August 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 170080 : August 01, 2007] CONSOLATION Q. AUSTRIA V. CONSTANCIA Q. LICHAUCO, , CONSUELO Q. JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS, RICARDO M. QUINTOS, JR., AILEEN M. QUINTOS AND TYRONE M. QUINTOS :
[G.R. No. 170080 : August 01, 2007]
CONSOLATION Q. AUSTRIA V. CONSTANCIA Q. LICHAUCO, , CONSUELO Q. JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS, RICARDO M. QUINTOS, JR., AILEEN M. QUINTOS AND TYRONE M. QUINTOS
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 1 August 2007:
G.R. No. 170080 (Consolation Q. Austria v. Constancia Q. Lichauco, , Consuelo Q. Jalandoni, Jose Alberto L. Quintos, Ricardo M. Quintos, Jr., Aileen M. Quintos and Tyrone M. Quintos).�In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 9 May 2007 respondents seek the review of the Decision of the Court dated 3 April 2007 insofar as it partially reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati dated 21 June 2005.
To recall, the petition originated from a complaint for partition filed by respondents against petitioner who had consistently refused to agree to the sale or partition of two parcels of land situated in Makati City. The Court agreed with the ruling of the RTC that respondents were entitled to seek the partition of the property. However, the RTC also authorized as an alternative the sale of the subject property and the division of the proceeds of such sale among the co-owners. On this point, the Court disagreed and struck down the order authorizing the sale. We ratiocinated that there are two stages in every action for partition. First, the determination of whether a co-ownership existed and whether partition was proper. Upon an affirmative finding on both issues, the parties are allowed to make partition among themselves. It is only if the parties are unable to agree on partition that the court may direct the partition itself with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The Court noted that only the first phase had been reached in this case, and that the RTC went astray when it authorized the sale of the property to a third party.
Respondents argue in the Motion for Reconsideration that while the general right of partition is grounded on Article 494 of the Civil Code, their cause of action is anchored on Article 498. Said provision states that "whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed." It is contended that the indivisibility of the subject property had been established, with the consequence that the sale thereof under Article 498 may thereupon materialize.
To be certain, it is only in the present Motion for Reconsideration that respondents argue before this Court that their action for partition pivoted on Article 498. In their comment to the petition, respondents contended that the rule applicable to the present case "is unequivocally stated in Article 494 of the Civil Code."[1] No reference was made in said comment as to Article 498. More tellingly perhaps, a perusal of the original complaint[2] for partition likewise reveals that only Article 494, and not Article 498, was expressly cited therein. If indeed the cause of action was primarily hinged on Article 498, such fact was not sufficiently highlighted by respondents.
Still, there may be sufficient allegations in the Complaint itself, as well as the evidence submitted during the trial, that allude to the factual predicates mentioned in Article 498. For one, paragraph 2 of the Complaint states that "the nature and configuration of the existing improvements [on the subject property] render the Properties indivisible," and that the "said parcels of land have permanent improvements thereon which straddle both lots."[3] Respondents' Annex "I," a letter dated 9 July 1996 to the Barangay Chairman of Palanan, Makati written by respondents, states that "the property in question is basically indivisible because on its 661 square meters stand a residential bungalow house and two separate but adjoining apartments."[4] Respondents' Annex "H-2," a letter-report addressed to respondent Jalandoni by Licensed Real Estate Broker Antonio Cesar Fernando, stated in the course of an appraisal of the subject properties that "the lots are presently developed and utilized as a residential compound improved with a single storey residential structure and a two-storey residential apartment, x x x the single storey residential structure is on both lots, the lots are perceived to be only one lot x x x[5] The letter also observes, with respect to the prospect of subdividing the lots, that "due to the location of the land improvements, a prospective buyer may perceive the lots to be only one lot. Such perception will increase the desirability and demand for the lots."[6]
Ultimately, Article 498 warrants consideration by this Court if only because the RTC decision did expressly advert to said Article as part of its basis for ruling that the properties may be sold.
Facially, there are two joint requisites necessary before Article 498 may apply. The first requirement is that "the thing is essentially indivisible," and the second is that "the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others." The square application of Article 498 cannot be had if only one of these two requisites is present, meaning for example that the sheer inability of the co-owners to agree on how to partition the co-owned property is not sufficient in itself to call for the application of Article 498.
