October 21, 2003, finding the accused guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Flordeliza Ladores Suerte-Felipe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide described and penalized under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA No. 7659, in relation to Art. 63 of the same code, and acting in conspiracy with unnamed Does, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the court has no recourse but to impose upon her the penalty of death. She is also sentenced to pay the heirs of Ulysses Suerte Felipe as follows:
- P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
- P 50,000.00 as .moral damages;
- P 31,500.00 as actual damages;
- P 1,053,000.00 as compensatory damages.
And to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, the accused contended that the circumstantial evidence presented against her was not sufficient to convict her of parricide, and that assuming that she was guilty of the crime, treachery should not be appreciated against her.
On October 30, 2006, the CA affirmed the conviction,[8] holding that the circumstantial evidence presented against the accused established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It noted the categorical, straightforward and detailed testimony of Roque in identifying her as the woman he had seen at the scene of the crime; observed that improper motive did not actuate the Prosecution's witnesses, entitling their testimonies to full faith and credit; and indicated that the accused herself testified to the effect that she had not known Roque prior to her husband's killing, and that she had no knowledge of any reason why Roque testified against her. It found the Defense witnesses to have incurred contradictions in their testimonies, pointing out that although the accused claimed to have left for Cabanatuan on the night of December 12, 2000 to watch a contest, Carmelita Manalang stated that the accused had been only in their place in Gapan, Nueva Ecija; and declared that even if the accused had really been in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, that place could still be an "easy distance travel to and from Quezon City especially at this modern age when motorized vehicles can easily traverse towns."
The CA agreed with the RTC's finding of the attendance of treachery, noting Roque's testimony that a man had approached the left side of the MERALCO van and had fired the lethal shots, then had walked away; and the locations of the gunshot wounds on the victim's body.
The CA disposed thuswise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of the Court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, downgrading the penalty meted upon Appellant FLORDEL1ZA LADORES-SUERTE FELIPE from death to reclusion perpetua and ordering the said Appellant to pay Victim's heirs the amount of Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P19,800.00) and Three Million Six Hundred Seventy Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P3,670.800.00) as actual and compensatory damages, respectively.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In the present appeal, both parties reiterated the arguments made in their respective briefs before the CA. Thus, the accused continues to insist that the circumstantial evidence presented against her did not suffice to convict her; and that the attendance of treachery in the commission of the crime should not be appreciated.
We affirm.
First of all, we stress that the lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of an accused cannot anymore be proved by other evidence, because direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence.[10] Circumstantial evidence, also referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue. It may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting felons free.[11]
For circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the following elements must be shown to concur, namely: (a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (c) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[12] No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."[13]
The Revised Penal Code defines and punishes parricide thus:
Article 246. Parricide. � Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
We concur with the CA in affirming the conviction based on the findings by the RTC on the chain of circumstances establishing the guilt of the accused for killing her husband, to wit:
- The victim told his co-employees he was going out to meet his wife Liza (the accused) at an undisclosed place;
- Ulysses went to Madeliene St., Parkway Village, parked his van and a woman whom we now have determined to be the accused approached it;
- Just as the accused alighted from the van, a man approached the driver's seat and soon gun shots rang out;
- The man who went near the van walked away;
- Another man who was sitting by the road flagged a tricycle, then let the woman to board it, boarded it himself, then passed by the man who approached the van;
- That man boarded the same tricycle and sped away;
- Roque approached the van and saw a man slumped and bloodied in his seat. Incidentally, a folder containing the photocopies of a certificate of titles under their names was found beside the victim in the van.
The circumstances lead to no other conclusion that the woman later identified as accused Flordeliza Ladores-Suerte Felipe and her male companions acted in conspiracy and shot the defenseless victim.[14]
We cannot contradict the unanimous observations and conclusions of the RTC and the CA. Nor are we inclined to re-evaluate the testimonies of the witnesses and the parties� evidence, as the Defense desires. Settled is the rule that the determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court due to its having the unique position of observing the witness� deportment while testifying, as well as of assessing the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the witnesses' credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court, particularly when affirmed by the CA.[15]
Accused's denial and alibi did not overcome the weight of the circumstantial evidence indicating her complicity beyond reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic that the positive assertions of the Prosecution witnesses deserve more credence and evidentiary weight than the negative averments of the accused and her witnesses.[16]
The finding of treachery by the RTC and the CA is correct and supported by the evidence. The accused beckoned her husband to meet her on Madeleine Street in Parkway Village, where they met inside his van. After she alighted from the van, a man went near the driver's seat and shot the victim. Immediately following the shooting, another man, acting as the lookout, flagged a tricycle, which the accused and the shooter likewise boarded. They all sped off on board the tricycle. The victim was unarmed and unprepared for the sudden deadly attack. He had no hint in the least of the looming danger after he had a talk with his wife. Such sudden manner of attack against the victim just after his wife had left the van constituted treachery because it was mounted without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself. In determining the existence of treachery, what is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.[17]cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 30, 2006 by the Court of Appeals. Costs of suit to be paid by the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] CA rollo, pp. 191-218; penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal (retired), with Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a Member of the Court) and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring.[2] Records, p. 1.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 170-182.
[4] Id., pp. 172-173.
[5] Records, pp. 312-313.
[6] Supra, note 1, pp. 194-195.
[7] Records, pp. 328-329.
[8] Supra, note 1.
[9] Supra at Note 1, pp. 218-219.
[10] Gan v. People, G.R. No. 165884, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 550, 571; also People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000, 325 SCRA 835, 850.
[11] Gan v. People, supra.
[12] Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court; People v. Ochate, G.R. No. 127154, July 30 2002, 385 SCRA 353, 358; People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No. 94308, June 16, 1994, 233 SCRA 231, 235; People v. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678, 682: People v. Iran, G.R. No. 88915, December 14, 1992, 216 SCRA 575, 580.
[13] People v. Ludday, 61 Phil. 216, 221-222 (1935).
[14] Records, pp. 324-325.
[15] People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 306, 314; People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, -546-547. People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432: October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230; Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150443, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 220; People v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139, 153-154; People v. Genita, Jr., G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 343, 349; People v. Pacheco, G.R. No. 142887, March 2, 2004, 424 SCRA 164, 174; People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2006, 423 SCRA 260, 265-266: People v. Santiago, G.R. Nos. 137542-43, January 26, 2004, 420 SCRA 248, 256.
[16] People v. Villarino, G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 372, 388.
[17] People v. Napalit, G.R. No. 181247, March 19, 2010, 616 SCRA 245, 249.
