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Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan's The Labor Code of the Philippines, Annotated Labor Standards & Social Legislation Volume I of a 3-Volume Series 2019 Edition (3rd Revised Edition)
 

 
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

 
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

   
May-1949 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. L-1674 May 9, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PABLO SOMERA

    083 Phil 548

  • G.R. No. L-1765 May 9, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MARIO TANDUG

    083 Phil 551

  • G.R. No. L-1881 May 9, 1949 - MANILA TERMINAL COMPANY v. LA CORTE DE RELACIONES INDUSTRIALES

    083 Phil 559

  • G.R. No. L-1512 May 12, 1949 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. FEDERICO

    083 Phil 569

  • G.R. No. L-1900 May 12, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALFREDO LACSON

    083 Phil 574

  • G.R. No. L-2064 May 12, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ELIGIO TORRES

    083 Phil 595

  • G.R. No. L-1769 May 13, 1949 - PURITA PANAGUITON v. FLORENTINO PATUBO

    083 Phil 605

  • G.R. No. L-1833 May 13, 1949 - MEDARDO MUÑOZ v. EMILIO RILLORAZA

    083 Phil 609

  • G.R. No. L-792 May 14, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. E.C. CAÑADA

    083 Phil 612

  • G.R. No. L-1429 May 16, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RICARDO AQUINO Y ABALOS

    083 Phil 614

  • G.R. No. L-1950 May 16, 1949 - LAO SENG HIAN v. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ

    083 Phil 617

  • G.R. No. L-2014 May 16, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. BENJAMIN Z. YELO

    083 Phil 618

  • G.R. No. L-1212 May 18, 1949 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. CELESTINO BASA Y OTROS

    083 Phil 622

  • G.R. No. L-1918 May 18, 1949 - PEDRO L. FLORES v. PERFECTO R. PALACIO

    083 Phil 626

  • G.R. No. L-2484 May 18, 1949 - LEE KO v. DIONISIO DE LEON

    083 Phil 628

  • G.R. No. L-2117 May 19, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. APOLONIO SOMBILON

    083 Phil 631

  • G.R. No. L-1471 May 20, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JULIAN ORAZA

    083 Phil 633

  • G.R. No. L-1917 May 20, 1949 - CATALINO MAGLASANG v. CIRILO C. MACEREN

    083 Phil 637

  • G.R. No. L-2245 May 20, 1949 - AMBROSIO CARBUNGCO v. RAFAEL AMPARO

    083 Phil 638

  • G.R. No. L-2831 May 20, 1949 - BERNARDO TORRES v. MAMERTO S. RIBO

    083 Phil 642

  • G.R. No. L-432 May 23, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. IGNACIO CALINAWAN

    083 Phil 647

  • G.R. No. L-1795-6 May 23, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PEDRO VALDEZ

    083 Phil 650

  • G.R. No. L-1989 May 23, 1949 - JOSE REYES y RAMIREZ v. EL TRIBUNAL DE APELACION

    083 Phil 658

  • G.R. No. L-2203 May 23, 1949 - SAN MIGUEL BREWERY v. LA CORTE DE RELACIONES INDUSTRIALES

    083 Phil 663

  • G.R. No. L-2431 May 23, 1949 - CEFERINO TAVORA v. PEDRO OFIANA

    083 Phil 672

  • G.R. No. 213 May 24, 1949 - GENEROSA A. DIA v. FINANCE & MINING INVESTMENT CORP.