Respondents seek to impress on us that all the requisites as stated in Article 498 were indubitably established in this case, thus justifying the partition sale as authorized under that provision. We disagree with this conclusion. More fundamentally, we are not convinced that Article 498 should apply to the case at bar in the first place.
As stated earlier, the sale of the property under Article 498 clearly avails only upon the concurrence of the two requisites: the indivisibility of the property and the disagreement among co-owners that the property be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others. There is another instance whereby Article 498 may be resorted to, and that is, as stated in Article 495, if there is a desire to terminate the co-ownership and partition cannot avail because a physical division of the thing owned in common would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended.
The modality in Article 498 is hardly the only legal means by which property intended for partition may instead be sold, with the proceeds distributed among the co-owners. Article 496 states that partition may be made by agreement by the parties or by judicial proceedings, and that partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with the Civil Code. It is Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that governs judicial partition, under the legal framework established by Article 496 of the Civil Code itself.
It is from Rule 69 that we derive the governing paradigm involving a two-tiered stage in partition proceedings. Under Section 2, Rule 69, the first order of business once the complaint for partition is filed is the determination by the trial court if the plaintiff has the right to seek partition. Upon finding the existence of such right, the trial court shall order "the partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest." Thereupon, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties x x x"
If the parties are unable to agree as to how to partition the property, Section 3 of Rule 69 mandates that the court appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and Rule 69 further empowers the commissioners to make such partition. However, and pertinently to this matter, Section 5 also allows the court, "when it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion, thereof cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, xxx to order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such amounts; as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine."
Rule 69 makes it clear that the sale of the property subject of the partition proceeding is a final resort. The sale may only avail after the occurrence of the following six (6) successive conditions: (1) a decision affirming the right of the plaintiff in a complaint for partition to seek such relief and ordering the partition of the property; (2) disagreement among the parties as to how to effect the court-mandated partition; (3) appointment by the court of not more than three commissioners to make the partition; (4) an appearance to the commissioners that the property cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties; (5) a manifestation by an interested party that the property be sold instead of being assigned to just one of the co-owners; and (6) a court order directing the commissioners to sell the property at public auction.
How does this course of action in Rule 69 integrate with the Civil Code provisions on partition? The Rule 69 procedures operate as the general rules governing judicial actions for partition, including any eventual sale of the subject property. These Rules of Court provisions flesh out and operationalize the broad rights established under the Civil Code. At the same time, adherence to the Rule 69 protocol may be excused if specifically authorized by the Civil Code, as the statute does in limited conditions. If, for example, it is found by the court that the property is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it is clear under Article 498 that the sale of the property avails immediately upon the establishment of those two conditions. There would be no need, in such case, to engage the services of a commissioner before the sale can be effected.
Article 498 cannot apply to the case at bar. Pointedly, we are not convinced that the "essential indivisibility" of the subject properties has been conclusively established. Respondents' evidence before the trial court includes a report by Licensed Real Estate Broker Antonio Cesar Fernando which unmistakeably suggests three (3) possible subdivision schemes covering the subject properties, with each scheme contemplating a portion of the property to be retained while the remainder was to be sold in the real estate market.[7] That the properties, by respondents' own admission, are susceptible to subdivision, is a clear contradiction of the requirement that the property under Article 498 is "essentially indivisible."
Would the fact that a co-owner has consistently refused to consent to the partition render the property "essentially indivisible"? We believe not. The intransigence of such co-owner bears no integral relation to the corporeal nature of the property. "Essentially indivisible," it is our belief, pertains less to "state of mind" than "state of physical matter." The fact that such a co-owner is physically able to change his or her mind and later consent to the partition weakens any submission that a co-owner's refusal renders the property "essentially indivisible."
It is from the above perspective that we examine Reyes v. Conception[8] the case invoked by respondents. Therein, the Court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the public sale of the property and the distribution of the proceeds thereof, on the ground that it was apparent from the various allegations and admissions of the parties in the course of trial that the legal requisites for the application of Article 498 were present. At the same time, there is a material difference between Reyes and the case at bar. In Reyes, the Court noted that the RTC had issued an order requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of determining whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of the Civil Code were present. It was clear in Reyes that the matter of whether or not said requisites were present was specifically litigated by the trial court. If a trial court arrives at a definite conclusion that the two requisites for applying Article 498 are present, such conclusion authorizes the sale under that Article, provided of course that the trial court decision is not reversed or modified on review.
