Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions

G.R. No. 189217 (MARICRIS SALINAS v. FRANCISCO L. BEECH and ELEONOR H. ESCUETA).. - In resolving petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated April 4, 2011 of this Court's Resolution dated January 31, 2011, it is but proper to state the antecedent facts which are the following:

Petitioner Maricris Salinas filed a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003) against respondents Francisco Beech and Eleonor Escueta. Finding the existence of probable cause, the State Prosecutor filed an Information against the respondents for violation of Section 4 (a), in relation to Section 3 (a) and Section 10 of the said law before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Aggrieved by the filing of the Information, respondents filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the State Prosecutor's previous disposition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the DOJ, but the same was denied.

Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Information before the RTC on the ground that the DOJ Secretary has already reversed and set aside the Resolution of the State Prosecutor finding probable cause against respondents for the filing of the subject information.

In its Decision, the RTC denied respondents' Motion to Withdraw Information on the following grounds: (1) that probable cause actually exists to indict the accused for Trafficking in Person under Section 4 (a), in relation to Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9208; and (2) that the court is not bound by the resolution of the DOJ because the issue is still discretionary upon the court.

On appeal made by the respondents, the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled and set aside the Orders of the RTC and dismissed the criminal complaint against respondents on the ground that no probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an Information for violation of R.A. 9208 against respondents. The CA reasoned that no evidence exists showing that petitioner was recruited by respondents for the purpose of exploitation or prostitution.

Unable to accept the findings of the CA, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court assailing the decision of the CA. This Court denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision contending that the DOJ, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors, is entrusted with the determination of whether probable cause exists as to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused.

On March 23, 2011, this Court received a notice from the Clerk of Court that it received the separate letters dated February 3, 2011 of the CA and February 21, 2011 of the RTC transmitting the CA rollo and the entire records of the criminal case, respectively, to this Court.

On April 5, 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution of this Court dated January 31, 2011.

A cursory reading of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration shows that it contains the same arguments that she raised in her petition. Again, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the CA.

The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.^[1] The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court is well settled.^[2]

This power of review, however, does not preclude this Court and the Court of Appeals from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJ's findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.^[3]

Indeed, as this Court ruled in Chua v. Padillo,^[4] not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case.^[5]

In this particular case, it must be remembered that after the review of the Secretary of Justice, the latter found no probable cause to indict the respondents; hence, the filing of the Motion to Withdraw the Information. As the Court pointed out in Guy v. Asia United Bank,^[6] the Secretary of Justice would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence warrants the filing of the action in court.^[7]

Nevertheless, the petitioner now questions the findings of the CA that there exists no probable cause in this case. The CA, and even this Court, may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.^[8]  The factual findings of the CA are no different from those of the Secretary of Justice and this Court finds no reason to disturb the said facts as found by the appellate court.

Furthermore, this Court finds that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to appeal with this Court by petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the CA's dismissal of the criminal action without the conformity and participation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). This Court notes that the OSG has no participation whatsoever in the appeal of this case, which is not for the protection of the petitioner's pecuniary interest but for the eventual reinstatement of the criminal action dismissed by the CA for lack of probable cause. Hence, the recent case of Dacer v. Lacson^[9] is applicable, wherein this Court resolved that: 

Section 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court dictates that all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor; hence, any private prosecutor assisting the private offended party upon the civil aspect comes under the public prosecutor's authority. Yet, although the Rules of Court so permit the offended party to take part in the prosecution of a criminal action, and in certain instances on appeal from the order or judgment of the courts in a criminal action, the permission to take part is true only where the party injured has to protect his pecuniary interest as part of the civil liability of the accused. 

Here, however, the petitioners do not appeal to protect their pecuniary interest as offended parties of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against Senator Lacson that the CA had dismissed on the ground that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against Senator Lacson. As such, they have no right to the recourse, because the right exclusively pertained to the OSG in behalf of the People of the Philippines.^[10] Indeed, we have ruled in a number of cases^[11] that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or may represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings before the Court and the CA.^[12]

Again, petitioner, who is the private offended party, has no interest to assail the decision of the CA dismissing the criminal case which did not, in any way, affect the civil aspect of the same case.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.  

SO ORDERED. 

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

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^[1] Tan v. Ballena, G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 229, citing Rules of Court, Rule 112, Sec. 4, last paragraph.

^[2] Solar Team Entertainment, Inc., v. How, 393 Phil. 172, 178 (2000), citing Dimatulac v. Villon, G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 679, Roberts v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996, 254 SCRA 307, Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106695, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 39, and Crespo v. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462. 

^[3] Tan v. Ballena, supra note 1, at 252, citing Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA 318, 335, citing Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 208 and Salonga v. Cruz-Pa�o, No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438. 

^[4] G.R. No. 163797, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 60. 

^[5] Id. at 69, citing Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1983, 227 SCRA 627. 

^[6] G.R No. 174874, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 703. 

^[7] Id. at 713-714, citing Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 599, 616. 

^[8] Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 616 (1996), citing Salonga v. Cruz-Pa�o, supra note 3. 

^[9] Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 196209, June 8, 2011. 

^[10] Ricafort v. Fernan, No. L-9789, May 25, 1957, 101 SCRA 575, 579-560. 

^[11]  Among them, Heirs of Federico C. Delgado v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 503, 524; Carina v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688; Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384 Phil. 322 (2000); Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111267, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 219; People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 80845, March 14, 1994, 231 SCRA 264; People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155; People v. Calo, Jr., G.R. No. 88531, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA 620; People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 750. 

^[12]  Dacer v. Lacson, supra note 9. (Emphasis supplied.)