    083 Phil 675

  • G.R. No. L-1700 May 24, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LORENZO MINTU

    083 Phil 678

  • G.R. No. L-2004 May 24, 1949 - PABLO COTAOCO v. RAFAEL DINGLASAN

    083 Phil 681

  • G.R. No. L-2251 May 24, 1949 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. ELISA TANDAG

    083 Phil 683

  • G.R. No. L-1980 May 25, 1949 - CIPRIANO SEVILLA v. CEFERINO DE LOS SANTOS

    083 Phil 686

  • G.R. No. L-944 May 26, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FAUSTO AVILA

    083 Phil 687

  • G.R. No. L-1823 May 26, 1949 - GERONIMO DE LOS REYES v. ARTEMIO ELEPAÑO

    083 Phil 691

  • G.R. No. L-1825 May 26, 1949 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. EUGENIO BERSIDA

    083 Phil 696

  • G.R. No. L-2022 May 26, 1949 - GUIA S. J0SE DE BAYER v. ERNESTO OPPEN

    083 Phil 700

  • G.R. No. L-2161 May 26, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JAMES YOUNG

    083 Phil 702

  • G.R. No. L-2323 May 26, 1949 - M. A. ZARCAL v. S. HERRERO

    083 Phil 711

  • G.R. Nos. L-675 & L-676 May 27, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. NEMESIO LASTIMOSO

    083 Phil 714

  • G.R. No. L-1274 May 27, 1949 - PHIL. TRANSIT ASSN. v. TREASURER OF MANILA

    083 Phil 722

  • G.R. No. L-1394 May 27, 1949 - RAFAEL ROA YROSTORZA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

    083 Phil 727

  • G.R. No. L-1861 May 27, 1949 - RIZAL SURETY AND INSURANCE CO. v. BIENVENIDO A. TAN

    083 Phil 732

  • G.R. No. L-1869 May 27, 1949 - JOSE PIO BARRETTO v. N. ALMEDA LOPEZ

    083 Phil 734

  • G.R. No. L-2300 May 27, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MARCELINO TUMAOB

    083 Phil 738

  • G.R. No. L-2382 May 27, 1949 - PABLO S. RIVERA v. FRANCISCO ARELLANO

    083 Phil 744

  • G.R. No. L-1606 May 28, 1949 - IN RE: YEE BO MANN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

    083 Phil 749

  • G.R. No. L-2309 May 28, 1949 - LOPE SARREAL v. SOTERO RODAS

    083 Phil 751

  • G.R. No. L-2518 May 28, 1949 - DONATA OLIVEROS DE TAN v. ENGRACIO FABRE

    083 Phil 755

  • G.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949 - JOSE P. MONSALE v. PAULINO M. NICO

    083 Phil 758

  • G.R. No. L-1511 May 30, 1949 - MIGUEL OJO v. JOSE V. JAMITO

    083 Phil 764

  • G.R. No. L-1550 May 30, 1949 - IN RE: FREDERICK EDWARD GILBERT ZUELLIG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

    083 Phil 768

  • G.R. No. L-1609 May 30, 1949 - REMIGIO M. PEÑA v. FRANCISCO ARELLANO

    083 Phil 773

  • G.R. No. L-1686 May 30, 1949 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. SANTOS TOLEDO

    083 Phil 777

  • G.R. No. L-1723 May 30, 1949 - LUZ MARQUEZ DE SANDOVAL v. VICENTE SANTIAGO

    083 Phil 784

  • G.R. No. L-1978 May 30, 1949 - EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. ANTONIO ORCULLO Y OTROS

    083 Phil 787

  • G.R. No. L-1996 May 30, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. SALIP JULMAIN

    083 Phil 793

  • G.R. No. L-2031 May 30, 1949 - HERMOGENES C. LIM v. RESTITUTO L. CALAGUAS

    083 Phil 796

  • G.R. No. L-2069 May 30, 1949 - LUZON BROKERAGE CO. v. LUZON LABOR UNION

    083 Phil 801

  • G.R. No. L-2083 May 30, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. SALVADOR MALIG

    083 Phil 804

  • G.R. No. L-2098 May 30, 1949 - PIO MARQUEZ v. ARSENIO PRODIGALIDAD

    083 Phil 813

  • G.R. No. L-2099 May 30, 1949 - JOSE ONG v. BIENVENIDO A. TAN

    083 Phil 834

  • G.R. No. L-2130 May 30, 1949 - FRANCISCO SANCHEZ v. PEDRO SERRANO

    083 Phil 838

  • G.R. No. L-2132 May 30, 1949 - JUAN SAVINADA v. J. M. TUASON & CO.