In the case at bar, unlike in Reyes, there is no clear demonstration that the litigation of the case was oriented towards establishing the factual requisites under Article 498. For its part, the trial court did not come out with an explicit conclusion that petitioner's unwillingness to consent to the partition sufficiently met the "essential indivisibility" standard required under Article 498. Moreover, if there was actually such a conclusion, all the more there is justification for this Court to reverse such finding as an error of law.[9]
The RTC did cite Article 498 in its decision, but such citation should be seen in its proper context. Held the RTC:
Indeed, it would have been a more viable argument for respondents had the contention been that their right to an immediate sale is justified under Article 495 in relation to Article 498, instead of Article 498 by its lonesome. For Article 495 would allow for the operation of the sale contemplated in Article 498 even if the property were not essentially indivisible, for so long as it is established that the physical division of the thing owned in common "would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended."
Considering the precise argument raised by respondents in their present Motion for Reconsideration, it would frankly be a luxury in their favor if the Court were to consider whether the RTC decision authorizing the sale is nonetheless justified following Article 495. Still, Article 495 if taken into account would not justify the RTC's decision.
Following Article 495, there must be a finding that the division of the thing owned in common would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. Again, had there been so specific a finding by the RTC to that effect, its decision would have been sustained. Yet the factual findings of the RTC were confined to the contents of the Commissioner's Report. Such report is exhaustive in detailing the abject refusal of petitioner to consent to the partition of the properties. But there is no conclusion therein that the division of the thing owned in common would render it unserviceable for the use for which it was intended. It is quite clear in the said report that respondents had willingly explored options on how to subdivide the properties, to the extent of engaging the services of a real estate broker to devise the options. In fact, another report proposing three possible subdivision plans was presented in evidence by respondents themselves.[11] Clearly, there has been no consistent stance on the part of respondents that the division of the properties would have rendered it unserviceable for whatever use for which it was intended, a conclusion that should have dissuaded them from exploring partition as an option in the first place.
To grant the Motion for Reconsideration, we will have to ignore the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which precisely stands as the general procedure to be observed in actions for partition. The integrity of this procedure cannot be dismissed lightly, as it lays primacy on the most ideal of among the possible resolutions�preservation of the co-owned thing or an equitable plan of partition based on the mutual consent of the parties. Both Rule 69 and the Civil Code do provide for the possibility of the sale of the co-owned thing, but only when no other solution is viable. Rule 69 ensures that the sale may ensue only as a last resort when no mutual agreement among the co-owners could be reached, while the Civil Code guarantees that such sale may actualize only when partition is physically impossible or extremely prejudicial to the interest of the co-owners.
There is no showing in the case at bar that the conditions are so exceptional as to allow for the immediate sale under the auspices of the Civil Code without undergoing the procedure laid down by Rule 69. Hence, we cannot grant the Motion for Reconsideration, and the succeeding proceedings in this case will have to be held in accord with Rule 69. If the parties still could not agree on how to partition the subject property, Rule 69 permits an expedient solution that would authorize the sale under the terms so desired by respondents. Yet if the succeeding remand authorizes a mutually-acceptable resolution to this long-running dispute, among family members nonetheless, then the deliberate procedure adopted in actions for partition would exhibit another clear benefit.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
G.R. No. 170080 (Consolation Q. Austria v. Constancia Q. Lichauco, , Consuelo Q. Jalandoni, Jose Alberto L. Quintos, Ricardo M. Quintos, Jr., Aileen M. Quintos and Tyrone M. Quintos).�In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 9 May 2007 respondents seek the review of the Decision of the Court dated 3 April 2007 insofar as it partially reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati dated 21 June 2005.
To recall, the petition originated from a complaint for partition filed by respondents against petitioner who had consistently refused to agree to the sale or partition of two parcels of land situated in Makati City. The Court agreed with the ruling of the RTC that respondents were entitled to seek the partition of the property. However, the RTC also authorized as an alternative the sale of the subject property and the division of the proceeds of such sale among the co-owners. On this point, the Court disagreed and struck down the order authorizing the sale. We ratiocinated that there are two stages in every action for partition. First, the determination of whether a co-ownership existed and whether partition was proper. Upon an affirmative finding on both issues, the parties are allowed to make partition among themselves. It is only if the parties are unable to agree on partition that the court may direct the partition itself with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The Court noted that only the first phase had been reached in this case, and that the RTC went astray when it authorized the sale of the property to a third party.
