Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2007 > August 2007 Resolutions > [G.r. No. 150850 : August 08, 2007] VICENTE GO, PETITIONER VERSUS VICENTE CHUA, RESPONDENT :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 8 August 2007:

G.R. No. 150850 - VICENTE GO, petitioner versus VICENTE CHUA, respondent

Before us is an appeal both from the Decision^[1] dated May 15, 2001 and the Resolution^[2] dated October 18, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42620 dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Vicente Go of the Decision^[3] dated February 5, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch VIII, Cebu City. The RTC had acquitted Go of the crime of estafa but had ordered him to pay respondent Vicente Chua P210,000 with 12% interest per annum until full payment.

The facts are as follows:

In an information dated April 13, 1992, petitioner Vicente Go was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) in relation to paragraph 2(d)^[4] of the Revised Penal Code. The information reads as follows:

x x x x

That on or about the 28^th day of September, 1990, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to defraud and by means of pretending to possess credit in exchange for cash he obtained from Vicente Chua issued the following checks, namely:

BANK	CHECK NUMBER	DATE	AMOUNT
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., Cebu Br.	CE 139099	9.28.90	P 40,000.00
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., Cebu Br.	CE 139085	10.28.90	P 150,000.00
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., Cebu Br.	CE 294541	11.23.90	10,000.00
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., Cebu Br.	CE 294542	12.8.90	10,000.00
			___________
			P 210,000.00 vvvvvvvvvv

all payable to Vicente Chua, assuring said Vicente Chua that said checks had sufficient funds and would be honored by the drawee bank and by means of such inducement and misrepresentation, said Vicente Chua was induced to deliver and in fact did deliver to said accused the total amount of P210,000.00, when in truth and in fact said accused very well knew said checks would not be honored by the drawee bank as each check bears only one signature contrary to what is required of two signatures in each check before it could be honored by the bank and once said checks; were presented for payment, the same were dishonored for reason of "Two Signatures Required", and in spite of repeated demands made upon him by Vicente Chua to comply with his obligation, he has failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Vicente Chua in the amount of P210,000.00, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.^[5]

Go was arraigned on June 17, 1992. He pleaded not guilty to the charge.^[6];

On February 5, 1993, the RTC acquitted Go of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 since there was no proof of deceit when the four checks were issued and the checks were dishonored not because they were not funded but because of the absence of the required two signatures. The RTC however directed Go to reimburse Chua P210,000. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, ACQUITTAL of the accused, VICENTE GO, is hereby directed, but he should reimburse the complainant a total of P10,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, until full payment.

SO ORDERED.^[7]

Go appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in ruling that he is civilly liable. His appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated May 15, 2001, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[8]

Go filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated October 18, 2001.

Hence, this petition.

In his petition, Go raises the following issues:

I

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT PETITIONER IS CIVILLY LIABLE TO [RESPONDENT] BECAUSE HE ADMITTED IN HIS JOINT COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT THAT THE FOUR (4) CHECKS WERE PAYMENTS OF AN EXISTING DEBT IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS WITH THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT SAID CHECKS WERE PART OF THE FIFTEEN (15) CHECKS WHICH PETITIONER ISSUED TO RESPONDENT IN EXCHANGE FOR TWO CASHIER'S CHECKS IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF Pl,500,000.00 WHICH IN TURN CONFLICTS WITH THE ADMISSION OF RESPONDENT THAT SAID FOUR (4) ( CHECKS WERE NOT PART OF THE FIFTEEN (15) CHECKS.

II.

THE SAID FINDING OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS BASED Of A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.^[9]

The main issue before us is whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in its finding that the checks of Go were payments for an existing debt and not part of the 15 checks in exchange for two cashier's checks totaling P1 ,500,000 as found by the trial court.

Go argues he cannot be held civilly liable for P210,000. He points out that the RTC held him civilly liable for the reason that the four checks were allegedly part of checks which he issued to Chua in exchange for two cashier's checks which Chua gave him in the total amount of P1,500,000 and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court based on a different finding of fact: that petitioner, in his joint counter-affidavit, allegedly admitted that the four checks were issued in payment of an existing debt.^[10]

Chua, on the other hand, contends that the issues which petitioner has brought forth are the same issues that the Court of Appeals had painstakingly reviewed and discussed in its decision and to ask this Court to review the factual antecedents anew and go over the voluminous records once again would unduly burden the Court and delay disposition of other equally important cases.^[11]

The general rule is that in the exercise of the Court's power of review, binding on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and the Court. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee: (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.^[12]

A plain reading of the decisions of the RTC and Court; of Appeals would show that the abovementioned findings of fact of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are not contradictory. In fact, they even support each other such that we may infer that the four checks, which formed part of 15 checks Go issued, answer for his existing debt to Chua. The RTC decision stated that the cashier's checks dated March 17, 1989 and November 21, 1988 in the amounts of P500,000 and P1,000,000, respectively, were given by Chua to Go and the latter in turn gave Chua a total of 15 checks.^[13] The four checks issued by Go were all dated in 1990.^[14] Based on the dates alone, it can be inferred that the four checks were issued as payment by Go for the cashier's checks given by Chua. The Court of Appeals corroborated this deduction when it emphasized Go's admission in the joint counter-affidavit that the four checks were issued to answer for an existing debt. Certainly then, these two findings of fact of the RTC and Court of Appeals are not contradictory but are complementary based on the admissions by Go of his civil liability.

As to Go's civil liability, jurisprudence tells us that an accused who is acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant.^[15]

In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,^[16] this Court held:

An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable when the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.

The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is sufficient to sustain the award was

explained by the Code Commission in connection with Art. 29^[17] of the Civil Code, In wit:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other private rights. One is for punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. It is just and proper that for the purposes of imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?^[18]

Thus, Go may be held civilly liable even if he was acquitted of the crime of estafa provided the facts established by the evidence so warrant.

The RTC found that Go did not employ deceit in obtaining money from Chua, although it concluded that Go's liability is totally civil in character. The Court of Appeals not only affirmed Go's civil liability but presented further proof thereof, pointing out Go's admission in his joint counter-affidavit that he issued the checks to answer for an existing debt to Chua. Finding no reason to deviate from these findings, we affirm Go's civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2001 and Resolution dated October 18, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42620 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 19-23. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Alicia L. Santos concurring.

^[2] Id. at 31.

^[3] Records, pp. 89-98. Penned by Judge Bernardo LI. Salas.

^[4] ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). � Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow:

^[5] Records, pp. 1-2

^[6] Id. at 39.

^[7] Id. at 98.

^[8] Rollo, p. 22.

^[9] Id. at 8.

^[10] Id. at 55.

^[11] Id. at 63-64.

^[12] C & S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122720, December 16, 2002, 394 SCRA 82, 88.

^[13] Records, p. 92.

^[14] Id. at 41, 43, 46, 48.

^[15] Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21, 2004, 441 SCRA 137, 147.

^[16] G. R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370.

^[17] Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

^[18] Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, supra at 378-379.