    083 Phil 840

  • G.R. No. 49102 May 30, 1949 - W.C. OGAN v. BIBIANO L. MEER

    083 Phil 844

  • G.R. No. L-1104 May 31, 1949 - EASTERN THEATRICAL CO. v. VICTOR ALFONSO

    083 Phil 852

  • G.R. Nos. L-1264 & L-1265 May 31, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. TIMOTEO SAGARIO

    083 Phil 862

  • G.R. No. L-1271 May 31, 1949 - BENIGNO DEL RIO v. CARLOS PALANCA TANGUINLAY

    083 Phil 867

  • G.R. No. L-1281 May 31, 1949 - JOSEPH E. ICARD v. CITY COUNCIL OF BAGUIO

    083 Phil 870

  • G.R. No. L-1298 May 31, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PEDRO SANTOS BALINGIT

    083 Phil 877

  • G.R. No. L-1299 May 31, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JACOB J. LOEWINSOHN

    083 Phil 882

  • G.R. No. L-1827 May 31, 1949 - ALFREDO CATOLICO v. IRINEO RANJO

    083 Phil 885

  • G.R. No. L-1927 May 31, 1949 - CRISTOBAL ROÑO v. JOSE L. GOMEZ

    083 Phil 890

  • G.R. No. L-1952 May 31, 1949 - FRANCISCO R. VlLLAROMAN v. FLORENTINO J. TECHICO

    083 Phil 901

  • G.R. No. L-2108 May 31, 1949 - PAMPANGA BUS CO. v. LUIS G. ABLAZA

    083 Phil 905

  • G.R. No. L-2252 May 31, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. BARTOLOME BEDIA

    083 Phil 909

  • G.R. No. L-2253 May 31, 1949 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. SERVANDO MANIEGO

    083 Phil 916

  • G.R. No. L-2283 May 31, 1949 - MARINA TAYZON and FLORDELIZA G. ANGELES v. RAMON YCASIANO

    083 Phil 921

  • G.R. No. L-2326 May 31, 1949 - FERNANDO ALEJO v. MARIANO GARCHITORENA

    083 Phil 924

  • G.R. No. L-2351 May 31, 1949 - FRANCISCO ARGOS v. DOMINADOR VELOSO

    083 Phil 929

  • G.R. No. L-2377 May 31, 1949 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. JUSTA G. VDA. DE GUIDO

    083 Phil 934

  • G.R. No. L-2450 May 31, 1949 - VERONICA RUPERTO v. CEFERINO FERNANDO

    083 Phil 943

  •  





     
     

    G.R. No. L-2351   May 31, 1949 - FRANCISCO ARGOS v. DOMINADOR VELOSO<br /><br />083 Phil 929

     
    PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

    FIRST DIVISION

    [G.R. No. L-2351. May 31, 1949.]

    FRANCISCO ARGOS, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR VELOSO, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Respondents.

    Ramon Duterte, Cecilio V. Gillamac & Gaudioso P. Montecillo for Petitioner.

    Lydia Florendo-Veloso and Jose L. Blanco for respondent Veloso.

    Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondent Secretary of Justice.

    SYLLABUS


    PUBLIC OFFICERS; REINSTATEMENT; FAILURE TO INSTITUTE THE ACTION WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE CAUSE OF OUSTER; ABANDONMENT OF THE OFFICE. — Petitioner’s action cannot prosper, not only because he failed to institute it within one year from the date he was allegedly dispossessed of his lawful position, (even assuming October 15, 1946, to be such date, and not June 18, 1945, when he was first by G. S. G.) , but because his subsequent acts showed abandonment of the office, it appearing that from October 29, 1946, to January 24, 1948, he worked in the Surplus Property Commission as skilled laborer and clerk-typist, and that on February 12, 1947, he surrendered his policies to the Government Service Insurance System and received their cash value. It is not pretended that the petitioner could perform the duties of the justice of the peace of Opon while he was in the employ of the Surplus Property Commission. Our decision in Floresca v. Quetulio. (82 Phil., 128), and Potot v. Bagano, (82 Phil., 679), are in point. The fact that "petitioner was forced to seek or accept these jobs in order to live would not alter the case even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that economic necessity was a valid plea."