Respondents argue in the Motion for Reconsideration that while the general right of partition is grounded on Article 494 of the Civil Code, their cause of action is anchored on Article 498. Said provision states that "whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed." It is contended that the indivisibility of the subject property had been established, with the consequence that the sale thereof under Article 498 may thereupon materialize.
To be certain, it is only in the present Motion for Reconsideration that respondents argue before this Court that their action for partition pivoted on Article 498. In their comment to the petition, respondents contended that the rule applicable to the present case "is unequivocally stated in Article 494 of the Civil Code."[1] No reference was made in said comment as to Article 498. More tellingly perhaps, a perusal of the original complaint[2] for partition likewise reveals that only Article 494, and not Article 498, was expressly cited therein. If indeed the cause of action was primarily hinged on Article 498, such fact was not sufficiently highlighted by respondents.
Still, there may be sufficient allegations in the Complaint itself, as well as the evidence submitted during the trial, that allude to the factual predicates mentioned in Article 498. For one, paragraph 2 of the Complaint states that "the nature and configuration of the existing improvements [on the subject property] render the Properties indivisible," and that the "said parcels of land have permanent improvements thereon which straddle both lots."[3] Respondents' Annex "I," a letter dated 9 July 1996 to the Barangay Chairman of Palanan, Makati written by respondents, states that "the property in question is basically indivisible because on its 661 square meters stand a residential bungalow house and two separate but adjoining apartments."[4] Respondents' Annex "H-2," a letter-report addressed to respondent Jalandoni by Licensed Real Estate Broker Antonio Cesar Fernando, stated in the course of an appraisal of the subject properties that "the lots are presently developed and utilized as a residential compound improved with a single storey residential structure and a two-storey residential apartment, x x x the single storey residential structure is on both lots, the lots are perceived to be only one lot x x x[5] The letter also observes, with respect to the prospect of subdividing the lots, that "due to the location of the land improvements, a prospective buyer may perceive the lots to be only one lot. Such perception will increase the desirability and demand for the lots."[6]
Ultimately, Article 498 warrants consideration by this Court if only because the RTC decision did expressly advert to said Article as part of its basis for ruling that the properties may be sold.
Facially, there are two joint requisites necessary before Article 498 may apply. The first requirement is that "the thing is essentially indivisible," and the second is that "the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others." The square application of Article 498 cannot be had if only one of these two requisites is present, meaning for example that the sheer inability of the co-owners to agree on how to partition the co-owned property is not sufficient in itself to call for the application of Article 498.
Respondents seek to impress on us that all the requisites as stated in Article 498 were indubitably established in this case, thus justifying the partition sale as authorized under that provision. We disagree with this conclusion. More fundamentally, we are not convinced that Article 498 should apply to the case at bar in the first place.
As stated earlier, the sale of the property under Article 498 clearly avails only upon the concurrence of the two requisites: the indivisibility of the property and the disagreement among co-owners that the property be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others. There is another instance whereby Article 498 may be resorted to, and that is, as stated in Article 495, if there is a desire to terminate the co-ownership and partition cannot avail because a physical division of the thing owned in common would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended.
The modality in Article 498 is hardly the only legal means by which property intended for partition may instead be sold, with the proceeds distributed among the co-owners. Article 496 states that partition may be made by agreement by the parties or by judicial proceedings, and that partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with the Civil Code. It is Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that governs judicial partition, under the legal framework established by Article 496 of the Civil Code itself.
It is from Rule 69 that we derive the governing paradigm involving a two-tiered stage in partition proceedings. Under Section 2, Rule 69, the first order of business once the complaint for partition is filed is the determination by the trial court if the plaintiff has the right to seek partition. Upon finding the existence of such right, the trial court shall order "the partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest." Thereupon, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties x x x"
If the parties are unable to agree as to how to partition the property, Section 3 of Rule 69 mandates that the court appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and Rule 69 further empowers the commissioners to make such partition. However, and pertinently to this matter, Section 5 also allows the court, "when it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion, thereof cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, xxx to order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such amounts; as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine."
