April 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 200476 : April 18, 2012]
GILDA G. LUNZAGA v. ALBAR SHIPPING AND TRADING CORP. AND/OR AKIRA KATO, AND DARWIN, VENUS, ROMEO ULYSSES, MARIKIT ODESSA, ALL SURNAMED LUNZAGA
G.R. No. 200476 (Gilda G. Lunzaga v. Albar Shipping and Trading Corp. and/or Akira Kato, and Darwin, Venus, Romeo Ulysses, Marikit Odessa, all surnamed Lunzaga)
RESOLUTION
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 21, 2011 Decision[1] and February 2, 2012 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116476. The CA Decision upheld the Decision dated April 30, 2010[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which dismissed the appeal of petitioner for having been filed out of time. The CA Decision, in effect, affirmed the Order dated August 28, 2009[4] of the Labor Arbiter, which ruled that jurisdiction over the instant controversy is with the regular courts and not with the NLRC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED the parties are directed to ventilate their conflict before the regular court to determine who the rightful heirs to receive the disability benefits.
For the meantime instant case is temporarily dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Romeo Lunzaga (Romeo) was a seaman working for respondent Albar Shipping and Trading Corp. (Albar). On June 11, 2008, Romeo was assigned as Chief Engineer on board Albar's Philippine vessel MV Lake Aru by virtue of a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved employment contract. One month later, Romeo suffered a heart attack and was repatriated to the Philippines only to die on September 5, 2008.
Sometime in early 2009, Gilda G. Lunzaga (Gilda), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Romeo, filed with the NLRC a complaint against Albar for payment of death benefits, damages and attorney's fees. It should be noted that Gilda was the designated heir in Romeo's Overseas Filipino Worker Verification Sheet and PhilHealth Information Sheet. Darwin Lunzaga, Venus Lunzaga, Romeo Ulysses Lunzaga, and Marikit Odessa Lunzaga (Lunzaga siblings), the children of Romeo from his first marriage that was judicially declared null and void, opposed the complaint through a complaint-in-intervention. The Lunzaga siblings claimed that Gilda is not entitled to the death benefits of Romeo, as she had a subsisting marriage when she married him. They claim that her marriage with Romeo was, therefore, bigamous. During the mandatory conferences of the parties before the Labor Arbiter, Albar signified its willingness to pay Romeo's death benefits in the amount of USD 55,547.44. However, Gilda and the Lunzaga siblings could not agree as to the sharing of the benefits.
Thus, on August 28, 2009, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order temporarily dismissing the complaint and directing the parties to file their case with the regular courts. Gilda received a copy of the August 28, 2009 Order of the Labor Arbiter on September 28, 2009. Gilda's appeal to the NLRC was, however, filed only on October 9, 2009, one day past the 10-day period for filing an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the NLRC rendered a Decision dated April 30, 2010, dismissing the appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
On appeal, the CA rendered the July 21, 2011 Decision, ruling that the petition is devoid of merit. The CA ruled that despite the fact that the appeal to the NLRC was filed only one day beyond the reglementary period, Gilda failed to present any reason for the liberal application of the rule on filing of appeals. The CA wrote, "Indeed, the matter of the parties' entitlement is inherently intertwined with their status as legal heirs of Romeo Lunzaga. Clearly, this is a matter not within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to decide."[5]
Gilda's motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the CA was denied in its February 2, 2012 Resolution. Hence, We have this petition.
We agree with the pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter and the CA that the issue of who is the proper beneficiary of Romeo is properly within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. However, this is not the only issue in the instant petition.
A review of the records of the case reveals that the main issue in the complaint before the Labor Arbiter was whether the heirs of Romeo are entitled to receive his death benefits from Albar. Clearly, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over this issue and the case itself, involving as it does a claim arising from an employer-employee relationship. And while the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to determine who among the alleged heirs is entitled to receive Romeo's death benefits, it should have made a ruling holding Albar liable for the claim.
In this light, substantial justice and fair play dictate that the Court reconsider the August 28, 2009 Order of the Labor Arbiter, the April 30, 2010 Decision of the NLRC, and the July 21, 2011 Decision and February 2, 2012 Resolution of the CA.
With regard to the dismissal of the appeal by the NLRC on the ground that it was filed one (1) day past the reglementary period, We rule that the ends of justice would be best served with the admission of the appeal for the complete ventilation of the issues in the case. Considering that Albar admitted its liability to the heirs of Romeo for his death benefits, the NLRC should have given due course to the meritorious appeal. Thus, this Court ruled in Chronicle Securities Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:[6]
In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.
In Philippine National Bank, et al. v. Court of Appeals, we allowed, in the higher interest of justice, an appeal filed three days late.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we ordered the Court of Appeals to entertain an appeal filed six days after the expiration of the [reglementary] period; while in Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, we accepted an appeal filed thirteen days late. Likewise, in Olacao v. NLRC, we affirmed the respondent Commission's order giving due course to a tardy appeal "to forestall the grant of separation pay twice" since the issue of separation pay had been judicially settled with finality in another case. All of the aforequoted rulings were reiterated in our 2001 decision in the case of Equitable PCI Bank v. Ku.
Notably, in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,[7] the Court cited the following cases, applicable to the instant controversy:
It has been said this time and again that the perfection of an appeal within the period fixed by the rules is mandatory and jurisdictional. But, it is always in the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. Strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof warrant the suspension of the rules.
x x x x
In Siguenza vs. Court of Appeals, the appeal which was perfected thirteen days late was permitted, "since on its face the appeal appeared to be impressed with merit." x x x
x x x x
In Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, the counsel of record of a party failed to withdraw his appearance as such when he was appointed as Judge of the RTC of Dumaguete City. Thus, the copy of the adverse decision was still served at his address of record in Cebu City on 28 February 1983. He was at the time in Dumaguete City and learned of the decision only on 8 March 1983 when he came home to Cebu City. He right away informed his client through a telegram, which reached the latter's office in Zamboanga City at a time when he was out on official business and which came to his knowledge only a few days later. It was only on 22 March 1983 that a notice of appeal was filed by his new lawyer. This Court held that the seven-day delay is excusable, and that the appeal, being ostensibly meritorious, deserves to be given due course. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the NLRC and the CA erred in not giving due course to the appeal due to a one (l)-day delay of its filing, considering the apparent merit of the appeal as shown by the admission of Albar.
Verily, Albar is liable to the heirs of Romeo for the amount of USD 55,547.44. Albar hereby is ordered to deposit this amount in an escrow account under the control of the NLRC in order to protect the interests of Romeo's heirs. The parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of Romeo are directed to file the appropriate action with a trial court to determine the true and legal heirs of Romeo entitled to receive the disability benefits. The amount in the escrow account will only be released to the legal heirs per the decision of a trial court.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 21, 2011 Decision and February 2, 2012 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 116476, the Decision dated April 30, 2010 of the NLRC, and the Order dated August 28, 2009 of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint of petitioner Gilda G. Lunzaga are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Further, respondent Albar Shipping and Trading Corp. is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Lunzaga the amount of USD 55,547.44 and to deposit in escrow the said amount with the NLRC in a bank account in trust for the heirs of Romeo Lunzaga. The said amount shall only be released to the legal beneficiaries of Romeo adjudged as such by a trial court in the appropriate action to determine his legal heirs.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 22-39. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Danton Q. Bueser.[2] Id. at 42-43.
[3] Id. at 49-50.
[4] Id. at 45-46.
[5] Id. at 36.
[6] G.R. No. 157907, November 25, 2004; 444 SCRA 342, 349.
[7] G.R. No. 108870, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 304, 316-318.
