October 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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Name[G.R. NO. 143605 : October 15, 2007] SPS. JOSE RUIZ AND CAROLINA RUIZ, PETITIONERS VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS AND INOCENCIO CHUA, RESPONDENTS. :
[G.R. NO. 143605 : October 15, 2007]
SPS. JOSE RUIZ AND CAROLINA RUIZ, PETITIONERS VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS AND INOCENCIO CHUA, RESPONDENTS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 15 October 2007:
G.R. No. 143605 - SPS. JOSE RUIZ and CAROLINA RUIZ, petitioners versus COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO CHUA, respondents.
This petition for certiorari[1] assails three resolutions by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62548, namely: (1) the Resolution[2] dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioners' motion for leave to file appellees' brief; (2) the Resolution[3] dated May 11, 2000 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 13, 2000; and (3) the Resolution[4] dated April 10, 2000, submitting for resolution respondent's appeal without petitioners' appellees' brief. According to petitioners, the cited resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the appellate court.
The following are the antecedent facts in this case:
Private respondent Inocencio Chua and the petitioners, spouses Jose and Carolina Ruiz, entered into a contract of sale wherein Chua agreed to buy for P7 million a portion from the latter's parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters under TCT No. 57115. The land is located in Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu. The contract stipulated the initial payment of P1 million, with the balance of the purchase price to be payable within four months after Chua secures a bank loan, using the same property as collateral for the loan. The spouses had authorized Chua to mortgage the property. After the four-month period, however, Chua could not pay the P6 million-balance, prompting the spouses to demand payment in a letter dated November 17, 1993. The letter stated that Chua had 10 days to pay, otherwise, the deal would be cancelled. But, Chua insisted that the spouses should execute in his favor a deed of absolute sale and transfer the title to the property after he paid the P1 million-downpayment. The spouses refused to do so, saying the contract did not contain such stipulation.
Thereafter, Chua filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City a complaint against the Ruiz spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-19787 for reformation of contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses.
Chua appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 16, 1999, the spouses manifested before the appellate court that they were foregoing with the filing of a brief. But, on January 27, 2000, they moved for leave to file and admit appellees' brief. They attached a copy of their brief.
The appellate court, in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000, refused to admit the brief:
On April 10, 2000, respondent court issued the third assailed resolution, declaring Chua's appeal submitted for decision without the spouses' brief, to wit:
In their petition, the spouses aver that they did not file an appellees' brief upon the advice of their lawyer. They claim that Chua received the appellate court's notice requiring his filing of an appellant's brief on August 3, 1999. Chua asked for and was granted, on October 7, 1999, a 30-day extension. They further claim that they received the appellant's brief of Chua on November 10, 1999; and that under Rule 44[8] of the Rules of Court they still had 45 days thereafter, or until December 26, 1999, to file a brief.[9] They argue that admitting their brief would cause Chua no damage or injury since their motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 2000 Resolution, and Chua's appeal had yet to be resolved. They point out that there would be no delay in the proceedings as they had attached their brief to their motion for leave and had not introduced new matters or evidence therein.
Petitioners, likewise, contend that respondent court abused its discretion by denying them the opportunity to be heard and by not resolving the case on the merits, adding that substantial justice must prevail over technicalities.
Private respondent Chua in his Comment[10] avers that the period to file the appellee's brief had lapsed at the time petitioners filed it and to admit said brief at that late stage would violate the Rules. He accuses petitioners of tinkering with the Rules on appeal. He insists that petitioners should suffer the consequences of their initial decision not to file a brief. To condone petitioners' actions, he warns, would set a bad precedent by affording parties an unbridled opportunity to change their mind in the middle of a proceeding, resulting in more delays in the disposition of cases.
Petitioners deny that they are mocking the Rules and they appeal to the Court's sense of justice and equity.[11]
Pertinent in this regard are Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Rule 44 mandates that a party in an ordinary appealed case should file an appellee's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the appellant's brief:
Petitioners' failure to file their appellees' brief on due date, after the holidays, is the result of their reliance upon the advice of their counsel. But even so, that is no excuse or justification to impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court. A lawyer's miscalculation binds his client.[12] That is the general rule. And here, we find no valid exception. The records show that the Court of Appeals noted their manifestation that they were not filing any brief. For their change of mind or strategy, the petitioners cannot fairly disclaim the procedural consequences.
Considering the circumstances in this case, we cannot agree that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court. It noted petitioners' motion for leave to file and admit brief, more than forty-five (45) days from receipt of appellant's brief on November 12, 1999. It held, by way of ratiocination, that liberal construction of the Rules does not mean hindering or delaying the administration of justice. It ruled, and we agree, that the grounds relied upon by petitioner were unfounded and should not be given credence.[13] Thus, the late filing of the brief could not be permitted, much less excused.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated March 13, 2000, April 10, 2000 and May 11, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 62548, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143605 - SPS. JOSE RUIZ and CAROLINA RUIZ, petitioners versus COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO CHUA, respondents.
This petition for certiorari[1] assails three resolutions by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62548, namely: (1) the Resolution[2] dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioners' motion for leave to file appellees' brief; (2) the Resolution[3] dated May 11, 2000 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 13, 2000; and (3) the Resolution[4] dated April 10, 2000, submitting for resolution respondent's appeal without petitioners' appellees' brief. According to petitioners, the cited resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the appellate court.