Rule 69 makes it clear that the sale of the property subject of the partition proceeding is a final resort. The sale may only avail after the occurrence of the following six (6) successive conditions: (1) a decision affirming the right of the plaintiff in a complaint for partition to seek such relief and ordering the partition of the property; (2) disagreement among the parties as to how to effect the court-mandated partition; (3) appointment by the court of not more than three commissioners to make the partition; (4) an appearance to the commissioners that the property cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties; (5) a manifestation by an interested party that the property be sold instead of being assigned to just one of the co-owners; and (6) a court order directing the commissioners to sell the property at public auction.
How does this course of action in Rule 69 integrate with the Civil Code provisions on partition? The Rule 69 procedures operate as the general rules governing judicial actions for partition, including any eventual sale of the subject property. These Rules of Court provisions flesh out and operationalize the broad rights established under the Civil Code. At the same time, adherence to the Rule 69 protocol may be excused if specifically authorized by the Civil Code, as the statute does in limited conditions. If, for example, it is found by the court that the property is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it is clear under Article 498 that the sale of the property avails immediately upon the establishment of those two conditions. There would be no need, in such case, to engage the services of a commissioner before the sale can be effected.
Article 498 cannot apply to the case at bar. Pointedly, we are not convinced that the "essential indivisibility" of the subject properties has been conclusively established. Respondents' evidence before the trial court includes a report by Licensed Real Estate Broker Antonio Cesar Fernando which unmistakeably suggests three (3) possible subdivision schemes covering the subject properties, with each scheme contemplating a portion of the property to be retained while the remainder was to be sold in the real estate market.[7] That the properties, by respondents' own admission, are susceptible to subdivision, is a clear contradiction of the requirement that the property under Article 498 is "essentially indivisible."
Would the fact that a co-owner has consistently refused to consent to the partition render the property "essentially indivisible"? We believe not. The intransigence of such co-owner bears no integral relation to the corporeal nature of the property. "Essentially indivisible," it is our belief, pertains less to "state of mind" than "state of physical matter." The fact that such a co-owner is physically able to change his or her mind and later consent to the partition weakens any submission that a co-owner's refusal renders the property "essentially indivisible."
It is from the above perspective that we examine Reyes v. Conception[8] the case invoked by respondents. Therein, the Court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the public sale of the property and the distribution of the proceeds thereof, on the ground that it was apparent from the various allegations and admissions of the parties in the course of trial that the legal requisites for the application of Article 498 were present. At the same time, there is a material difference between Reyes and the case at bar. In Reyes, the Court noted that the RTC had issued an order requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of determining whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of the Civil Code were present. It was clear in Reyes that the matter of whether or not said requisites were present was specifically litigated by the trial court. If a trial court arrives at a definite conclusion that the two requisites for applying Article 498 are present, such conclusion authorizes the sale under that Article, provided of course that the trial court decision is not reversed or modified on review.
In the case at bar, unlike in Reyes, there is no clear demonstration that the litigation of the case was oriented towards establishing the factual requisites under Article 498. For its part, the trial court did not come out with an explicit conclusion that petitioner's unwillingness to consent to the partition sufficiently met the "essential indivisibility" standard required under Article 498. Moreover, if there was actually such a conclusion, all the more there is justification for this Court to reverse such finding as an error of law.[9]
The RTC did cite Article 498 in its decision, but such citation should be seen in its proper context. Held the RTC:
The co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it was intended (Art. 495, Civil Code). In such a case, or whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the other, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed (Art. 498, Civil Code).[10]A perusal of the RTC decision reveals insinuations that the alternative relief of sale was actually justified, to the trial court's mind, under the aegis of Article 495, which relies on a different standard - the unserviceability of the thing for the use it is intended if divided - than that under Article 498. Notably, Article 495 itself also refers to Article 498, as providing the means by which co-ownership may be terminated if the division of the thing would render it unserviceable for the use it is intended. The passage in the RTC decision is a correct restatement of the law, and one oriented towards an order for a sale in accordance with Article 495 in relation to Article 498.
Indeed, it would have been a more viable argument for respondents had the contention been that their right to an immediate sale is justified under Article 495 in relation to Article 498, instead of Article 498 by its lonesome. For Article 495 would allow for the operation of the sale contemplated in Article 498 even if the property were not essentially indivisible, for so long as it is established that the physical division of the thing owned in common "would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended."
Considering the precise argument raised by respondents in their present Motion for Reconsideration, it would frankly be a luxury in their favor if the Court were to consider whether the RTC decision authorizing the sale is nonetheless justified following Article 495. Still, Article 495 if taken into account would not justify the RTC's decision.
