October 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 162419 : October 10, 2007] PAUL V, SANTIAGO V. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. :
[G.R. No. 162419 : October 10, 2007]
PAUL V, SANTIAGO V. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 10 October 2007:
G.R. No. 162419 (Paul V, Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.) &msdash For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 August 2007 filed by respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., seeking the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court dated 10 July 2007.
The main issue raised herein is whether the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has jurisdiction over the complaint filed against respondent by the petitioner who signed an employment contract with the respondent but was never deployed abroad. While we concluded that no employer-employee relationship was started between the parties, we also held that respondent is still liable for breach of contract and that notwithstanding the absence of an employer-employee relationship, the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act (R.A. No. 8042) which states:
Respondent claims that a review of jurisprudence "reveal[s] that money claims of overseas Filipino workers must be employment related," yet the cases it cites are simply inapplicable since the Court therein did not explicitly conclude, nay even intimate, that the NLRC has no jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee relationship even though the cases may involve claims arising from contracts concerning a Filipino worker for overseas deployment.
Let us examine the cases of Eastern Shipping v. POEA[1] and Javier v. Court of Appeals[2] relied upon by respondent. Both cases were decided prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042. Under the previous law, Executive Order No. 797, it was the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) that was granted jurisdiction over "all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen."[3] in Eastern Shipping and Javier, the Court affirmed the POEA's jurisdiction over the respective claims posed therein by the overseas employees, since the POEA had jurisdiction over all claims involving employer-employee relations. In both cases, the existence of the employer-employee relationship was not denied, hence there was no need for the Court then to consider or expound on the second category under which the POEA then (and the NLRC now) exercised jurisdiction, i.e., when the claim is "by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." Neither case could be taken as prescribing that under the previous legal paradigm, the POEA had jurisdiction only upon the existence of an employer-employee relationship. And certainly, since the adoption of R.A. No. 8042, no case had pronounced that the Labor Arbiter retained jurisdiction under that law only if there existed an employer-employee relationship.
In addition, respondent argues that "claims for damages must have reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship," citing towards that end Dai-Chi Electronics v. Hon. Villarama,[4] San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,[5] and Pepsi-Cola Distributors v. Gallang.[6] However, none of these cases involved overseas Filipino workers or RA. No. 8042 for that matter. These cases concerned the application of Article 217 of the Labor Code, which deals with the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction over all money claims of workers. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 provides for a jurisdictional rule peculiar to overseas Filipino workers different from that of Article 217 of the Labor Code. R.A. No. 8042 even stipulates that the jurisdictional rule established therein as to overseas Filipino workers withstood "any provision of law to the contrary." Indeed, the preclusion provided by Article 217 of the Labor Code cannot affect the exercise of jurisdiction by the Labor Arbiter over the present complaint following Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY for lack of merit.
No further pleading or motion shall be entertained. Let entry of final judgment be made in due course.
G.R. No. 162419 (Paul V, Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.) &msdash For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 August 2007 filed by respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., seeking the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court dated 10 July 2007.
The main issue raised herein is whether the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has jurisdiction over the complaint filed against respondent by the petitioner who signed an employment contract with the respondent but was never deployed abroad. While we concluded that no employer-employee relationship was started between the parties, we also held that respondent is still liable for breach of contract and that notwithstanding the absence of an employer-employee relationship, the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act (R.A. No. 8042) which states:
SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar clays after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.In support of its stance that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over petitioner�s complaint, respondent argues that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is a prerequisites to the NLRC�s acquisition of jurisdiction over the instant case. However, the plain text of the above quoted Section 10 simply belies respondent's claim. As textually provided, R.A. 8042 confers original jurisdiction on the NLRC over "claims of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages." The fact that the provision utilizes the conjunctive "or" signifies that the jurisdiction of the NLRC avails not only in an employer-employee relationship, but also absent any such relationship, provided that the claim involves a Filipino worker for overseas deployment such as petitioner it inner, and arises by virtue of any law or contract, such as the employment contract entered into by petitioner and respondent. The jurisdictional requisites under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 having been met, the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC properly exercised jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint.
Respondent claims that a review of jurisprudence "reveal[s] that money claims of overseas Filipino workers must be employment related," yet the cases it cites are simply inapplicable since the Court therein did not explicitly conclude, nay even intimate, that the NLRC has no jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee relationship even though the cases may involve claims arising from contracts concerning a Filipino worker for overseas deployment.
Let us examine the cases of Eastern Shipping v. POEA[1] and Javier v. Court of Appeals[2] relied upon by respondent. Both cases were decided prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042. Under the previous law, Executive Order No. 797, it was the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) that was granted jurisdiction over "all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen."[3] in Eastern Shipping and Javier, the Court affirmed the POEA's jurisdiction over the respective claims posed therein by the overseas employees, since the POEA had jurisdiction over all claims involving employer-employee relations. In both cases, the existence of the employer-employee relationship was not denied, hence there was no need for the Court then to consider or expound on the second category under which the POEA then (and the NLRC now) exercised jurisdiction, i.e., when the claim is "by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." Neither case could be taken as prescribing that under the previous legal paradigm, the POEA had jurisdiction only upon the existence of an employer-employee relationship. And certainly, since the adoption of R.A. No. 8042, no case had pronounced that the Labor Arbiter retained jurisdiction under that law only if there existed an employer-employee relationship.
In addition, respondent argues that "claims for damages must have reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship," citing towards that end Dai-Chi Electronics v. Hon. Villarama,[4] San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,[5] and Pepsi-Cola Distributors v. Gallang.[6] However, none of these cases involved overseas Filipino workers or RA. No. 8042 for that matter. These cases concerned the application of Article 217 of the Labor Code, which deals with the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction over all money claims of workers. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 provides for a jurisdictional rule peculiar to overseas Filipino workers different from that of Article 217 of the Labor Code. R.A. No. 8042 even stipulates that the jurisdictional rule established therein as to overseas Filipino workers withstood "any provision of law to the contrary." Indeed, the preclusion provided by Article 217 of the Labor Code cannot affect the exercise of jurisdiction by the Labor Arbiter over the present complaint following Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY for lack of merit.
No further pleading or motion shall be entertained. Let entry of final judgment be made in due course.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] G.R. No. 77828, 8 February 1989, 170 SCRA 50.
[2] G.R. No. 96617, 14 October 1992, 214 SCRA 672.
[3] See Section 4(a), Executive Order No. 797.
[4] G.R. No. 112940, 21 November 1994, 238 SCRA 267.
[5] G.R. No. 1-80774, 31 May 1988, 161 SCRA 719.
[6] G.R. No. 89621, 21 September 1991, 201 SCRA 695.