    D E C I S I O N


    PARAS, J.:


    The petitioner was the pre-war justice of the peace of the municipality of Opon, Province of Cebu. After the liberation, or on April 10, 1945, he resumed his position under a verbal temporary appointment made by the commanding officer of PCAU 15. The petitioner was thereafter replaced, first, by Gregorio S. Gochoco on June 18, 1945; secondly, by Bonifacio Yuson on September 1, 1946; and lastly, by the respondent Dominador Veloso on October 15, 1946. In the present action for quo warranto, instituted originally in this Court only on July 12, 1948, the petitioner seeks to obtain his reinstatement to his former judicial position, with the consequent ouster therefrom of respondent Dominador Veloso.

    The respondents have set up the defenses of prescription and abandonment, which are valid. In Abeto v. Rodas (82 Phil., 59), we have already given effect to Rule of Court 68, section 16, which provides that "Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed to authorize an action. . . against an officer for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold office arose; . . ." The petitioner’s contention that the one-year period does not apply to public officers, but to corporations, and cannot affect, at any rate, officers whose tenure is protected by the Constitution, has been overruled in the case of Tumulak v. Egay (82 Phil., 828).

    Petitioner’s action cannot prosper, not only because he failed to institute it within one year from the date he was allegedly dispossessed of his lawful position, (even assuming October 15, 1946, to be such date, and not June 18, 1945, when he was first replaced by Gregorio S. Gochoco), but because his subsequent acts showed abandonment of the office, it appearing that from October 29, 1946, to January 24, 1948, he worked in the Surplus Property Commission as skilled laborer and clerk-typist, and that on February 12, 1947, he surrendered his policies to the Government Service Insurance System and received their cash value. It is not pretended that the petitioner could perform the duties of the justice of the peace of Opon while he was in the employ of the Surplus Property Commission. Our decisions in Floresca v. Quetulio (82 Phil., 128), and Potot v. Bagano (82 Phil., 679), are in point. The fact that "petitioner was forced to seek or accept these jobs in order to live would not alter the case even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that economic necessity was a valid plea."cralaw virtua1aw library

    The petition is therefore dismissed, with costs. So ordered.

    Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

    Separate Opinions


    FERIA, J., dissenting and concurring in the result:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    I dissent from the decision of the majority in that it holds that the petitioner has abandoned or vacated his office, for having, from October 29, 1946, to January 24, 1948, "worked in the Surplus Property Commission as skilled laborer and clerk-typist," because, as the decision says, "It is not pretended that the petitioner could perform the duties of the Justice of the Peace of Opon while he was in the employ of the Surplus Property Commission. Our decision in Floresca v. Quetulio (82 Phil., 128), and Potot v. Bagano (82 Phil., 679), are in point."cralaw virtua1aw library

    The rule applied by the majority in order to arrive at that conclusion is the well known common law rule that he who while occupying an office accepts another incompatible with the first ipso facto vacates the first office, and that incompatibility "which shall operate to vacate the first office, exists where the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper from considerations of public policy for one person to retain both" (Mechem on Public Officers, sections 420 and 422). This rule is quoted with approval in the decision of the majority in the case of Summers v. Ozaeta (81 Phil., 754), penned by the same member of this Supreme Court who pens the decision of the majority in the present case.