The following are the antecedent facts in this case:
Private respondent Inocencio Chua and the petitioners, spouses Jose and Carolina Ruiz, entered into a contract of sale wherein Chua agreed to buy for P7 million a portion from the latter's parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters under TCT No. 57115. The land is located in Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu. The contract stipulated the initial payment of P1 million, with the balance of the purchase price to be payable within four months after Chua secures a bank loan, using the same property as collateral for the loan. The spouses had authorized Chua to mortgage the property. After the four-month period, however, Chua could not pay the P6 million-balance, prompting the spouses to demand payment in a letter dated November 17, 1993. The letter stated that Chua had 10 days to pay, otherwise, the deal would be cancelled. But, Chua insisted that the spouses should execute in his favor a deed of absolute sale and transfer the title to the property after he paid the P1 million-downpayment. The spouses refused to do so, saying the contract did not contain such stipulation.
Thereafter, Chua filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City a complaint against the Ruiz spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-19787 for reformation of contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses.
Chua appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 16, 1999, the spouses manifested before the appellate court that they were foregoing with the filing of a brief. But, on January 27, 2000, they moved for leave to file and admit appellees' brief. They attached a copy of their brief.
The appellate court, in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000, refused to admit the brief:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Leave to File Appellees' Brief is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.The appellate court also denied their motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On April 10, 2000, respondent court issued the third assailed resolution, declaring Chua's appeal submitted for decision without the spouses' brief, to wit:
In view of the foregoing, the case is submitted for decision without the appellees' brief and the case is referred to the Raffle Committee for assignment to a justice for study and report.Impugning the aforementioned Resolutions, the spouses now come before this Court, alleging in the instant petition that:
SO ORDERED.[6]
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS ORThe sole issue before us, simply stated, is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to admit appellees' belated brief.
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT ADMITTING THE APPELLEES' BRIEF WHICH IN EFFECT AMOUNTS TO ALLOWING TECHNICALITY TO PREVAIL OVER THE ENDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND THE NEED TO ALLOW ALL PARTIES TO BE FULLY HEARD.[7]
In their petition, the spouses aver that they did not file an appellees' brief upon the advice of their lawyer. They claim that Chua received the appellate court's notice requiring his filing of an appellant's brief on August 3, 1999. Chua asked for and was granted, on October 7, 1999, a 30-day extension. They further claim that they received the appellant's brief of Chua on November 10, 1999; and that under Rule 44[8] of the Rules of Court they still had 45 days thereafter, or until December 26, 1999, to file a brief.[9] They argue that admitting their brief would cause Chua no damage or injury since their motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 2000 Resolution, and Chua's appeal had yet to be resolved. They point out that there would be no delay in the proceedings as they had attached their brief to their motion for leave and had not introduced new matters or evidence therein.
Petitioners, likewise, contend that respondent court abused its discretion by denying them the opportunity to be heard and by not resolving the case on the merits, adding that substantial justice must prevail over technicalities.
Private respondent Chua in his Comment[10] avers that the period to file the appellee's brief had lapsed at the time petitioners filed it and to admit said brief at that late stage would violate the Rules. He accuses petitioners of tinkering with the Rules on appeal. He insists that petitioners should suffer the consequences of their initial decision not to file a brief. To condone petitioners' actions, he warns, would set a bad precedent by affording parties an unbridled opportunity to change their mind in the middle of a proceeding, resulting in more delays in the disposition of cases.
Petitioners deny that they are mocking the Rules and they appeal to the Court's sense of justice and equity.[11]
Pertinent in this regard are Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Rule 44 mandates that a party in an ordinary appealed case should file an appellee's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the appellant's brief:
SEC. 7. Appellant's brief. - It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the. appellee.The two provisions when harmonized reveal that petitioners are correct and that they had until December 26, 1999 to file an appellees' brief, after receiving a copy of Chua's brief on November 10, 1999. Yet 10 days prior to the deadline, they formally opted before the appellate court not to file any.
SEC. 8. Appellee's brief. - Within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the appellant's brief, the appellee shall file with the court seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellant.
Petitioners' failure to file their appellees' brief on due date, after the holidays, is the result of their reliance upon the advice of their counsel. But even so, that is no excuse or justification to impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court. A lawyer's miscalculation binds his client.[12] That is the general rule. And here, we find no valid exception. The records show that the Court of Appeals noted their manifestation that they were not filing any brief. For their change of mind or strategy, the petitioners cannot fairly disclaim the procedural consequences.
Considering the circumstances in this case, we cannot agree that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court. It noted petitioners' motion for leave to file and admit brief, more than forty-five (45) days from receipt of appellant's brief on November 12, 1999. It held, by way of ratiocination, that liberal construction of the Rules does not mean hindering or delaying the administration of justice. It ruled, and we agree, that the grounds relied upon by petitioner were unfounded and should not be given credence.[13] Thus, the late filing of the brief could not be permitted, much less excused.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated March 13, 2000, April 10, 2000 and May 11, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 62548, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.)LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-19.
[2] Id. at 20-22. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now a member of this Court) and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. concurring.
[3] Id. at 26-27.
[4] Id. at 24.
[5] Id. at 22.
[6] Id. at 24.
[7] Id. at 10.
[8] ORDINARY APPEALED CASES.
[9] Rollo, pp. 4-5
[10] Id. at 31-34.
[11] Rollo, pp. 36-40
[12] Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, G.R. No. 150286, October 17, 2003, 413 SCRA 669, 678.
[13] Rollo, pp. 21-22.