Following Article 495, there must be a finding that the division of the thing owned in common would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. Again, had there been so specific a finding by the RTC to that effect, its decision would have been sustained. Yet the factual findings of the RTC were confined to the contents of the Commissioner's Report. Such report is exhaustive in detailing the abject refusal of petitioner to consent to the partition of the properties. But there is no conclusion therein that the division of the thing owned in common would render it unserviceable for the use for which it was intended. It is quite clear in the said report that respondents had willingly explored options on how to subdivide the properties, to the extent of engaging the services of a real estate broker to devise the options. In fact, another report proposing three possible subdivision plans was presented in evidence by respondents themselves.[11] Clearly, there has been no consistent stance on the part of respondents that the division of the properties would have rendered it unserviceable for whatever use for which it was intended, a conclusion that should have dissuaded them from exploring partition as an option in the first place.
To grant the Motion for Reconsideration, we will have to ignore the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which precisely stands as the general procedure to be observed in actions for partition. The integrity of this procedure cannot be dismissed lightly, as it lays primacy on the most ideal of among the possible resolutions�preservation of the co-owned thing or an equitable plan of partition based on the mutual consent of the parties. Both Rule 69 and the Civil Code do provide for the possibility of the sale of the co-owned thing, but only when no other solution is viable. Rule 69 ensures that the sale may ensue only as a last resort when no mutual agreement among the co-owners could be reached, while the Civil Code guarantees that such sale may actualize only when partition is physically impossible or extremely prejudicial to the interest of the co-owners.
There is no showing in the case at bar that the conditions are so exceptional as to allow for the immediate sale under the auspices of the Civil Code without undergoing the procedure laid down by Rule 69. Hence, we cannot grant the Motion for Reconsideration, and the succeeding proceedings in this case will have to be held in accord with Rule 69. If the parties still could not agree on how to partition the subject property, Rule 69 permits an expedient solution that would authorize the sale under the terms so desired by respondents. Yet if the succeeding remand authorizes a mutually-acceptable resolution to this long-running dispute, among family members nonetheless, then the deliberate procedure adopted in actions for partition would exhibit another clear benefit.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 125.
[2] Records, pp. 1-5.
[3] Id. at 2.
[4] Id. at 411.
[5] Id. at 423.
[6] Id. at 423.
[7] Id. at 423-428.
[8] G.R. No. 56550, 1October 1990, 190 SCRA 171.
[9] Respondents also cite Aguilar v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 76351, 29 October 1993, 227 SCRA 472), in support of the claim that a sale following Article 498 was warranted in this case. Aguilar did involve a trial court decision that upheld a co-owner's right to partition, and at the same time, authorized the sale of the co-owned property to a third person. The Court, in affirming the lower court decision, adverted to Article 498 and even the Reyes case. However, that decision was occasioned by the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court decision, on the ground that the defendant to the partition action was improperly declared in default. Thus, the issues presented for resolution of the Court in Aguilar pertained to whether the defendant was correctly adjudged in default (see Aguilar v. Court of Appeals., id. at 477), and on that score, the trial court was affirmed. The Court also reviewed the ruling of the trial court as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by defendant as co-owner, ultimately concluding that the defendant was entitled to use the property without paying compensation to the plaintiff up until the point when defendant was ordered by the trial court to vacate the said property. By way of prefacing such conclusion, the Court dwelt in brief on the right of the co-owner to demand the partition of the co-owned thing, as well as the ultimate relief of a partition sale. (See id. at 479-480.) Given this context, any seeming conclusion in Aguilar that an action for partition based on Article 494 may result in the relief of a sale under the terms of Article 498, without having to undergo the procedure required under Rule 69 should be deemed as obiter, since such discussion is far removed from the issues raised and decided in that case. If that discussion in Aguilar had been considered at all as doctrinal, it is a doctrine that may warrant considered reevaluation by the Court.
The same conclusion though cannot be ascribed as to Reyes, wherein the trial court directly ruled that the conditions mandated for a sale under Article 498 were present in that particular case. Since Article 498, by itself, enables the public sale of the thing co-owned upon the establishment of the requisites stated in that same provision, the existence of such a finding as made by the trial court ,as what happened in Reyes, could authorize the sale under that article.
[10] Records, p. 453.
[11] See note 6.
