Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions

G.R. No. 155245 (Gloria Reyes Paulino, et al. v. Magno Sarreal, et al.). - This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated September 27, 2002, of petitioners Gloria Reyes Paulino and Anatalia Reyes, which seeks to nullify the Resolution^[1]  dated September 10, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA).

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Respondents Vicente Reyes, Apolonia Reyes Samson, Monico Reyes Palmario, Felicisima Reyes Chingcuanco, Julia Reyes, Maxima Reyes, Bienvenido Reyes, Manuel Reyes Samson, Calixto Eugenio, Agripino Eugenio, Brigido Eugenio, Arsenio Francisco, Mario Samson, Gliserio Samson, Crispin Samson, Numeriano Samson, Fermina Samson, Martin Samson, Elpidio Samson, Ricardo Samson, Victorino Samson, Emiliano D. Samson, Jr., Carmelita Samson Vergara, Shiela Ann V. Samson and Francisco Samson, on May 17, 1993, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 223, Quezon City, a Complaint^[2]  for an action for Partition and Accounting and Receivership. In an Order^[3] dated September 11, 1996, the RTC denied the petition for the appointment of a receiver. On September 3, 2001, the same respondents again filed a ^[4] for the appointment of a receiver.

On September 7, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision^[5] on respondents' Complaint for an action for Partition and Accounting and Receivership, the dispositive portion of which reads: 

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby rules in favor of the plaintiffs as against defendants GLORIA REYES PAULINO and ANATALIA REYES and, accordingly, hereby renders judgment:

1. Declaring the Deed of Sale dated January 24, 1979, executed by Eustaquia Reyes in favor of Gloria Reyes Paulino and Anatalia Reyes, NULL and VOID; 

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 272976 in the name of Gloria Reyes Paulino and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 272977 in the name of Anatalia Reyes; 

3. Upon cancellation of the said titles, ALLOWING the partition of the property previously covered by TCT No. 26031 among the legal heirs of EUSTAQUIA REYES and the legal heirs of husband (now deceased) MAGNO SARREAL; 

4. Directing the appointment of the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court, Atty. Elena A. Amigo-Amino as Commissioner for the purpose of the partition of the property and the accounting of all income derived therefrom from the time of the death of Eustaquia Reyes Sarreal on May 7, 1987; 

5. Pending partition, appointing the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan as the Receiver of the subject property and the rents and incomes derived therefrom; 

6. Ordering defendants Gloria Reyes Paulino and Anatalia Reyes to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P70,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P100,000.00; and 

7. Ordering the same defendants to pay the costs of the suit. 

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal^[6] on September 20, 2001, which was later approved by the RTC in its Order^[7] dated September 24, 2001.

Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Authorize the Appointed Receiver to Take Control and Administer the Subject Property and the Rents and Income Therefrom and Motion to Direct the Philippine National Police to Assist the Receiver^[8] dated September 26, 2001, which was granted by the same court in its Order^[9]  dated September 28, 2001.

Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction^[10] dated October 8, 2001 with the CA, which assailed the Order implementing the appointment of Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan to act as receiver oft the subject property. In a Resolution^[11] dated October 15, 2001, the CA granted the issuance of a restraining order.

Meanwhile, on October 16, 2001, the RTC issued an Order^[12] approving the bond filed by the receiver and at the same time reiterated its Order dated September 28, 2001. The said Order reads: 

Acting on the Motion to Approve Receivership Bond and To Direct the Receiver to Discharge Her Duties with Motion to Conduct Accounting of the Rents and the Income Derived From the Subject Property filed by the plaintiffs thru counsel and it appearing that the Court has already approved the bond filed by plaintiffs on October 11, 2001 in the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), the Court hereby resolves to grant the motion. 

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan is hereby directed to discharge her duties and exercise the powers of the appointed receiver. Further, Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan is hereby authorized to conduct accounting of the rents and income derived from the subject property and to require the defendants Reyeses to submit an accounting of the rents and income derived from the subject property from the death of Eustaquia Reyes Sarreal on May 7, 1987. 

SO ORDERED.

On November 13, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision^[13] on herein petitioners' petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction, dated October 8, 2001, and annulled and set aside the Order dated September 28, 2001 of the RTC, thus: 

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is GRANTED and the Order dated September 28, 2001 issued by respondent Judge is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondents. 

SO ORDERED.

The RTC, on December 4, 2001, issued an Order^[14] reiterating its Order dated October 16, 2001 that gave Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan authority to act as receiver, thus: 

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court orders the defendants Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes Paulino, members of their staff, agents and representatives to stop: (1) interfering or harassing the Receiver Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan and her authorized representatives from performing her duties as the Receiver, specified in Section 6, Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) threatening the stallholders and other occupants and from harassing the traders in delivering and in bringing out products; and (3) making use of any of the places or structures inside the subject property under receivership. 

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA several motions with the basic issue raised, according to the CA, as to whether or not Atty. Sergio F. Angeles and Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan should be punished for contempt of court. The CA, in its Resolution^[15] dated September 10, 2002, denied the said motions filed by petitioners, thus: 

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Contempt of Court of Attys. Sergio Angeles and Mercedes Gatmaytan is DENIED and this incident is considered closed. 