    The application of the above-quoted rule to the case at bar is due to an evident misconception of said rule by the majority and confusion of the nature of an office as contradistinguished from a mere employment "An important characteristic which ordinarily distinguishes an office from an employment or contract lies in the fact that the creation of an office involves a delegation to the person filling the office of some part of the sovereign power or functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public" (46 C. J., p. 928). It is self-evident that the office of justice of the peace is a public office, while the work of a skilled laborer or clerk-typist in the Surplus Property Commission is a mere employment. The rule refers clearly and expressly to an acceptance by a person who is occupying a public office of another incompatible office, not of an employment. Because there can not be an incompatibility of the nature and duties of a public office and those of an employment, for an employee dose not exercise any authority or public function or duty which may be incompatible with that of a public officer or justice of the peace. "The term ’public office’ embraces the ideas of tenure and of duration or continuance; hence, an important distinguishing characteristic of an officer is that the duties to be performed by him are of a permanent character as opposed to duties which are occasional, transient, and incidental," as those of a skilled laborer and clerk-typist. (46 C. J., p. 929.)

    A public officer who, while occupying, accepts another office which is not incompatible with that he is occupying in the sense above stated by Mechem, that is, that the nature and duties of his offices are not such as to render it improper from considerations of public policy for a person to retain both, or who accepts a mere employment, does not vacate ipso facto the first office he is occupying. The fact that, by such acceptance, he could not physically devote all his time required by law for the performance of the duties of his office, if he has to devote part of his time to the performance of the duties of the other office, or to the works for which he is employed, may be a sufficient reason for requiring him to leave the one or the other, or for requiring him for cause if he does not do so. But it can not be considered as an implied voluntary resignation of the first office he is occupying.

    "At common law the holding of one office does not of itself disqualify the incumbent from holding another office at the same time, provided there is no inconsistency in the functions of the two office in questions. But where the functions of two offices are inconsistent, they are regarded as incompatible. The inconsistency, which at common law makes offices incompatible, does not consist in the physical impossibility to discharge the duties of both offices, but lies rather in a conflict of interest, as where one is subordinate to the other and subject in some degree to the supervisory power of its incumbent, or where the incumbent of one of the offices has the power to remove the incumbent of the other or to audit the accounts of the other. The question of incompatibility does not arise when one of the positions is an office and the other is merely an employment." (46 C. J., pp. 941-943.)

    Besides in the present case, the justice of the peace is not required to devote all his time to the works of his office, and he may even practice law if he is a lawyer with the permission of the Court of First Instance.

    I concur with the majority in dismissing the action of the petitioner on the ground that it is barred by the special statute of limitation provided for in section 16, Rule 68, alleged by the respondent in his answer, not on the strength of the ruling in the decision of the majority in Abeto v. Rodas (82 Phil., 59), cited in the decision, in which it was held by the majority that it is not necessary to allege, as a defense, that the period of one year fixed as a limitation of action expressly by said section 16 had already expired, for said period is not a limitation of action but a condition precedent; but in accordance with my dissenting opinions in said case of Abeto v. Rodas and in the case of Tumulak v. Egay (82 Phil., 828), in which I maintained that said period of one year is a period of limitation that must be set up as a defense, otherwise it shall be deemed waived, and the very recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Martinez v. Ozaeta, 1 G. R. No. L-2430; and of Tavora v. Ofiana (83 Phil., 672), in which the said ruling in Abeto v. Rodas was practically revoked and this Court considered said period as a limitation of action to be alleged by the Respondent.

    PERFECTO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

    We agree with the reasons given in the opinion of Mr. Justice Feria in support of the theory that petitioner had not forfeited his right to continue occupying his pre-war position as justice of the peace of Opon, Cebu.

    Not having forfeited his right to occupy the position, the fact that petitioner filed his petition more than a year after the cause of his ouster had arisen, do not deprive him of the right to be restored, the provisions of section 16 of Rule 68 notwithstanding. Regarding the application of said provisions, we stick to the opinion we have already advanced in several cases, especially in those of Summers (81 Phil., 754) and Abeto (82 Phil., 59).

    Endnotes:



    1. Unreported; Prom. May 19, 1949.

    G.R. No. L-2351   May 31, 1949 - FRANCISCO ARGOS v. DOMINADOR VELOSO<br /><br />083 Phil 929


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