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition with the following issues raised:

ISSUES  

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESTRAINING ORDER AND DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT DISQUALIFYING ATTY. MERCEDES GATMAYTAN FROM ACTING AS RECEIVER CAN BE OVERTURNED BY A SUBSEQUENT ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE EMILIO L. LEACHON, JR. 

WHETHER OR NOT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECEIVERSHIP BY ATTY. MERCEDES GATMAYTAN, DESPITE THE RESOLUTION AND DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT DISQUALIFYING HER, IS CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Petitioners argue that the CA, in its challenged resolution, disregarded the other motions they filed and opted merely to act on the motion for contempt. In denying the motion for contempt, petitioners claim that the CA recklessly and irreverently followed the argument of Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan, Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr. and the lawyer for respondents that they are not enforcing the Order dated September 28, 2001 appointing Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan as receiver, but the subsequent Order dated October 16, 2001 which again approved the appointment of Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan. According to petitioners, the CA's refusal to act on those several motions that they filed is tantamount to abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners insist that although the Resolution dated October 15, 2001 of the CA nullified the Order dated September 28, 2001 of the RTC and not the latter's Order dated October 16, 2001, the contents of the two Orders are the same.

Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in the prayer contained in the same petition, one of the reliefs sought by petitioners is the confirmation of the undated decision of the CA and to disqualify Atty. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan from acting as a receiver. As correctly observed by respondents,^[16] petitioners pointed vaguely to the said decision of the CA, which is not the Resolution of the CA being questioned by petitioners. This, therefore, leads into an unnecessary confusion as to the true nature of the petition filed by petitioners.

It is also apparent that while petitioners stated in the first paragraph of the sub-heading Grounds Relied upon for the Allowance of the Instant Petition that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction which is proper for the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the other grounds stated in the sub-paragraphs show the contrary, thus: 

x x x x 

a.) First, the respondent Court of Appeals failed to issue a clarificatory Order nullifying the blatant and barefaced defiance committed by the Court a quo in issuing the Order of October 16, 2001, which directly contravenes the restraining order issued by the respondent Court of Appeals and the decision which is clearly and unequivocally ordered Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan to refrain from assuming Receivership over the property in question; 

b.) Second, the respondent Court of Appeals failed to cite for direct contempt both Atty. Mercedes Gatmaytan and Atty. Sergio F. Angeles for forcibly taking possession of petitioner's property in direct contravention of the clear mandate and disposition rendered in its resolution dated November 15, 2001 (Annex �K"' hereof) and decision dated November 13, 2001 (Annex "I� hereof); 

c.) Third, the Honorable Court of Appeals in its questioned Resolution (Annex �N� hereof) cited the subsequent Order of Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., causing confusion, but failed to nullify these subsequent Order which fraudulently and deceptively defied the authority and jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of Appeals, and particularly disobeyed the decision of this Honorable Court of Appeals dated November 13, 2001.

It clearly appears from the above that petitioners' allegations are more apt to be raised in a petition for mandamus or in an administrative case and not in a petition for certiorari. Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedures reads as follows: 

Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.^[17]  It cannot be legally used for any other purpose. Its function is only to keep the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.^[18]  It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged in the petition and established: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[19] Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.^[20] Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.^[21]

In challenging the Resolution dated September 10, 2002 of the CA for its refusal to act on several other motions, petitioners should have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus.^[22] As extensively discussed in Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee,^[23] mandamus  is appropriate in the following: 

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. 

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/realtor from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the realtor, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. 

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus  cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus  will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus  lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. 

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus  lies in the sound discretion of the court.^[24]

However, neither the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 nor a petition for mandamus can be availed of in the present case, because of the availability of another remedy. Petitioners should be aware of the dispositive portion of the CA's Resolution dated September 10, 2002, which they seek to nullify. It reads: 

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion to Cite for Contempt of Court Attys. Sergio Angeles and Mercedes Gatmaytan is DENIED and this incident is considered closed. 

SO ORDERED.

Necessarily, the petition filed should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as it seeks to reverse the Resolution dated September 10, 2002 of the CA which denied petitioners' Motion to Cite for Contempt of Court Atty. Sergio F. Angeles and Atty. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan. A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 will not cure a failure to timely file a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45. Nor can it be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.^[25]  cralaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, dated September 27, 2002 of petitioners Gloria Reyes Paulino and Anatalia Reyes , is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.  

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

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^[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Sergio L. Pesta�o, concurring.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 40-46. 

^[3] Id. at 51-52.

^[4] Id. at 53-61. 

^[5] Penned by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.; id. at 62-69. 

^[6] Rollo, pp. 70-74. 

^[7] Id. at 75. 

^[8] Id. at 76-78. 

^[9] Id. at 79. 

^[10] Id. at 80-103. 

^[11] Id. at 105-106. 

^[12] Id. at 107. 

^[13] Id. at 108-117. 

^[14]Id. at 124-125. 

^[15] Id. at 119-123. 

^[16] Id. 

^[17] Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 479. 

^[18] Id. at 480, citing Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527 (1986). 

^[19] Id., citing Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159 (1998). 

^[20] Id., citing Couriers v. City of Knoxville, 189 S.W. 870 (1916). 

^[21] Id., citing Martin, Rules of Court of the Philippines, 2nd ed., Vol. 3, p. 152 (1969). 

^[22] Petitions for Mandamus  are governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Section 3 of which provides:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

^[23] G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 211.

^[24] Id. at 216-220. (Citations omitted.)

^[25] National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129169, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 255, 265.